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ABSTRACT
Limited development offers the hope of turning market
development pressure which threatens open land into a means
for financing its protection. In theory, the profit from
developing a small portion of a parcel can be used to sub-
sidize the protection of the remainder. This thesis critic-
ally examines the financial, institutional, and agricultural
effectiveness of limited development as a tool for protect-
ing farmland.
An alternative accounting methodology is proposed which
expresses cash flows as sources and uses of subsidies for
the support of non-market land uses, allowing comparison of
limited development and traditional tools for financing land
conservation. The model also attempts to determine the
extent to which limited development profits are due to en-
hancement of development land value by the restriction of
adjacent open space, market appreciation in real estate
prices, and deal-making and subdivision of land. The model
assumes the perspective of a non-profit limited developer.
The model is then applied to three Massachusetts case
studies of farmland preservation through limited develop-
ment. The agricultural viability of the protected farmland
is briefly examined in each case study.
The thesis concludes that limited development often
provides only a minor supplement to public subsidy programs
and private contributions in the protection of farmland,
although it can supply significant subsidies in some cases.
Furthermore, limited development can put a non-profit into
the awkward and risky role of a for-profit developer. Agri-
culturally, limited development leaves small farm parcels
adjacent to residential use. While not ideal, such a
pattern is typical of metropolitan areas, and one to which
some farmers have successfully adapted.
Thesis Supervisor: Phillip B. Herr
Title: Adjunct Professor
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
In the face of increasing need and cost to protect land
of agricultural or natural resource value, limited
development is being held out as one alternative to public
subsidies or private contributions for financing land and
resource protection. Limited development is, in the words
of one of its foremost practitioners, on the "cutting edge"
of land conservation.1
The allure of limited development is that it can
provide a market-driven mechanism for financing the purchase
of resource land. In theory, the profits from developing
only a portion of a property can pay for the purchase and
permanent protection of the remainder of the property.
There is tremendous appeal in this idea that the market
forces that make land conservation necessary can also make
it possible.
Others see in limited development a way to reconcile
competing public demands for dwindling and increasingly
expensive undeveloped land, including agriculture, open
space, and affordable housing.
This thesis is an attempt to critically examine the
'Davis Cherington, "Public and Private Acquisition
Strategies," presentation at "Planning for the Changing
Rural Landscape of New England: Blending Theory and
Practice," conference sponsored by Center for Rural
Massachusetts, Durham, N.H., November 17, 1987.
1
effectiveness of limited development as a tool for land
protection, specifically for the protection of viable
agricultural land in three Massachusetts case studies.
Because limited development is primarily a financial tool,
the bulk of this thesis is a financial analysis of these
case studies.
Limited development can at times live up to its
promise: it can provide a replacement for public subsidies
and private contributions. More often, I have concluded, it
provides only a marginal supplement to traditional methods
of financing land protection, and places non-profit
conservation groups in the often uncomfortable and risk-
laden role of a for-profit developer. From a public policy
perspective, I believe limited development cannot eliminate
or significantly reduce the need for direct public or
private assistance, or public policy initiatives to conserve
land.
DEFINING LIMITED DEVELOPMENT
Limited development, also known as partial development,
creative land development, and compromise development, has
come to mean many things. It has been applied to a range of
situations, from simply subdividing an existing house lot
from a farm for sale, to cluster development bylaws which
provide density incentives. It is important to carefully
define limited development in order to identify the
2
questions which must be addressed in this thesis.
The essence of limited development is that it is
"limited"--that the site is developed at less than its legal
capacity. This frames the basic question about limited
development: Who is paying for the forgone development
potential of the land? Put another way, who is paying for
the public good of protecting land?
In order for land to be developed less than is legally
allowed, some person or entity--the seller, the purchaser, a
government or other outside body--must be willing to pay for
or subsidize the protection of land. Limited development
offers the hope that the limited developer will pay for
protection of the undeveloped portion of the site with the
profit earned by developing the other portion.
In this sense limited development is not cluster
zoning, which typically allows the same or greater density
of development on a site, but allows or requires it to be
concentrated on one section of the site in order to maintain
the remainder as open land. Although cluster development
can achieve some of the same objectives, it presents a
different array of questions and policy concerns.
That the site is being developed at less than its legal
capacity also distinguishes limited development from a
subdivision in which unbuildable land is "protected." In
such a case, the developer has not forgone any development
potential.
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A second component of limited development is that it is
permanently limited. In other words, the undeveloped land
must be permanently protected from future development,
normally through a deed restriction. The farmer who sells
off a house lot has not protected the remainder of the farm,
which can still be developed.
For the purposes of this thesis, I will also draw a
distinction between development which is limited only by
reducing the amount of development, rather than by setting
aside a portion of the land for public access or use, or
some publicly supported objective such as agricultural
preservation. In this sense, limited development is not
simply reduction of the density of a development. Thirty-
acre house lots are still house lots, and are, although at a
lower density, developed.
For the purposes of this thesis, limited development is
examined only as it is practiced by non-profit conservation
organizations. Although for-profit developers can, and
sometimes do, undertake limited development, theirs is
necessarily a different approach that raises different
concerns.
LIMITED DEVELOPMENT AND AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION
As a tool for the preservation of viable agricultural
activity, limited development offers the hope of filling the
often substantial gap between the value of land for
4
development and what a farmer can pay for it from
agricultural income.
Limited development can prove problematic in the
protection of farmland, however. Conflicts between
residential and agricultural use are common complaints by
farmers in metropolitan areas. The potential for these
conflicts are imbedded in agricultural limited development,
which places residential use in close proximity to protected
farmland. In addition, the conservation mission of many
limited developers can sometimes be in subtle conflict with
the agricultural preservation goals of a specific project.
Why Preserve Agriculture?
The intent of this thesis is not to justify the
preservation of agricultural activity or the protection of
farmland. Rather, it is an attempt to assess the
effectiveness of one tool for agricultural preservation. In
approaching limited development from the perspective of non-
profit limited developers, I am assuming, rather than
questioning, the validity of their underlying motivation.
Several basic arguments are usually made in support of
agricultural preservation:
* Self-sufficiency in food production, both
nationally and regionally. The continuing and
largely permanent conversion of prime farmland to
non-agricultural use raises the specter, albeit a
distant one, of a nation unable to feed itself.
* Continued local production of food, providing
higher quality, fresher food.
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* Maintenance of an agricultural, rural lifestyle
as viable alternative to urban life.
* Preservation of the rural landscape.2
Although often minimized, the latter two bases for
farmland preservation are often very strong. There is an
often deeply felt need to perpetuate what one writer calls
the "garden image" of America, an image which links our
self-perception as individualists to the landscape around
us. To the few for whom this is not just an image but a
lifestyle, there is very often a strong ethic attached to
farming that is apparent in the frequent willingness of
farmers to sell their land for far less than its full value
to ensure that it will continue to be farmed actively.
Approaches to Agricultural Preservation
There are two basic approaches to the preservation of
farming. The first is an attempt to maintain the
availability and affordability of the resource base of
agricultural land. Programs to accomplish this fall into
two categories:
2 Robert E. Coughlin, et al, Saving the Garden: The
Preservation of Farmland and Other environmentally Valuable
Land, Philadelphia: Regional Science Research Institute,
(1977), p. 1; Robert E. Coughlin and John C. Keene, eds.,
The Protection of Farmland: A Reference Guidebook for State
and Local Governments, Washington D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, (1981), p. 16; Rink Dickinson, Revitalizing
Farmland in Massachusetts: An Analysis of the Development
Rights Program, Cambridge, Mass.: unpublished M.I.T. Master
of City Planning Thesis (1986), pp. 1-3.
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* Discouraging the conversion of farmland by
reducing its relative attractiveness for
development, usually by directing development
through metropolitan planning of infrastructure.
* Preventing the conversion of farmland through
zoning, other development controls, purchase of
development rights, or outright purchase and
restriction of land.'
The second basic approach deals not with protecting
land resources, but with improving the financial viability
of farming as an activity and allowing it to better compete
with development for land. Techniques again fall into two
broad categories:
* Reducing costs of farming by offsetting
additional burdens placed on farming by
urbanization, including relief from real estate
taxes, utilities charges, and protection from
public takings of land.*
* Increasing farmers' income through better
distribution and marketing, particularly in
metropolitan areas where direct access to urban
markets can offset some of the pressures put on
farming by urbanization.'
The Loss of Agricultural Land
Regardless of the approach taken, maintaining a base of
land in agricultural use is essential to preserving farming
as an activity, particularly in metropolitan areas. The
'Coughlin and Keene, Protection of Farmland, pp. 37-38.
* Ibid.
'Dickinson, pp. 19-22, 62-63.
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conversion of farmland to non-agricultural activity, for all
intents and purposes--is permanent. While it easy for
farmland to be developed for residential, commercial, or
industrial use, it is difficult to reverse that process and
convert developed land into farmland.
The growth of metropolitan areas since the introduction
of the automobile has put severe pressure on agricultural
land use in metropolitan areas throughout the United States.
Simultaneous changes in the technology of transporting
agricultural products--refrigeration and the advent of the
interstate highway system--have reduced the market advantage
once enjoyed by farmers on the metropolitan fringe. Even
seemingly rural areas beyond the metropolitan fringe can
feel tourist development pressure driven by neighboring
metropolitan areas.
Nationally, 23.4 million acres of agricultural land
were converted to non-agricultural use between 1967 and
1975. The worst-hit region was the Northeast, including New
England, New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.
Of non-federal Northeast land available for agriculture in
1967, 3.3 percent of it had been converted to non
agricultural use eight years later.'
In Massachusetts, the amount of agricultural land
declined from 1.9 million acres in 1940 to 600,000 acres in
1974. At the same time the number of farms in the state
'Coughlin, The Protection of Farmland, p. 32.
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declined from 39,000 to 7,000.'
Difficulty in acquiring and holding land is one of, if
not the, main hurdle to farming in the Northeast. An early
1980's survey--before the steepest escalation in land
prices--rated the rising cost of land as the most critical
issue facing small farmers in the Northeast Region."
Agricultural Preservation in Massachusetts
Agricultural preservation in Massachusetts has made use
of all the basic tools available. In addition to the
marketing efforts of the state's Department of Food and
Agriculture (DFA), public agricultural preservation efforts
in Massachusetts can be broken down into three areas:
relief from taxation, local land use regulation, and the
DFA's purchase of development rights program.
Massachusetts Chapter 61A allows farmers to lower their
real estate tax burden, while providing some disincentives
to conversion of farmland. Farmers who enroll their land
are taxed on the basis of agricultural income from their
property rather than the potential value of the property for
development. The law also provides that when land is
withdrawn from the program, the owner must pay a penalty
which decreases over 10 years, as well as paying all of the
'Dickinson, pp. 8-10.
'Howard W. Kerr, Jr., "Update on Small Farms Survey in
the Northeastern Region," in Research for Small Farms,
Beltsville, Maryland: U.S. Department of Agriculture
(1982), pp. 27-37.
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taxes avoided in the previous five years.
Although it provides cost-savings to enrolled farmers,
Chapter 61A often proves ineffective as barrier to farmland
conversion. In very active real estate markets, paying
withdrawal penalties can become just another component in
the cost of acquiring development land. The reasoning that
voluntary preferential tax assessment programs should be
used to lure farmers into long term commitment of their land
is flawed. If the penalties are severe enough to really
discourage conversion, they will likely discourage
enrollment in the first place.
A number of towns in Massachusetts have attempted to
promote agriculture through local land use regulation.
Tools in use include state-sanctioned creation of
agricultural districts which provide a series of benefits to
farmers, and transfer of development rights (TDR). The
latter attempts to allow farmers to realize the equity in
their land in return for a permanent commitment to
agricultural use. Under a TDR scheme, a farmer can sell the
right to develop his or her farm to a developer, who can
then use the development rights to increase the density
allowed on another site in a designated area. For a TDR
scheme to work, there must be a "market" with a number of
buyers and sellers. Establishing that market within a
single town has proven difficult, and has limited the
effectiveness of municipal TDR in Massachusetts.
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The primary--and most effective public tool for
agricultural preservation in Massachusetts has been the
Agricultural Preservation Restriction (APR) program. Under
the program, the state purchases and retires the development
rights to farmland.' Farmers who sell an APR to the state
are able to realize the equity in their land and continue in
ownership. The APR itself is a deed restriction, preventing
all future owners from developing the farm.
The APR program has been largely successful at
preserving prime agricultural land and creating a market in
affordable agricultural land."* The effort has been
expensive, however. As of October, 1987, about $41 million
had been spent since the program's first purchases in 1979.
The money bought development rights on 219 farms totalling
just under 20,000 acres. The recently passed open space
bond bill included another $30 million in funding for the
APR program."1
The APR program has been increasingly priced out of the
real estate market, particularly in the Boston suburbs. As
development pressure increases on farmland, the development
'The value of the development rights is equal to the
market value of the farmland for development, minus the
value of the land for agriculture (based on capitalized
potential income).
"*Dickinson, pp. 32-60.
"'Interview with Craig Richov, Bureau of Land Use, APR
Program, Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture,
October 23, 1987.
11
value of farmland rises much faster than its agricultural
value, widening the gap that the APR program must fill.
"We're limited in what we can do [within the metropolitan
Boston area]," the Chief of the DFA's Bureau of Land Use
said.12
Private Preservation Efforts and Limited Development
Still another tool for the protection of farmland in
Massachusetts has been the outright purchase of farms by
town conservation commissions, private conservation groups,
and in some instances neighbors. In some cases the land is
then leased to a farmer, in others it is sold with a deed
restriction, effecting a purchase of development rights.
Limited development was born as a method of easing the
financial burden of purchasing conservation land. The town
of Lincoln has been in the forefront of developing
techniques to protect land. A group of citizens concerned
with protecting natural and scenic resources in Lincoln
carried out a "creative land development" project in 1966,
protecting sections of the Wheeler Farm. The project was
the first in an ongoing series that have served as models
for limited development.13
12 Interview with James Alicata, Chief, Bureau of Land
Use, Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture,
December 7, 1987.
"
3 Robert A. Lemire, Creative Land Development, Bridge
to the Future, Lincoln, Mass.: Robert A. Lemire (1979), pp.
55-111.
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The 1970's saw a number of limited developments in the
state. Several farms have been protected on Martha's
Vineyard through the efforts of the town and a local land
trust.1" In two cases, the Lookout Farm in Natick and the
Goodale Orchard in Ipswich, neighbors purchased a farm,
developed portions, and sold the remainder to farmers with
deed restrictions preventing future development."5 In the
1980's, limited development as been turned to other uses as
well. The town of Harvard combined market development,
affordable housing, and farmland protection in a 1985
project."'
The 1980's have also seen the emergence of conservation
groups whose main focus is limited development. The
Massachusetts Farm and Conservation Lands Trust (MFCLT) has
undertaken several limited development projects, including
two of the case study farms examined in this thesis. The
Land Planning and Management Foundation was formed in 1986
by statewide private conservation organizations as an
experimental limited development entity. 7
'*Lemire, pp. 128-130; telephone interview with Mark
Racicot, Director, Vineyard Open Lands Foundation, October
13, 1987.
"
5 Telephone interview with George Mumford, Lookout Farm
Trust, November 24, 1987; telephone interview Max Russell,
Goodale Orchards, Ipswich, September 21, 1987
'"Lemire, p. xv.
"
7 Telephone interview with Wesley Ward, Executive
Director, Massachusetts Farm and Conservation Lands Trust,
October 5, 1987; telephone interview with Davis Cherington,
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The Role of Limited Development
Limited development is a method of financing the
purchase and protection of farmland, and in some rare cases
in providing financial assistance to farm operations.
It is often used, as in the three case studies, in
conjunction with the APR program. In this role, limited
development serves two functions. First, limited
development decreases the amount of land for which an APR is
sought, lowering the cost of protecting the farmland,
ensuring that APR funds are spent only on critical
agricultural land, and lessening the extent to which the
program takes land out of the marketplace.1"
The second function is to supplement the subsidy paid
by the APR, allowing DFA to purchase an APR at a bargain
price. This role is seen by DFA as increasingly important
in the metropolitan Boston area. DFA's Alicata said limited
development is "a means of accomplishing APR's in areas that
are beyond our reach."I"
This second role is the one of greatest concern in this
thesis: does limited development have the potential not
just to limit, but to significantly replace APR subsidies?
OCtober 22, 1987.
*Interview with Craig Richov, Massachusetts Department
of Food and Agriculture, APR Program, October 23, 1987.
1'Alicata interview.
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PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
In this thesis, I have attempted an evaluation of the
effectiveness of non-profit limited development as a tool
for financing the protection of farmland. In addition the
thesis considers the impact of limited development on the
agricultural viability of protected farmland in an
increasingly metropolitan state, and the institutional
implications of limited development for non-profit
organizations.
Chapter II outlines the financial analysis methodology
on which the bulk of the analysis in this thesis rests.
This methodology is an alternative cash accounting model.
It is designed to determine not simply whether a project
will make ends meet, but how it can make ends meet when the
final use of the land cannot produce income enough to
finance the purchase of the land at market prices. The
methodology is intended to answer two questions:
1. Who is paying for the public good of farmland
preservation?
2. How does limited development generate the
"profits" that can help pay for this public good?
This analysis is intended to provide insight into the future
policy role of limited development as an instrument in the
preservation of farmland. In addition, it is intended to
offer insight on strategies for limited development.
The financial analysis assumes the perspective of the
15
limited developer. It does not examine the motivations of
sellers of land or local communities which seek to protect
agricultural land. Although the thesis addresses the
relationship of limited development to the APR program, the
financial analysis of the case studies is as limited
development projects which included APR's, not as APR
projects which included limited development.
The financial analysis, is particularly concerned with
the non-profit limited developer. The non-profit limited
developer typically approaches limited development from a
"make ends meet" point of view. The non-profit limited
developer usually is seeking to meet maximum land protection
goals with a minimum level of development, and often a
minimum return. It is not pursuing limited development to
make money, but to protect land. The financial analysis
methodology described in Chapter II and applied to the three
case studies assumes this point of view.
The for-profit developer, on the other hand, is most
concerned with obtaining the greatest return possible from
an investment. Competition forces the for-profit developer
to maximize its return, at least in theory. Rather than the
"make ends meet" analysis used here, a for-profit developer
uses a cost-benefit approach, comparing potential returns.
This perspective is inappropriate to limited development.
It would evaluate a limited development project in terms of
the potential development income forgone rather than meeting
16
actual costs of acquiring and protecting the land.
Chapters III to V tell the stories of three limited
development projects in Massachusetts, the Barton Farm in
Sudbury (1981-82), the Powisset Farm in Dover (1985-88), and
the Loomis Farm in Ashfield (1985-88). Each chapter
presents a chronology of the limited development project and
considerations it raised, a discussion of its impact on
agricultural viability of the farmland, and a financial
analysis.
Chapter VI uses the case study analyses to draw
conclusions about the financial, agricultural, and
institutional effectiveness of limited development as a tool
for farmland protection.
Financially, it is intended to offer a policy
perspective of limited development, assessing its potential
as a significant vehicle for agricultural preservation as
well as to suggest strategies for limited development.
Institutionally, the conclusion examines the
effectiveness of non-profit organizations as limited
developers and the constraints under which they operate. It
poses the question: is it possible for a single
organization to successfully be both a land conservator and
land consumer?
Agriculturally, the conclusion looks at the viability
of farming in Massachusetts on small dispersed parcels
adjacent to residential uses.
17
Finally, the conclusion offers a broad policy
perspective of the potential role for limited development in
agricultural preservation and land conservation.
18
CHAPTER II: FINANCIAL ANALYSIS
OVERVIEW
Limited development offers the hope that the very
market development forces that threaten agricultural land
can be harnessed to finance its preservation. The financial
analysis in this thesis is designed to examine the extent to
which limited development fulfills this promise.
This thesis proposes a new method of financial
accounting in order to determine not only whether the case
study limited development projects were financially
successful, but why they were successful. It is hoped that
this accounting methodology will help answer two basic
questions about each limited development project:
1. How effective was limited development as a
tool for financing land preservation, and was it
able to supplant or significantly supplement other
tools for financing the preservation of
agricultural land?
2. How did limited development create the
internal "profits" used to finance agricultural
preservation, and under what conditions was it
most effective in doing so?
In addressing the first question, this analysis is
meant to provide a policy perspective for public officials
and private conservation organizations concerned with the
protection of agricultural land. It can help in discerning
19
the future role of limited development and its place in the
array of tools for financing agricultural preservation and
land conservation in general.
In dealing with the second question, this analysis is
intended to provide a better understanding of the financial
structure and potential of limited development and to guide
future strategies for limited developers. This financial
analysis is concerned, in particular, with the non-profit
organization as limited developer.
Limited development also can be viewed from the
perspective of the private seller of resource land which is
used in a limited development project, or from the
perspective of a local community or state concerned with
land protection but not acting as a limited developer. From
both of these perspectives, however, limited development
differs little from traditional land conservation projects.
Neither perspective exposes the internal financial structure
which distinguishes limited development from a simple
purchase of resource land at market or reduced prices.
The financial analysis used is a reconfiguration of
traditional income and expense cash accounting methodology,
which I have called "subsidy source and use." Income and
expense accounting aggregates all income and all expenses
for a project and is primarily intended to determine whether
the project can make ends meet--whether all of the income
can cover all of the expenses.
20
Subsidy source and use accounting, on the other hand,
looks at the net income or net expenses attributable to each
final land use within a limited development project, and at
outside sources of income not based on use of the land. It
is intended to reveal where the resources come from that
allow land to be used in ways, such as farming in most of
Massachusetts, that do not provide enough income to purchase
the land at market prices.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
The Need for a Subsidy
Underlying subsidy source and use accounting is the
need for a subsidy to support land uses which cannot compe
for land at market prices.
In a market economy, the market value of a piece of
land is based on its "highest and best use"--the legally
allowable use which will produce the greatest net income.
The price a buyer is willing to pay for land is the income
from selling the final product of the land's highest and
best use, such as houses or subdivided house lots, minus t
costs of producing the final product, and minus what the
developer considers a reasonable return for the effort and
risks involved. The highest and best use of most farmland
in Massachusetts (and in all three of the case studies) is
residential development.
When land is used in a way, such as farming on most
21
te
he
sites in Massachusetts, that produces less net income than
the highest and best use, there is a gap between what the
"lower," or non-market use can pay for the property based on
income, and the market value of property (see Figure 2-1).
A lower or non-market use of land cannot pay the market
value of the land solely on the basis of income from use of
the land.
For farming in Massachusetts this gap can be quite
wide. The 1986 agricultural value--what a farmer could pay
for land based solely on agricultural income--of farmland in
Massachusetts ranges between $1,000 and $30,000 per acre.'
Because prime farmland in Massachusetts is usually flat,
cleared land near an urban market, it is also prime
development land, and its market value can exceed $100,000
per acre. Farming simply cannot compete in the marketplace
for developable land throughout most of Massachusetts.
In order to use land for a lower or non-market use,
this gap between its economic value for non-market use and
its market value determined by its highest and best use must
be filled. The gap must be filled, in particular, when land
is permanently converted to a non-market use (by a deed
restriction or conservation easement, for instance),
removing any future possibility of realizing the property's
market value.
'U.S. Department of Agriculture, "Land Value Survey
Questionnaire" for each Massachusetts county, photocopied
document from Massachusetts DFA, 1986.
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Figure 2-1: The Need for a Subsidy
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In order for this gap between non-market and
marketvalues to be filled, some person or entity has to
commit economic resources to a non-market use without being
repaid from use of the land--what I am calling a "subsidy."
The purpose of subsidy source and use accounting is to
determine where those uncompensated resources are coming
from: who is giving up money to allow land to be farmed
rather than developed? To answer this, it is important to
distinguish between income from subsidies and income in
general.
Redefining "Subsidy"
In order to compare disparate sources and forms of
uncompensated resources, it is helpful to first broaden the
definition of subsidy. We normally think of a subsidy as "a
grant by a government to a private person or company to
assist an enterprise deemed advantageous to the public."2
For the purposes of this analysis, it is more helpful
to understand a subsidy as a grant not to a person or
entity, but to the "advantageous enterprise"--the non-market
use of land. Rather than subsidizing a farmer, then, one is
subsidizing farming. Rather than subsidizing a purchaser of
conservation land, one is subsidizing the conservation of
land.
It is more helpful, too, to think of subsidies as being
2 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, Springfield,
Mass.: G & C. Merriam Co. (1981), p. 1153.
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granted not only by governments, but also by individuals and
private organizations. Thus, a private conservation
organization or an individual land seller, as well as a town
or state government, can subsidize the protection of
farmland or open space.
Another useful broadening of the definition is to
understand a subsidy not only as a grant of cash, but also
of potential economic resources. Thus a seller's
willingness to forgo income by accepting a lower price for
property (a "bargain sale") can be seen as subsidizing the
non-market use of the property. The federal government's
willingness to forgo income tax revenue by allowing a
charitable contribution deduction for a bargain sale also
constitutes a subsidy, as does a land trust's willingness to
absorb staff costs resulting from a limited development.
What is most important in the definition of a subsidy,
and what distinguishes a subsidy from other sources of
income, is that it is "a grant" given to support what is
essentially a public good (eg. the preservation of
agricultural land or the protection of open space). It is
the use of economic resources without the expectation of
economic compensation, promoting a public purpose. It is
not money invested to obtain an economic return.
Several examples from limited development may help
clarify this point:
Income from the sale of restricted land at its
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agricultural value to a farmer is not a subsidy. The farmer
who purchases the land will be repaid through income from
farming the land. The farmer is not giving away his or her
money, but investing it.
The purchase of an Agricultural Preservation
Restriction is a subsidy because the Department of Food and
Agriculture is not buying something of economic value or
receiving economic compensation. Although in theory the
state is buying development rights to farmland, legally and
politically it cannot use those development rights to recoup
its investment. In reality, the state is not purchasing
development rights, but is purchasing a restriction on the
farmland.
The purchase of open space or conservation land by a
municipality also can be thought of as a subsidy. Although
the town is receiving property in return for its money, it
is politically and legally prevented from using that
property to recoup its expenditure.' Although the town is
not subsidizing a person or entity, purchasing open space
can be thought of as subsidizing the non-market use of land
as open space.
'Although it is often argued that purchasing open space
brings economic returns through increased surrounding land
values and tax revenues, this is a secondary effect of
purchasing the open space. Municipalities generally do not
purchase open space in an effort to increase tax revenues.
These added tax revenues are best thought of as a reduction
in the net cost of purchasing open space, not as a return on
an investment.
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Gross income from the sale of development parcels by a
limited developer is not a subsidy. The builder who buys
those parcels is not giving away money--he or she is
investing in land and will be repaid from the resale of
finished houses.
The limited developer's "profit" from the sale of
development parcels--what is left from sales income after
the cost of the land and development expenses have been
paid--is available to be used as a subsidy, however. This
profit is used in limited development to fill the gap
between the non-market and market values of the non-market
portions of the limited development. The limited developer
is "giving" that profit to the non-market portion of the
project, using those economic resources without economic
compensation.
Modelling Subsidy Flows
Like income and expenses, subsidies are best thought of
as cash flows--money coming from a source and going to a
use. This analysis is an attempt to account for those cash
flows in an effort to determine who is paying for the non-
market use of land, and how.
Both income and expense and subsidy source and use
accounting are based on the same cash income and the same
cash expenses, and thus produce the same "bottom line"
difference between gross income and gross expenses or total
subsidy sources and uses. By accounting for those cash
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flows in different ways, however, income and expense and
subsidy source and use accounting provided different
insights into the financial structure of a limited
development.
Income and Expense
Income and expense accounting breaks a project's income
and expenses down by where the cash actually came from, and
how it was actually spent. All money received is income and
all money spent is expense.
This accounting is inadequate to explain limited
development because it does not show how big the gap between
non-market and market values is, or how it was filled.
Rather, it shows only how gross income meets gross expense.
Furthermore, income and expense accounts for all income
and expenses equally. For instance, it treats $200,000
spent to acquire an agricultural parcel which will need to
be subsidized as the equivalent of $200,000 spent to acquire
a parcel which will be developed and sold at a profit. The
$200,000 spent on the development parcel will not be an
"expense" to the effort to preserve farmland since its
purchase price will be repaid when it is sold.
Similarly, an income and expense analysis treats the
receipt of a $200,000 APR as the equal of selling $200,000
of development land. The APR contributed the entire
$200,000 to the agricultural use of part of the limited
development. The sale of development land, however,
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contributed only the profits that remained after the cost of
acquiring and converting the development parcels was paid.
Subsidy Source and Use
Subsidy source and use accounting isolates the flow of
subsidies--that cash which is used to fill the gap between
the non-market value and market value of the non-market
portions of a limited development project.
Subsidy source and use accounting is perhaps best
understood as a series of income and expense analyses for
the different land uses within a limited development
project. Use of the agricultural portion of the development
for farming cannot pay the market value of the land, so it
creates a net expense, or subsidy use. Similarly, use of
land for open space produces no income to pay the market
value of the land, so it creates a net expense, or subsidy
use.*
Selling a portion of the project for market
development, however, produces net income, and is a source
of subsidy. Payments under the APR program, the purchase of
open space by a municipality, and a buyer's willingness to
sell the land at less than its market value all produce net
income, and are sources of subsidy.
By accounting for cash flows as subsidy sources and
4 Although sale of the land to a town does produce
income, its use as open space does not. Again, for this
analysis, subsidies should be thought of as going to a non-
market use of land, not to the land or its owner.
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uses, it is possible to identify and compare the sources of
subsidies which allow land to be converted to non-market
uses. For each case study, subsidy source and use analysis
allows a comparison of the subsidies from development
profits with those from external sources unrelated to
development of a portion of the project, such as an APR
payment, sale of open space, or a bargain sale. This
comparison gives some measure of the effectiveness of
limited development in internally subsidizing the non-market
use of land through development profits.
In addition, subsidy source and use accounting tries to
account for what created the limited developer's development
profits. This provides some insight into strategies and
market conditions which make limited development most
effective.
Sources of Subsidies
Subsidy sources have been divided into two categories:
"non-development" subsidies which come from external sources
and are not due to sale of part of the site for development;
and "development" subsidies, which are the result of the
sale of development land.
Non-Development Subsidy Sources
Four non-development subsidies have been considered in
this analysis: bargain sale and federal tax subsidy,
Agricultural Preservation Restriction (APR) subsidy, open
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space sale subsidy, and cost subsidy.
Bargain Sale and Federal Tax Subsidy
A bargain sale occurs when the seller of a
property sells it for less than it is worth. By
lowering the price and forgoing potential income, the
seller is providing a subsidy.
Part of this subsidy is actually being provided by
the federal government through foregone income and
capital gains taxes. The difference between the market
value of the land and the actual sale price can be
treated as a charitable contribution which can provide
a federal income tax deduction to the seller, who will
also pay capital gains tax only on the actual sale
price of the property.
Because this analysis is concerned with the
perspective of the limited developer who purchases the
property, these two subsidy sources have not been
calculated separately. Instead, both components are
included together as the "Bargain Sale Subsidy" to the
buyer of the property (see Figure 2-2).
The Bargain Sale Subsidy is equal to the market
value of the land (because the highest and best use of
the land in the case studies was for development, I
have called the market value of the entire parcel the
"Total Development Value") minus the price at which it
was actually sold to the limited developer:
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Figure 2-2: Bargain Sale Subsidy to Buyer
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Bargain Total Sales
Sale Subsidy = Development Value - Price.
APR Subsidy
In theory the purchase of an APR by the
Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture is a
complete subsidy, providing all of the subsidy needed
to support the permanent restriction of agricultural
land. The price the state is willing to pay for an APR
is the difference between the market value (for
development) of the land and its economic value as
agricultural land (capitalized value of potential
agricultural income).
In response to the growing cost of purchasing
development rights, particularly in metropolitan
eastern Massachusetts, however, the APR program has
sought to buy development rights for less than the
difference between fair market value and agricultural
value.'
Because the entire APR payment acts as a subsidy,
the value of the APR Subsidy to a limited developer is
equal to the full payment by the state.
Open Space Sale Subsidy
The purchase of land for use as open space,
'Interview with James Alicata, Chief, Bureau of
Land Use, Massachusetts Department of Food and
Agriculture, December 7, 1987.
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recreation, or conservation land, usually by a town, is
viewed in this analysis as a subsidy to the use of the
land.
It can also be argued that the purchase of open
space by a town is not a subsidy, but represents income
from actual use of the land, paid collectively by the
town's taxpayers. This view of open space purchase is
a useful way of estimating the economic value of the
open space to the townspeople. But it is not useful in
this analysis, the purpose of which is to determine who
is paying for a public good, not the economic value
society collectively places on that public good.
As with the APR Subsidy, the value of the Open
Space Sale Subsidy is equal to the entire purchase
price paid by the town.
Cost Subsidy
A Cost Subsidy is created by the willingness of a
participant in a limited development to absorb costs
rather than seeking payment for them. In essence, the
value of the service is being donated as a subsidy.
The costs can include transaction costs such as legal
and surveying costs, administrative and other overhead
costs, and "soft" development costs such as site
planning.
A Cost Subsidy typically comes from limited
developers themselves, which often absorb project costs
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as part of their operating budgets. Other sources of
Cost Subsidies are a government agency (the
Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture
usually pays for the professional services involved in
determining the value of an APR, and has provided some
assistance in planning limited developments'), a
conservation organization, the seller of the land, or
the providers of professional services (pro bono legal
or site planning services, for example).
Although Cost Subsidies can be important to
limited development projects, determining their value
is at best difficult and often impossible. They have
not been addressed in the subsidy source and use
analysis, although they are discussed qualitatively in
the case studies.
Development Subsidy Sources
What makes limited development attractive to advocates
of land conservation is the hope that the profit from
developing part of a project can pay for, or subsidize, the
protection of the remainder.
This total profit from the development component of the
project, which I have called the "Total Development
'Interview with Craig Richov, APR Program,
Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture,
October 23, 1987; interview with Charles Chase, APR
Program, Massachusetts Department of Food and
Agriculture, October 23, 1987.
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Subsidy," is equal to gross income from selling the
development land, minus the expenses of acquiring the
development land, and minus the expenses of turning it into
developable land. In order not to include what is really a
bargain sale subsidy as a development subsidy, the cost of
acquiring the development land is assumed to be its market
value (for development) when acquired, not the price paid.
Total Gross Market Value
Development = Sales - of Development - Development
Subsidy Income Land at Acquisition Costs
The total development subsidy also can be viewed as the
increase in the value of the development land from the time
when it was acquired until the time it was sold, minus the
costs of increasing its value by turning it into developable
land. If we assume that the limited developer sold the
development land for its full market value (i.e. that gross
sales income equals market value at the time the development
parcels were sold), then:
Gross Market Value Increase in
Sales - of Development = Market Value of
Income Land at Acquisition Development Land.
If this is substituted into the previous equation, then:
Total Increase in
Development = Market Value of - Development
Subsidy Development Land Costs.
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Figure 2-3: Total Development Subsidy
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In other words, the subsidy generated by developing a
portion of the property is equal to the value added by
developing it minus the costs of developing it (see Figure
2-3).
Value can be added to the development parcels in three
ways in a limited development, each of which I have
considered a separate development subsidy source (see Figure
2-4). First, by restricting adjacent land to agricultural
or open space use, the value of the development land can be
enhanced, creating what I have called an "enhancement"
subsidy. Second, appreciation in market land values can add
value to the development land, providing an "appreciation"
subsidy. Lastly, the act of turning raw land into buildable
lots--including deal-making, design, approvals, and
marketing--adds value to land, contributing a "subdivision"
subsidy to a limited development project.
Enhancement Subsidy
An often stated advantage of limited development
is the opportunity to capture the value added to
surrounding land when a piece of land is restricted for
agricultural or conservation purposes. In an
economist's terms, limited development makes it
possible to internalize a positive externality of
preserving land.
The Enhancement Subsidy is simply the value added
to the development parcels by the restriction of the
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agricultural and open space portions of a limited
development. Because the limited developer is unable
to capture the value added to surrounding land under
different ownership, those increases in value are not
part of the Enhancement Subsidy.
It is important to note the difference between the
Enhancement Subsidy--the value added to the development
land by the restriction of adjacent farmland--and what
I have called the enhancement premium. The latter is
the rate at which the development land is enhanced. An
enhancement premium of 10 percent, then, means that the
value of the development parcels is increased by 10
percent by the adjacent restrictions. If their
original value was $200,000, this would result in an
Enhancement Subsidy of $20,000.
Net Appreciation Subsidy
The appreciation subsidy takes into account the
effects of time on the project. By simply holding the
development parcels in an inflationary land market,
they increase in value.'
But holding land also incurs expenses, primarily
'Although all of the land in a limited development
increases in value due to appreciation, that increase
in value can only be realized by sale of the land at
its market value (for development). Because only the
development parcels are sold at their market value,
only the appreciation on the development land provides
a subsidy to the project.
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interest, real estate taxes, and insurance, which erode
the subsidy provided by appreciation (see Figure 2-4).
The subsidy due to appreciation is the net appreciation
in the value of the development land, which equals the
gross appreciation in the market value of the
development land minus the costs of holding the
development land:
Net Gross Appreciation Costs of
Appreciation = in Market Value of - Holding
Subsidy Development Land Development Land
Net Subdivision Subsidy
The gross subdivision subsidy is the increase in
the market value of the development portion of a
limited development project which is not attributable
to either enhancement or appreciation.
The significance of the subdivision subsidy is
that it is the subsidy the limited developer creates by
acting as a land developer, creating building lots out
of "raw" land. It can include the value added by
bringing the various components and participants of a
project together, percolation testing of land,
subdivision design, obtaining needed approvals, legally
subdividing land, and marketing subdivided building
lots.
The gross subdivision subsidy is determined by a
residual calculation (see Figure 2-4). It equals the
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total increase in the market value of the development
land, minus the enhancement subsidy, minus the gross
appreciation in the market value of the development
land:
Gross Increase in Enhancement Gross
Subdivision = Market Value of - Subsidy - Appreciation.
Subsidy Development Land
The gross subdivision subsidy does not reflect the
costs of developing and subdividing the development
portions of a limited development project, however, and
is not an accurate measure of the subsidy actually
provided through land development and subdivision. In
order to calculate the Net Subdivision Subsidy, all of
the "non-holding costs"--all of the development costs
which are not the result of simply holding the
property--attributable to the development portion of
the project must be subtracted from the gross
subdivision subsidy:
Net Gross Non-holding Costs
Subdivision = Subdivision - Attributable to
Subsidy Subsidy Development Land.
The non-holding costs are costs which are not
related to time, including professional services, staff
salaries and overhead, and any "hard" development
costs. It is important to distinguish between these
costs, which are the result of changing the land or its
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legal status, and time-related or holding costs which
are the result of simply holding the property over
time.
Uses of Subsidies
Three non-market uses of land which require subsidizing
are of interest in the case studies: agricultural
preservation, (non-agricultural) open space protection, and
the contribution or bargain sale of land for affordable
housing. Although agricultural preservation is the subsidy
use of most concern in this analysis, the protection of non-
agricultural open space is a component of many agricultural
limited developments. Providing land at lower-than-market
costs to support the production of affordable housing is an
increasingly important part of land preservation projects.
For each non-market land use, the use of subsidy is
equal to the cost of acquiring and converting the portion of
land it uses to the non-market land use, minus the economic
value of the land for the non-market use of the land.8 To
avoid incorrectly attributing bargain sale subsidies as
development subsidies, the cost of acquiring the land for
each non-market use have been considered its market value
8 In determining the economic value of the land for a
non-market use, I am again drawing a distinction between
subsidies to non-market use of land, such as an APR or sale
of open space, and income produced from actual use of the
land, such as farming. Sale of restricted land to a farmer
is based on the land's value for farming, and is income from
non-market use. Sale of an APR is a subsidy to allow non-
market use of land, not income from that non-market use.
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for development when acquired. The costs of converting the
land include those non-holding development costs
attributable to that portion of the property.
All three subsidy uses are calculated with the same
formula (see Figure 2-5):
Subsidy Use Market Value of Non-holding Development Value for
by Non-Market = Non-Market Land + Costs Attributable to - Non-Market
Land Use at Acquisition Non-Market Land Use Use
Agricultural preservation
For Agricultural Preservation, I have assumed that the
value for non-market use is the sale price of restricted
agriculture to a farmer. In cases where the agricultural
land is leased rather than sold, I have assumed that the
value for agricultural use is the capitalized annual rent.
Open Space Protection
For Open Space Protection, I have assumed that the
value for non-market use is zero. While there is some
potential for income from recreational use of open space
land, it is insignificant in the three case studies.
Although increased tax revenues from surrounding
properties is likely and in some cases may be significant, I
have not included them as income from use of the land for
open space. Instead, I have assumed that these increased
revenues are included in the town's payment for the open
space, and are a source of subsidy to the project. Rather
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than paying to use the adjacent land as open space, then,
the neighbors can be thought of as subsidizing its
protection as open space through their increased tax
payments.
Affordable Housing Land Contribution
Production of affordable housing is often subsidized by
the donation or bargain sale of land. When a limited
developer contributes all or part of the value of land to
support affordable housing, as occurred in one of the three
case study projects, it is a use of subsidy by the limited
development project.
For the Affordable Housing Land Contribution, I have
assumed that the value for non-market use is the price at
which the affordable housing land was sold. Sale of land
for affordable housing is income from the actual non-market
use of the property, not a subsidy allowing that non-market
use to occur.
It is important to note, as well, that the market
development value of the affordable housing land is at
acquisition by the limited developer, not when sold by the
limited developer. This analysis is an accounting of the
actual use of subsidies by non-market land uses, not a cost-
benefit analysis comparing these to alternative uses of the
land.
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METHODOLOGICAL AND DATA COLLECTION ISSUES
Apportionment of Value and Costs
to Different Land Uses
The conceptual framework described above presents two
underlying methodological difficulties:
1. How to divide the market value of the entire
site at acquisition (the "Total Development
Value") among the component final land uses to
determine the market value of each portion of the
project at acquisition.
2. How to attribute the overall costs of project
to the specific components that caused them.
Total Development Value
Because many limited developments include bargain
sales, it is erroneous to assume that the Total Development
Value is the price paid for the land by the non-profit
limited developer. Making such an assumption would ignore
the often significant subsidy contribution by the seller of
the property.
In the marketplace, Total Development Value of a site--
what a developer is willing to pay for it--is equal to the
final value of the site when developed, minus the costs of
developing it, and minus the developer's return. With land
zoned for single-family residential development (as in all
three case studies), the final value of the site when
developed is based on the value of the potential final
building lots (or houses).
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Ideally, the way to divide the total development value
among the final land uses would be by the same method. The
market value (for development) of each portion of land
within a project would be equal to the value of the
potential final building lots that portion could physically
and legally accommodate, minus the costs of developing those
lots, minus a reasonable return. This requires a detailed
appraisal broken down by the final land use components,
however.
In the absence of such appraisals, two methods might
reasonably be used to divide the Total Development Value:
by the proportion of acreage and by the proportion of
existing road frontage.
Dividing value by acreage assumes that the value of
land for development lies primarily in its area. An
acreage-based analysis is most appropriate to parcels with
large sections of interior land that do not have frontage
and for real estate markets in which the retail value of the
building lots will support the cost of building subdivision
roads to gain access to interior land.
Dividing value by frontage assumes that the value of
land for development lies primarily in frontage, and that
interior land is of little or no value. It is most
appropriate for parcels which have extensive frontage and in
real estate markets in which final retail values will not
support the construction of subdivision roads.
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Neither method is ideal. The acreage method
undervalues frontage land. Because this land is
predominantly used for development in most limited
developments, an acreage analysis tends to exaggerate the
development subsidies generated. Acreage-based division
also overvalues the interior land by ignoring the added
costs that would be needed to build roads in order to
develop the land. Because this land is typically used for
agriculture and open space, an acreage analysis tends to
exaggerate these subsidy uses.
The frontage method, on the other hand, overvalues
frontage land, tending to underestimate the development
subsidies generated when this land is used primarily for
development. It also undervalues interior land, typically
understating subsidy use by agriculture and open space.
In each case I have chosen the method that I feel is
most appropriate given the site and market conditions.
Because the two methods represent extremes, I have compared
them to draw bounds of possible results in some cases.
Development Costs
Because none of the limited developers in the case
studies accounted for expenses by land use components, I
have used the same acreage- or frontage-based divisions as a
rough estimate of the division of costs.
Only non-time related costs are divided in this way,
however. All of the time-related costs are attributed to
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the development portion of the project. This assumes,
somewhat simplistically, that the agricultural, open space,
and affordable housing components of a project do not incur
holding costs. While they do incur such costs, in all three
case studies the bulk of the carrying costs can reasonably
be attributed to the development portions of the projects.
Data Sources and Collection
The Subsidy Source and Use model requires assumptions,
some specific to each project, and some a function of the
local real estate market. Collection and reliability of
these data, specifically the Total Development Value, the
value added by enhancement, and the market appreciation
rate, pose difficulties.
Because all three assumptions are estimates, each case
study financial analysis includes analysis of the
sensitivity of the results to assumptions of Total
Development Value, enhancement premium, and appreciation
rate.
Total Development Value
Where possible, the Total Development Value is based on
a "true" appraisal of the property's value for development.
Where this has not been possible, it has been based on
estimates by case study participants of the property's true
market value, or the sale price where there is reason to
believe it reflected the property's market value.
50
Enhancement
The enhancement premiums assumed are based on estimates
by case participants and area realtors. In two cases,
enhancement is treated as a uniform rate across all
development lots. For the third, where the realtor who
marketed the lots was able to estimate the enhancement value
added lot by lot, those estimates have been used.
Appreciation
Monthly appreciation rates assumed in the analyses are
based primarily on quarterly and annual median residential
sales prices (including finished homes and building lots)
from County Comps, a subscription service which reports
sales of properties to realtors for use as "comparables."
The appreciation rates assumed are also based on interviews
with area realtors and case participants.
An additional problem with appreciation is that the
model is based on a uniform, rather than variable, monthly
appreciation rate for the entire period of the limited
development project. Appreciation often occurs unevenly,
and the model fails to account for wide variations in
appreciation over brief periods.
An inherent difficulty with all appreciation data is
that to be useful, it must be from a narrow geographic area
(a single town), and measured over short periods of time.
This limits the number of individual sales on which the data
are based, however, tending to undermine the comparability
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of median sales.
ANALYSIS PRODUCTS
The basic outputs of the financial analysis are two
summary tables, one for income and expense accounting, the
other for subsidy source and use accounting.9 In addition,
I have used a graphic representation of the subsidy source
and use accounting. Tabular presentations of sensitivity
analyses appear in each case study text.
Income and Expense
The Income and Expense table (see Table 2-1) is a
standard form, accounting for all sources of income and all
expenditures in a project. The "bottom line" is the surplus
(or shortfall) of income over expenses, and is expressed as
a percentage of the total expenses of the project--the
return on all the money invested in the project.
Subsidy Source and Use Summary
The Subsidy Source and Use Summary (see Table 2-2)
shows the absolute and percentage amounts of each subsidy
source and subsidy use. The subsidy sources are sub-
totalled as Non-Development and Development subsidies for
comparison.
The percentage column for subsidy sources shows the
'The full spreadsheets which produced the summary
tables are included as appendices.
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TABLE 2-1: SAMPLE INCOME AND EXPENSE TABLE
INCOME
Total Rental Income $1,500
Sale to Farmer $25,000
APR Sale $200,000
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales $225,000
Open Space Land Sales $100,000
Market Development Land Sales $500,000
Affordable Housing Land Sales $50,000
Total Development Land Sales $550,000
Other Income $0
TOTAL INCOME $876,500
EXPENSES
Purchase Price $700,000
Financing $15,000
Real Estate Taxes $3,000
Insurance $2,000
Legal Services $20,000
Planning & Engineering $10,000
Surveying $5,000
Other Services $5,000
Total Professional Services $40,000
Staff Overhead $30,000
Other Expenses $0
TOTAL EXPENSES $790,000
INCOME AND EXPENSES
+ TOTAL INCOME $876,500
- TOTAL EXPENSES $790,000
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) $86,500
RETURN ON TOTAL EXPENSES 10.9%
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percentage of all subsidy sources represented by each
individual subsidy source or category of subsidy sources.
The percentage column for subsidy use shows the percentage
of the entire subsidy use by the project represented by each
individual subsidy use.
The "bottom line" in the Subsidy Source and Use Summary
is the surplus (or shortfall) of subsidy sources over
subsidy uses. It shows whether the project received and
provided enough subsidies to cover those that the non-market
uses of land required.
Note that this "bottom line" is the same absolute
amount as that shown in the Income and Expense Table because
the two account for the same inputs and outputs of cash.
The Subsidy Source and Use Summary expresses this surplus or
shortfall as a percentage of the total subsidy uses,
however. This gives an indication of the degree to which a
project exceeded or fell short of the subsidies it needed.
Subsidy Source and Use Graphic Summary
The total subsidy sources and uses for each case study
project are presented graphically as stacked bar graphs. In
each case study the subsidy sources and uses are presented
in terms of actual dollars. In order to compare the three
cases in the conclusion, each subsidy source and use has
been expressed there as a percentage of the Total
Development Value of the particular project.
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TABLE 2-2: SAMPLE SUBSIDY SOURCE AND USE SUMMARY
Percent of
Subsidy
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources
Bargain Sale Subsidy $200,000 29%
APR Subsidy $200,000 29%
Open Space Sale Subsidy $100,000 14%
Total Non-Development Subsidies $500,000 72%
Enhancement Subsidy $65,217 9%
Net Appreciation Subsidy $30,208 4%
Net Subdivision Subsidy $95,075 14%
Total Limited Development Subsidies $190,500 28%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $690,500 100%
Percent of
Subsidy
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses
Agricultural Preservation $460,000 76%
Open Space Protection $97,000 16%
Affordable Housing Contribution $47,000 8%
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $604,000 100%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $690,500
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $604,000
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) $86,500
PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES 14.3%
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PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
The basic subsidy source and use analysis described
above is an analysis of what actually happened in each case
study. The sensitivity analyses do not test what would have
happened had reality been different, but are testing the
analysis results given different assumptions about what
actually happened.
This model does not allow us to test the performance of
these limited development projects under different market
conditions. Of particular interest is the effect of market
appreciation rates on these projects, and, to a lesser
extent, the effect of different enhancement premiums.
The basic model does not permit variations in
appreciation or enhancement because the calculation of
development subsidies is a residual analysis. The model
determines a total development subsidy based on the actual
sales from development land, then subtracts estimates of
enhancement and gross appreciation to arrive at the gross
subdivision subsidy. Using this model, assuming a higher
appreciation rate does not increase the value of the final
sales or the total development subsidy, only the proportion
of the total development subsidy attributed to appreciation.
Rather than starting with the final sales and ending
with the value added through subdivision, the predictive
model starts with the market value of the subdivided
development parcels (as determined by the original residual
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analysis) first adds appreciation, then adds enhancement,
producing a final market value. This final market value is
then used as the sales price of the development land.
Because it uses subdivided land values determined by
the original analysis, this predictive model is sensitive to
the original division of Total Development Value and
development costs, and the original assumptions of Total
Development Value, appreciation rate, and enhancement
premium. The results of this model should be qualified not
only with regard to the alternative assumption about
appreciation or enhancement, but also with regard to all the
original assumptions.
The basic output of this analysis is the "bottom line"
surplus or shortfall. The question it attempts to answer
is: all else equal, would this project have worked if
appreciation (or enhancement) had been different than it
actually was? Although it is sensitive to the original
assumptions, and it is nearly certain that all else would
not have been equal, this analysis at least suggests how
susceptible a project is to market changes beyond the
control of the limited developer.
SUMMARY
Permanent non-market land uses such as agricultural
preservation and open space protection require a subsidy of
some sort. A number of subsidies are provided in a limited
57
development project.
Some of the subsidies provided, including bargain sale,
APR sale, open space land sale, and cost subsidies, are not
generated by the development aspects of a limited
development project. Others--enhancement, net appreciation,
and net subdivision subsidies--are a direct result of
developing a portion of a property.
The goal of the case study financial analyses is to
determine whether the development aspects of each limited
development project provided significant benefits to the
project, and if so, which development subsidies were most
significant.
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CHAPTER III: BARTON FARM
The 1981 limited development at the Barton Farm in
Sudbury, Massachusetts, succeeded in protecting 43 acres of
farmland and 15 acres of wetlands from an 81-acre farm. It
did so only with significant external assistance, however,
relying heavily on external subsidies which were
supplemented by relatively small development subsidies.
The Barton Farm project also suggests some of the risk
limited development presents to a non-profit land trust.
Even with the external subsidies it received, virtually no
carrying costs, and the assumption of staff costs by the
limited developer, the Barton Farm failed to break even.
CASE HISTORY
In 1980 the Barton family heirs petitioned for
settlement of the family estate, including the 80.5-acre
North Sudbury farm (Figures 3-1, 3-2). Although 86-year-old
Ralph Barton had given up farming in the 1960's, he had kept
the farm intact, leasing it to dairy and vegetable farmers
and a wholesale nursery.1
Sudbury is a commuting suburb about 20 miles west of
'Kay Longcope, "A Unique Land-Use Plan in Sudbury,"
Boston Globe, December 8, 1981, p. 19; the Massachusetts
Farm and Conservation Land Trust, Annual Report 1981,
Beverly, MA (1982), pp. 5-6.
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Boston which was beginning to come under development
pressure in the early 1980's, particularly for large-lot
"luxury" single-family homes. The land was zoned for
single-family residential, with minimum lot size of 40,000
square feet and minimum road frontage of 180 feet. Because
of the Barton Farm's approximately 4,600 feet of frontage on
three roads and access from a fourth, the Sudbury
Conservation Commission feared that the farm would be fully
developed, and contacted the Massachusetts Farm and
Conservation Land Trust (MFCLT) for assistance in saving
part of the farm.
MFCLT was created in July, 1980 when the preservation
of productive farmland was added to the goals of the
existing Land Conservation Trust. The new organization was
intended to work with the Agriculture Preservation
Restriction (APR) program of the Massachusetts Department of
Food and Agriculture (DFA). MFCLT acted as an "interim
buyer," purchasing land and giving farmers immediate access
to the value of their land during the period it took the APR
program to purchase the development rights. MFCLT could act
faster than the year or more that the APR program frequently
took to purchase development rights in 1981. MFCLT also
could provide a farmer with the full value of his land, not
just the value of the development rights. Unlike the APR
program, MFCLT could act as a limited developer, developing
land which was not agriculturally significant, thus lowering
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the cost of an APR and preserving only productive farmland.2
MFCLT is affiliated with The Trustees for Reservations
(TTOR), a statewide conservation organization founded in
1891 to preserve "beautiful and historic places and tracts
of land" in Massachusetts. TTOR provided MFCLT with access
to a $200,000 revolving fund to finance projects.'
The Barton Farm was one of several efforts to preserve
farmland in Sudbury in 1980-1981. The April 1981 Sudbury
Town Meeting approved a warrant article to contribute $500
per acre toward the purchase of agricultural preservation
restrictions on six open space parcels (including the Barton
Farm), totalling 194 acres. Farmer Stephen Verrill of
Concord, who leased several of the parcels and eventually
purchased some of the restricted land, was instrumental in
initiating the APR process.*
In addition to the $500-per-acre contribution to the
APR purchase, the same Town Meeting voted to pay up to
$110,000 to purchase 15.3 acres of the Barton Farm as
conservation land, including a pond, brook, and surrounding
wetlands.5
MFCLT had hired Matlock Associates, a land planning
2 MFCLT, Annual Report 1981, pp. 2, 4-5.
3 Ibid.
*Ibid, pp. 3, 6; telephone interview with Stephen
Verrill, Verrill Farms, Concord, December 10, 1987.
5 MFCLT, Annual Report, pp. 3, 6.
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firm in Lincoln, Massachusetts specializing in conservation
and limited development planning, to assist in planning for
the Barton Farm. Four separate development areas were
identified, totaling 22 acres (Figure 3-3). The land
was sold with deed restrictions limiting it to 13 building
lots.'
An historic 19th-century barn complex was isolated on
another 2.7-acre parcel adjacent to one of the development
parcels. Deed restrictions prohibiting any additions and
calling for the retention of roof profiles, cupolas, several
facades were placed on the barns. The restrictions did
allow one barn to become an apartment.7
Two agricultural parcels, divided by an unused railroad
right of way, remained. The eastern parcel (Figure 3-3)
included 17 acres, with about 10 acres of high quality
soils. The 26-acre western parcel has soils of varied
quality."
MFCLT competed with two other developers to purchase
the farm from the Barton estate. Although their bid was
lower than the other two, and lower than an appraisal for
the estate, MFCLT was able to win the contract to buy the
*MFCLT, Annual Report, pp. 6-7.
7 MFCLT, "Preservation Restriction," 1982 (in DFA APR
file for Barton Farm).
"MFCLT, Annual Report, pp. 6-7; the MFCLT,
"Preservation Restriction," 1982 (in DFA APR file for Barton
Farm).
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farm. In doing so, MFCLT argued that the estate's appraisal
had been unrealistic and that contingencies in the other
bids were not as valuable as estimated due to less accurate
soil testing. In addition, MFCLT offered the estate an
earlier closing date.
Purchase and sale agreements between MFCLT, the Barton
estate, the Town of Sudbury, and Creighton Hamill, a local
builder of custom homes, were signed in October, 1981. The
APR was approved in November, 1981. Simultaneous closings
on the development parcels, the town conservation land, and
the APR took place in February, 1982. MFCLT paid the estate
$537,500 for the entire 80.5 acres, a price MFCLT Executive
Director Wesley Ward said was "very close to the value given
by independent fair market value appraisal." The Town of
Sudbury paid $99,650 for the conservation land.1 *
Hamill paid $272,300 for the four development parcels.
Because of the high interest rates at the time (18-percent
mortgage rates), the builder's uncertainty over approvals on
raw land, and siting restrictions placed on some of the lots
by MFCLT, Ward said MFCLT was "lucky" to find a builder
willing to purchase the development parcels. Hamill was the
only builder interested, he said. Although MFCLT felt the
price was a bargain for Hamill, the builder said it was "a
'Ward interview, December 1, 1987.
1 0 MFCLT, Annual Report, pp. 6-7; Department of Food and
Agriculture, "Certificate of Vote," November 18, 1981 (in
DFA APR file for Barton Farm).
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fair price. By the time we got through with it, it got
expensive."11
MFCLT chose to wholesale the development parcels to
Hamill undivided and without any approvals (MFCLT's
subdivision of the development parcels from the main farm
parcels did not require subdivision approval). The
organization had, however, done a great deal of the
preliminary planning on the project and established its
credibility with the planning board and conservation
commission.1
The state Department of Food and Agriculture and the
Town of Sudbury jointly paid $200,350 for the development
rights on the 43 acres of farmland, $140,000 of it for the
smaller farmland parcel, and $60,500 for the larger
restricted parcel. The total $200,350 paid for the APR was
$30,150 less than the value of the development rights as
determined by the review appraisal done for the APR program.
Because the DFA was less interested in the larger, less
agriculturally significant parcel, the program paid less
than its worth, according to Ward.1 3
1 1 MFCLT, Annual Report, pp. 6-7; Ward interview,
December 1, 1987; telephone interview with Creighton Hamill,
December 23, 1987.
12Ward interview, October 5, 1987.
'"DFA, "Certificate of Vote"; James J. Czupryna,
"Appraisal Review and Valuation Analysis of Barton parcels
(I and II)," 1981 (in DFA APR file for Barton Farm), p. 15;
interview with Wesley Ward, Executive Director, MFCLT,
October 5, 1987.
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The two restricted farmland parcels were sold
approximately six months later to two Concord farmers,
Stephen Verrill and Nat Arena, for a total of $22,235.
During the delay, the farmers were charged rent equal to the
carrying costs of the agricultural parcels.1
MFCLT attempted in both the Barton and Powisset
(Chapter IV) limited developments to minimize complications
that would add delay, expense, and risk. "We kept them
pretty simple," said Wesley Ward. "We were interested in
both cases in speed and quick turnover because we might get
eaten up by interest, and it might complicate the survey."
That simplicity and speed came at "the risk of not being
innovative," he added.1 "
In particular, MFCLT avoided any plan calling for
clustered or attached housing on the development parcels,
particularly since neither Sudbury nor Dover allowed cluster
or multifamily development by right. Drawbacks to cluster
development included complicating and lengthening the
approvals process and greater difficulty in marketing the
final units, and thus the development parcels, Ward said.16
The simultaneous closings--and the willingness of the
estate to hold the property while MFCLT planned and marketed
it--allowed MFCLT to keep carrying costs to a minimum. No
"*Ward interview, October 5, 1987.
1"Ward interview, October 5, 1987.
16Ibid.
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financing was need for the purchase at all, and interest
costs were approximately $2,700, excluding six months of
interest resulting from the six-month delay in selling the
agricultural parcels.17
MFCLT's other expenses for the project included:
Legal Services $21,066
Planning and Engineering 9,900
Appraisals 1,050
Overhead (5%) 26,87518
Although MFCLT accounted for overhead and staff salaries and
benefits at five percent of the purchase price, the actual
overhead was not tracked and was certainly higher, according
to Ward.1 '
To date, Hamill has built 12 of the 13 houses he was
allowed, and now lives in the one adjacent to the barn
complex. Lots were divided and houses built largely in
accordance with the planning by Matlock on the three parcels
adjacent to the farmland. Woodmere Drive was extended into
the southeast corner of the farm where it terminates in a
cul-de-sac. Seven house lots were laid out along the road,
of which six have been built on. Hamill said he still
intends to build on the seventh lot. 2 0
"
7 Ward interview, October 5, 1987; telephone interview
with Ward, October 28, 1987.
1 8 MFCLT, Annual Report 1981, p. 7.
'Ward interview, October 5, 1987.
2
oHamill interview.
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AGRICULTURAL IMPACT
Both of the agricultural parcels at Barton Farm have
remained productive, largely because they were sold to two
established farm operations.
The smaller, more agriculturally valuable parcel sold
to Verrill Farms included about 10 acres of tillable
cropland and eight acres of woodland and wetland. The
larger parcel, sold to Arena Farms, included nine acres of
tillable cropland (four of which were still used by the
nursery) four of pasture, and three of woodland and
wetland.2 1
Farmer Stephen Verrill had leased the parcel he
eventually purchased for several years prior to the limited
development project. He has continued to use the parcel's
tillable land for silage corn for his Concord-based dairy
operation.2
After allowing the nursery to phase out its use of the
parcel Arena Farms has gradually been planting its 26 acres
with a variety of field crops suited to its eight different
soil types. Crops have included sweet corn, broccoli,
cabbage, gourds, pumpkins, squash. Planned crops include
2 1 MFCLT, Barton Farm Application Form, Agricultural
Preservation Restriction Act, 1981 (in DFA APR file for
Barton Farm), p. 2.
2 2 Verrill interview.
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asparagus and berries.2 3
Neither farmer reported any significant conflict with
their limited development neighbors. Verrill attributes
that to little "visible" use of chemicals on his field.
Given the few trees left as a buffer between the three
adjacent parcels and his field, Verrill said conflict with
neighbors "could be a problem" at the Barton Farm. In
addition, he has had considerable conflict with a neighbor
of the parcel directly across the street, which he also
owns. 24
Nat Arena of Arena Farms, also in Concord, said he has
had questions regarding insecticide use in his cornfield
adjacent to one of the three limited development houses
which abut his property. The questions came first from the
owners of a house surrounded by farmland on three sides and
then from a realtor selling the house (for the third time
since it was built). Arena cautioned residents against
going in the cornfield after it was sprayed, and sprays in
the early evening when there is less wind.25
Both the Verrill and Arena Farms provide examples of
adaptation to survive in a metropolitan area. Both farm a
large number of small, dispersed parcels, and to some extent
market directly through retail farmstands.
2 3 Interview with Nat Arena, November 13, 1987.
2 
4 Verrill interview.
2 'Arena interview.
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Although farming small, dispersed parcels "raises hell
with the efficiency," Verrill said he has used such a
pattern to stay in business. After "overextending" himself
in land purchases to protect himself from eviction from
rented land, Verrill said he has recently been able to
consolidate somewhat, selling off more distant parcels. The
parcels he currently owns are up to seven miles from his
main farm in Concord, but most are within three miles.2"
In addition to a dispersed parcels, Verrill has begun
to shift his operation from wholesale dairy to retail
vegetables and berries in recent years to provide diversity
and greater profit per acre (although how inventory is
accounted for affects the relative profitability within his
operation). In addition to retail vegetables, Verrill has a
pick-your-own strawberry operation.2
Arena Farms includes about 100 owned and leased acres,
including the 26 APR acres at Barton Farm, 12 acres adjacent
to the farmstand on Route 2 in Concord, and several parcels
under short-term lease in Concord and Wayland. Along with
Arena Farms produce, the farmstand sells a wide variety of
produce and food products.2"
Although he feels that the parcel he purchased was
capable of supporting a new farm starting up, Nat Arena said
2 6 Verrill interview.
27 Ibid.
2 8 Arena interview.
72
it is easier for an established farmer with existing outlets
for products to make use of the land. "The bottom line to
being able to use the farmland is marketing, being able to
sell the product," he said. In addition, an established
farm has other landholdings and credibility with local
banks, easing access to financing. Arena said past business
dealings was a factor in obtaining financing for the Barton
Farm purchase, but said the loan was secured only by the
Barton parcel.2 9
FINANCIAL ANALYSES
Financially, the Barton Farm suggests the continued
importance of external, non-development subsidies. Without
question the main subsidy sources to the Barton Farm limited
development project were the APR sale to the state and the
sale of the open space land to the Town of Sudbury.
Because the simultaneous purchase and sale agreements
and closings eliminated the possibility of any significant
appreciation, the Barton Farm offers an opportunity to deal
only with the two remaining development subsidies,
enhancement and subdivision. This allows an estimation of
the probable range of actual enhancement rather than relying
on estimates.
29 Ibid.
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TABLE 3-1: BARTON FARM INCOME AND EXPENSE TABLE
INCOME
Total Rental Income $1,554
Sale to Farmer $22,235
APR Sale $200,350
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales $222,585
Open Space Land Sales $99,650
Market Development Land Sales $272,300
Affordable Housing Land Sales $0
Total Development Land Sales $272,300
Other Income $0
TOTAL INCOME $596,089
EXPENSES
Purchase Price $537,500
Financing $4,232
Real Estate Taxes $5,375
Insurance $0
Legal Services $21,066
Planning & Engineering $9,900
Surveying $0
Other Services $1,050
Total Professional Services $32,016
Staff Overhead $26,875
Other Expenses $0
TOTAL EXPENSES $605,998
INCOME AND EXPENSES
+ TOTAL INCOME $596,089
- TOTAL EXPENSES $605,998
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) ($9,909)
RETURN ON TOTAL EXPENSES -1.6%
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Income and Expense
Despite minimal carrying costs and probable
underestimation of MFCLT's staff and overhead costs, the
Barton Farm project ran a deficit of $9,900, or two percent
of the total project expenses (Table 3-1). In terms of what
was a successful effort to preserve farmland and protect
open space, this shortfall is insignificant.
The slight loss may be attributable to MFCLT's
difficulty in finding a builder, which was probably
translated into a lower sales price for the development
land. But the same market conditions that made it difficult
for MFCLT to find a builder should have had a similar impact
on the price at which they purchased the farm.
With a total of $300,000 in income from the APR and
sale of open space land and $272,000 from the sale of the
development parcels, the income and expense analysis
suggests that the project was almost equally reliant on each
source of income.
Subsidy Source and Use
When viewed in terms of subsidy source and use, the
Barton Farm project was less reliant on development
subsidies than it was on the non-development subsidies from
sale of the APR and open space land to the Town of Sudbury.
Based on initial assumptions about enhancement,
appreciation, Total Development Value, and apportionment of
Total Development Value by frontage, 84 percent of the
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subsidies available to the project were from outside, non-
development subsidy sources, with the remainder coming from
development sources (Table 3-2, Figure 3-4).
The development subsidies really provided only a
marginal supplement to the non-development subsidies
TABLE 3-2: BARTON FARM SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES SUMMARY
Percent of
Subsidy
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources
Bargain Sale Subsidy $0 0%
APR Subsidy $200,350 56%
Open Space Sale Subsidy $99,650 28%
-- ---------------------------------------------------
Total Non-Development Subsidies $300,000 84%
Enhancement Subsidy $24,755 7%
Net Appreciation Subsidy ($8,053) -2%
Net Subdivision Subsidy $40,105 11%
----------------------------------------
Total Limited Development Subsidies $56,807 16%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $356,807 100%
Percent of
Subsidy
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses
Agricultural Preservation $251,975 69%
Open Space Protection $114,740 31%
Affordable Housing Contribution $0 0%
----------------------------------------
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $366,716 100%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $356,807
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $366,716
-----------------------------------
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) ($9,909)
-----------------------------------
PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES -2.7%
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SOURCE
intended for each subsidy use. The APR subsidy of $200,400
provided for most of the $252,000 subsidy required for
agricultural preservation, and the $99,700 open space sale
nearly covered the $114,700 in subsidies needed for open
space protection.
Apportionment of Total Development Value
and Development Costs
Apportionment of Total Development Value and
development costs in the Barton Farm analysis was based on
frontage. With the exception of the southern tip of the
original farm, all potential house lots on the property
could have had frontage on existing roads. 0  Although there
is interior land to the west of the railroad tracks, most of
was unbuildable because it lay within the 100-year
floodplain, was wetlands, or was unsuitable for septic
systems."
Frontage is not as useful a measure for the southern
tip of the farm, however, which had no frontage. Rather, an
existing subdivision road ended at the property line, and
has since been continued to form a cul-de-sac and create
3
*Matlock Associates, "18 Lot Development Sketch,
Barton Property - I, Sudbury, Mass," Lincoln, Mass.:
photocopied map from Matlock Associates, undated; and
"6 Lot Layout Plan, Barton II Property, Sudbury,
Massachusetts," Lincoln, Mass.: photocopied document and
map from Matlock Associates, July 28, 1981.
3 'Matlock Associates, "Development Constraints,"
Lincoln, Mass.: photocopied plan from Matlock Associates,
February, 1981.
78
frontage. Further, virtually all of this section of the
farm was dry and suitable for septic systems.2
There is little difference in the results of the
analysis if based on acreage rather than frontage, however.
When based on acreage, development subsidies accounted for a
somewhat greater proportion of the total subsidy sources--25
rather than 16 percent.3 3
Non-Development Subsidy Sources
Bargain Sale Subsidy
Because of the competing factions of the estate, the
fiduciary responsibility of the estate, comments by case
participants, and the appraisal as a basis for MFCLT's bid
for the property, I have used the purchase price of $537,500
as the Total Development Value for the Barton Farm analysis.
This means there was no Bargain Sale Subsidy.
APR and Open Space Sale Subsidies
The sale of the APR and Open Space land gave a combined
subsidy of $300,000 to the Barton Farm project. With the
actual level of development that took place, if the project
had an APR of zero, it would have run a deficit of $210,000.
Without the APR, either a great deal more development would
have been required, an alternate source of non-development
32 Ibid.
3 3 See Appendix B-1 for full acreage-based analysis.
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subsidy would have been needed, or the project would not
have been possible.
Cost Subsidy
The willingness of the estate to carry the property
while MFCLT planned the limited development project and
marketed the development parcels represents a sort of cost
subsidy.
MFCLT also provided cost subsidies to the project by
absorbing staff costs as part of its operating budget, the
extent of which is unknown. MFCLT also absorbed the $9,900
deficit of the project, providing another subsidy.
Development Subsidy Sources
Enhancement Subsidy
The basic Subsidy Source and Use analysis for Barton
Farm has assumed an overall enhancement premium of 10
percent. In other words, I have assumed that 10 percent was
added to the value of the unenhanced development parcels due
to the restrictions on the adjacent agricultural and open
space parcels. This assumption yielded an Enhancement
Subsidy of $24,800--only seven percent of the total subsidy
sources.
The basic assumption of 10 percent is not based on firm
data, however. Interviews with realtors and case
participants provided little clear insight into the value
added to the development by the restrictions on adjacent
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parcels.
The realtor who sold the finished houses that Creighton
Hamill produced, Jeanne Flynn, felt there was no value added
by the agricultural and open space restrictions at that time
the lots were sold. She added, however, that the
restrictions would add value to the houses in the future.
"The real value of this won't be realized for years," she
said."*
Hamill himself felt he paid no more for the land than
he would have without the restrictions. He said he had
"reservations" about the adjacent agricultural use, and felt
that potential buyers might share these.3 5
Two other local realtors not involved in the case
provided little insight into the value of the enhancement,
but maintained that it was tied to the specific site
conditions.
The first estimated that adjacent non-agricultural
restricted land would add between $25,000 and $50,000 to a
$200,000 house lot. Her estimates were for Sudbury in 1987,
however, five years after Hamill bought the land. She added
that restricted agricultural land would add no value to
adjacent building lots. She also argued that traffic past
some of the development parcels at Barton would counteract
"*Telephone interview with Jeanne Flynn, J. M. Flynn
Realty, Sudbury, December 3, 1987.
" Hamill interview.
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any enhancement of their value."*
The second realtor also argued that enhancement was a
function of the individual project and development parcel.
"So much depends on the specifics," said John Haslett. He
added that much of the value depends on the particular lot
buyer as well as the lot itself.3 7
MFCLT's Ward felt there was a premium on the
development land due to the restriction of the agricultural
land, and felt it might have been as high as 30 percent of
the value of the improved development land. He added,
however, that part of that premium was attributable to the
exclusive housing Hamill produced, which best took advantage
of the value of the restrictions.**
More important than the enhancement premium assumed is
the range of possible values of the Enhancement Subsidy. It
can be argued that the entire value added to the development
land was the result of enhancement: because of the
simultaneous closings, there was no appreciation in the
value of the land; and because MFCLT sold the development
parcels without subdividing them, there may have been no
value added through subdivision. If we accept this argument
and assume that the appreciation and subdivision subsidies
3 6 Telephone interview with Maureen Loynd, December 1,
1987.
3 7 Telephone interview with John Haslett, Davenport Boyd
West Realty, Dover, December 7, 1987.
"
8 Ward interview, October 5, 1987.
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were both zero, then the enhancement premium would have been
31 percent of the value of the unenhanced land. It is
unlikely that the enhancement premium was higher than 31
percent, and it was probably much less.
At 30 percent, enhancement would add a $63,000 subsidy
to the project, but this still would represent only 18
percent of the total subsidies provided (Table 3-3). Even
under extreme assumptions, then, enhancement added
relatively little to the success of the Barton Farm project.
TABLE 3-3: BARTON FARM
ENHANCEMENT SUBSIDY SENSITIVITY
TO ENHANCEMENT RATE
Percent of
Enhancement Enhancement Subsidy
Premium Subsidy Sources
0.0% $0 0%
10.0% $24,755 7%
20.0% $45,383 13%
30.0% $62,838 18%
Appreciation Subsidy
Because the simultaneous closings eliminated any
holding period for the project, I have assumed that
appreciation added no value to the Barton Farm development
parcels. The slight negative Net Appreciation Subsidy is
the result of the minimal interest and real estate costs
incurred by the project. Although MFCLT did not realize any
appreciation, Hamill was able to realize significant
appreciation during the time he built and marketed his
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houses, according to Ward.3 *
Net Subdivision Subsidy
Although it sold the development parcels undivided, it
is likely that MFCLT did realize a "subdivision" subsidy.
MFCLT added value to the development parcels by bringing the
entire project together, doing soil tests for septic
suitability on the development parcels, doing the
preliminary planning and design for the development parcels,
and establishing the plan's credibility with the town
planning board and conservation commission. In its
development role, MFCLT probably also decreased the value of
the value of the development parcels by placing limits on
the number of buildings that were allowed, and with the
preservation and rehabilitation restrictions on the barn
complex.
Based on the assumption of a 10-percent enhancement
premium, the net subdivision subsidy was $40,100, or 11
percent of the total subsidy sources (Table 3-4). The value
of the subdivision subsidy is sensitive to assumptions for
the enhancement premium and Total Development Value,
however.
The Net Subdivision Subsidy does vary with assumptions
about the enhancement premium--from zero if enhancement is
assumed to have accounted for all of the value added to the
39 Ibid.
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development parcels, to $64,900 if subdivision is assumed to
have accounted for all the increase in value of the
development parcels (Table 3-5). Even assuming an
enhancement premium of 30 percent, the Net Subdivision
accounts for only 18 percent of the total subsidy sources.
TABLE 3-4: BARTON FARM NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
Total Development Value $537,500
* Market Development Land Percentage 35%
Value of Development Land at Acquisition $186,957
Gross Sales of Development Land $272,300
- Value of Development Land at Acquisition $186,957
Increase in Value of Development Land $85,343
- Total Enhancement $24,755
- Gross Appreciation $0
Gross Subdivision Subsidy $60,589
- Professional & Staff Costs $20,484
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY $40,105
Although I have assumed that the purchase price of the
Barton Farm represents its Total Development Value, it is
possible that the real Total Development Value was slightly
higher (it is doubtful it was lower, however). A higher
Total Development Value means that the development parcels
were worth more when acquired, so there was less value added
to reach the sales price, and less subsidy attributable to
the land development process. The Net Subdivision Subsidy
is approximately zero when the Total Development Value is
assumed to be $650,000 (Table 3-6). It is possible, then,
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that there was little or no Net Subdivision Subsidy.
TABLE 3-5: BARTON FARM SENSITIVITY
OF NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
TO ENHANCEMENT RATE
Net Percent of
Enhancement Subdivision Subsidy
Rate Subsidy Sources
0.0% $64,860 18%
10.0% $40,105 11%
20.0% $19,476 5%
30.0% $2,021 1%
TABLE 3-6: BARTON FARM SENSITIVITY
OF NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
TO TOTAL DEVELOPMENT VALUE
Total Net Percent of
Development Subdivision Subsidy
Value Subsidy Sources
$537,500 $40,105 11%
$600,000 $18,366 5%
$650,000 $975 0%
Value added by assembling the players and pieces of the
Barton Farm project, preliminary engineering and subdivision
design, and initiating the approvals process was a small
part of the subsidy sources for the project, providing no
more than 18 percent of the subsidies.
Summary
Regardless of the relative size of the enhancement and
net development subsidies for the Barton Farm, the $57,000
in total Development Subsidies was much less important than
the $300,000 in subsidies from Non-Development sources (the
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sale of the APR to the state and the conservation land to
the Town of Sudbury).
Although the data do not allow an exact determination
of Enhancement or Net Subdivision Subsidies, each was
between $0 and $65,000. Enhancement added between zero and
30 percent to the value of the unenhanced land.
The Barton Farm project is not an illustration of
limited development as an alternative to the purchase of
development rights or land by government agencies. Rather,
it is an example of how limited development can marginally
augment these purchases.
87
CHAPTER IV: POWISSET FARM
The Powisset Farm limited development in Dover,
Massachusetts, also the work of the Massachusetts Farm and
Conservation Land Trust (MFCLT), shows the promise of
limited development, saving 106 acres of farmland and 29
acres open space with relatively small public subsidies.
The basic financial analysis suggests that the 54 acres
of development land at Powisset Farm generated more benefits
than all non-development sources combined--enough to have
supported the preservation of agricultural land and the
protection of open space without any non-development
subsidies. Uncertainty over basic assumptions casts doubt
on the reliability of this result, however.
CASE HISTORY
On her death in May, 1984, conservationist and
philanthropist Amelia Peabody left 542 acres of her Dover
estate to The Trustees of Reservations (TTOR, see Chapter
III), creating the Noanet Woodlands Reservation. Left to be
sold for charitable causes was the adjacent 187-acre
Powisset Farm (Figures 4-1 and 4-2), where she had
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overseen the raising of prize cattle and pigs.1
TTOR's affiliated organization, the Massachusetts Farm
and Conservation Land Trust (MFCLT, see Chapter III), sought
to purchase the property in order to control development
next to Noanet woodlands, create a link between Noanet and
another reservation in Medfield, and to preserve the
productive farmland.2 By 1984, MFCLT had evolved from a
farmland preservation organization assisting the APR program
into the land acquisition arm of TTOR. Despite the shift,
according to MFCLT Executive Director Wesley Ward, farmland
preservation remained a priority for the organization.3
The executor of the Peabody estate, attorney Harry
Rice, was concerned that development of the farm be
sensitive to neighbors' and the town's concerns. Ms.
Peabody's will, as well as town zoning, limited development
to a minimum lot size of one acre. Rice had already
received one offer from a developer whom he did not trust to
develop the land sensitively.'
Facing the high cost of buying Powisset Farm from the
Peabody estate, MFCLT proposed a limited development plan
'The Trustees of Reservations, "The Trustees of
Reservations, Summer Newsletter 1985," Beverly, Mass (1985),
p.l.
2 Ibid.
*Telephone interview with Wesley Ward, Executive
Director, MFCLT, December 1, 1987.
*Telephone interview with Harry Rice, December 3, 1987.
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for the site. Rice felt TTOR's plan to continue active
agriculture on the farmland would have pleased Ms. Peabody,
and he trusted TTOR to produce a development sympathetic to
the surroundings. "The Trustees of Reservations had too
much visibility to act up on me," he said.'
MFCLT signed a purchase and sale agreement for the farm
in April, 1985, and purchased the farm October 31, 1985 for
$2,407,270. Rice believed the price was a little--perhaps
$200,000--below what he might have gotten by selling it to a
for-profit developer. The land was being sold to fund two
charities created by Ms. Peabody; Rice served as the trustee
of one of them. Ward agreed that the price seemed like a
bargain at the date of the closing, but said it represented
the value of the land at the signing of the purchase and
sale six months earlier."
The purchase was financed by a $400,000 loan from
TTOR's revolving fund, $250,000 from the Town of Dover for
the purchase of 33 acres of conservation land from the farm,
and a commercial bank loan for the balance.'
MFCLT's limited development plan identified 106 acres
of agricultural land to preserved and 29 acres of
sIbid.
*Ibid; Telephone interview with Karen MacTavish,
Assessors Office, Town of Dover, December 3, 1987; TTOR,
"Summer Newsletter 1985"; telephone interviews with Wesley
Ward, December 1 and 23, 1987.
'TTOR, "Summer Newsletter"; MacTavish interview; Ward
interview, December 1, 1987.
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i
conservation land to be sold to the Town of Dover (Figure 4-
3). The remaining 54 acres were subdivided into 15
potential house lots, four of which included existing
houses, and all of which had frontage on Walpole or Powisset
Streets." Although MFCLT did not necessarily prefer the
large-lot pattern dictated by the plan, Ward said it kept
the deal as simple and swift as possible.'
Several development lots were combined when sold, and
deed restrictions limited the number of new houses on the
development parcels to no more than seven." In all, deed
restrictions barred construction on 15 of the 54 acres of
development land, all adjacent to Noanet Woodlands.
Sections of two lots must be maintained as open fields, and
deed restrictions prevent the expansion of any new or
existing dwelling by more than 30 percent in gross floor
area.11
8 TTOR, "Preservation & Limited Development Plan
(Preliminary) ... ," photocopied plan, May, 1985.
9 Ward interview, October 5, 1987; TTOR, "Preservation &
Limited Development Plan (Preliminary) .... "
"*Lots four and five in the western section of the
limited development were sold together and restricted to a
single house; lots six, seven, and eight in the western
section were sold together and restricted to a single house;
and lots four and five in the northern section were combined
and restricted to a single house. All other development
parcels allow construction of one house or maintenance of an
existing house. Interview with Peg Crowley, Realty World
Brown, Dover, Mass., December 7, 1987.
"'Paul V. O'Leary, Appraisal Review of Powisset Farm,
(DFA Powisset Farm APR file), March 12, 1986, p. 4.
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Rather than wholesaling undivided lots to a builder as
it had with the Barton Farm, MFCLT chose to retail the
houses and development lots to individual buyers and small
builders.1 2 Sales and contracted sales of house lots to
date total $3,175,000 (Table 4-1).
TABLE 4-1: POWISSET FARM MARKET DEVELOPMENT
LOT SALES
Lot Sale Sale
Designation Date Acres Price
South 3 10/85 2.1 $170,000
South 5 10/85 2.0 $175,000
South 7 10/85 2.2 $240,000
South 10 10/85 2.0 $185,000
North 3 10/85 3.7 $240,000
North 4 & 5 10/85 8.5 $345,000
South 6 11/85 2.1 $175,000
North 8 12/85 8.3 $425,000
West 6, 7, & 8 3/86 10.3 $375,000
North 6 7/86 6.5 $470,000
West 4 & 5 1/88 4.5 $375,000
South 8 UNSOLD 2.1 $0
TOTAL 54.4 $3,175,000
1 3
Lot number eight on the south side of Powisset Street
has yet to be sold, and probably will be kept as additional
1 2 Ward interview, October 5, 1987.
1 3 MFCLT, "Powisset Farm Project, Summary of Income &
Expense," undated photocopied document; Crowley interview;
telephone interviews with Karen MacTavish, Dover Assessors
office, December 3 and 23, 1987; Cheney Engineering, "Plan
of Land in Dover, Mass., being a subdivision of land
remaining on land court plan 27910A...," and "Plan of Land
in Dover, Mass., being a subdivision of Lot 2, land court
plan 18890C and a subdivision of lot shown on land court
plan 14550A," Needham, Mass.: Cheney Engineering,
blueprints from original mylar subdivision plans.
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open space. A trail easement across the lot has been given
to the Town of Dover by TTOR, providing a second entrance to
the town's conservation parcel.1"
An APR on 106 acres of farmland was sold for $350,000
($300,000 from the state, $50,000 from the Town of Dover) in
June, 1987. The price paid by the state for the APR was
well below its appraised worth. The review appraisal of the
property for the Department of Food and Agriculture
estimated the market development value of the restricted
agricultural land at $2,475,000 as of December, 1985, and
its value (including a house and several farm buildings)
when restricted as $700,000. The value of the APR, then,
was estimated to be $1,775,000.'*
James Alicata of the DFA's Bureau of Land Use termed
the sale of the APR a "bargain sale" by MFCLT. The APR
program could not afford the full cost of the APR, he said,
and agreed to buy it only at the lower price."*
Rather than selling the restricted farmland, MFCLT has
leased it to two different farmers for an annual total of
$10,000 plus real estate taxes. 17
''Ward interview, December 23, 1987.
1sO'Leary, Appraisal Review, pp. 6-13.
"*Interview with James Alicata, Massachusetts
Department of Food and Agriculture, Land Use Bureau,
December 7, 1987.
17MFCLT, "Powisset Farm Project, Summary of Income &
Expense," Beverly, Mass.: MFCLT, photocopied document,
undated.
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Although it certainly added to the sales income
realized by MFCLT, retailing the lots added expenses for
drilling wells, moving a barn, building repairs, and the
broker's commission.18 MFCLT's expenses for the project
included:
Interest
Real Estate Taxes
Insurance
Appraisal
Planning Services
Legal Services
Surveying
MFCLT Staff and Overhead Expenses (7.5%)
Building Repair, Moving Barn,
Well Drilling, Grounds Maintenance
Heat, Light, Water, & Telephone
Miscellaneous
$30,163
$25,605
$3,120
$800
$7,044
$60,121
$2,812
$180,545
$108,130
$4,713
$1,070
As described below in the financial analysis, the
Powisset Farm produced a considerable surplus. These excess
funds were added to the endowment for the maintenance of
Noanet Woodlands.2o
AGRICULTURAL IMPACT
TTOR, which owns and manages the farmland at Powisset,
chose to lease it out in order to maintain productive
agriculture. If the farmland had been sold, TTOR feared
"Ward interview, October 5, 1987.
1 9 MFCLT, "Summary of Income & Expense."
2
oWard interview, October 5, 1987.
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19
that it would quickly become a horse estate at "two or three
times the price"--beyond the reach of most farmers. 21
Scott Nutting, who lives in the farmhouse for $700 per
month, leases 102 acres of the farmland. Because of
differences between Nutting and TTOR, the lease is expected
to be cancelled in April, 1988. Officially the farm is
leased by the Powisset Dairy Corporation, which has a
"paper" agreement to pasture heifers (young cows not yet
producing milk) for the Shady Oaks Farm in Medway, owned by
Nutting's cousins. Because the heifers require only an hour
of feeding and washing each day, Nutting is strictly a part-
time farmer, working a full-time job off of the farm.2 2
Relations between Nutting and TTOR have been strained.
"The Trustees [of Reservations] saved this for farming, but
they apply suburban values to it," Nutting claimed. A
conservation organization leasing farmland needs to "just
trust [the farmer] and walk away," he argued.2 3
Nutting said the conflict centered around use of farm
buildings and physical changes to the farm. He felt TTOR
had been slow in permitting changes to the farm, but
admitted that he had made changes to the property without
2 1 Telephone interview with Davis Cherington, Land
Planning and Management Foundation (formerly of TTOR and
MFCLT), December 29, 1987.
2 2 Ward interviews, October 5, and December 1 and 23,
1987; telephone interview with Scott Nutting, November 10, 1987.
2Nutting interview.
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consulting TTOR, and that there had been farm management
problems.24
Davis Cherington, then Executive Director of MFCLT,
insisted TTOR did not hamper farming activity at Powisset in
any way. Nutting was not prohibited from using chemical
pesticides, for instance, only required to submit a list of
chemicals in use to TTOR. Cherington maintained that leased
farmland is often abused because of the lack of long-term
commitment by the lessee.2
Nutting said he and his cousins originally intended to
put 60 cows at Powisset, producing about one million pounds
of milk annually for sale in neighboring towns and at the
farm itself. They had intended to convert one building into
a small bottling plant, selling milk, egg nog, hay, grain,
and other farm products. Similar marketing at Shady Oaks
had been "a gold mine," Nutting said.2"
Sandy Hall currently leases less than an acre of land
and a former piggery building for his specialty sheep farm
now based on another estate in Dover.27
2 
4 Nutting interview.
2 sCherington interview, December 29, 1987.
26 Ibid.
2 7Ward interviews, October 5 and December 1 and 23, 1987.
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FINANCIAL ANALYSES
The clearest financial conclusion about the Powisset
limited development project is that it was enormously
successful, generating a surplus of just over $1 million.
Much less certain is exactly what produced that
surplus. The subsidy source and use analysis of Powisset
Farm suggests that the development parcels provided enough
subsidy to carry the entire project--including both the
agricultural and open space protection land uses.2"
According to the analysis, the success of the project was
primarily due to the subdivision of the land into building
lots.
Uncertainty over market appreciation rates, the Total
Development Value of the farm, as well as the method of
dividing the Total Development Value all undermine the
reliability of the analysis, however.
Income and Expense
Powisset Farm produced a 37-percent return on the total
expenses (Table 4-2). This success came in spite of the
very low sale of the APR to the state, and not selling the
final development lot. Viewed simply as income, the sale of
the limited development lots and houses drove the success of
2
"Throughout this analysis, the use of the surplus for
the Noanet Woodlands endowment is disregarded. Open space
protection refers only to the protection of the 29 acres of
open space land that was part of Powisset Farm.
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TABLE 4-2: POWISSET FARM INCOME AND EXPENSES
INCOME
Total Rental Income $0
--- --------------------------------------------------
Annual Rents Capitalized @ 10% $100,000
APR Sale $350,000
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales $450,000
--- --------------------------------------------------
Open Space Land Sales $250,000
--- --------------------------------------------------
Market Development Land Sales $3,175,000
Affordable Housing Land Sales $0
Total Development Land Sales $3,175,000
--- --------------------------------------------------
Other Income $0
--- --------------------------------------------------
TOTAL INCOME $3,875,000
EXPENSES
Purchase Price $2,407,270
--- --------------------------------------------------
Financing $30,163
Real Estate Taxes $25,605
Insurance $3,120
--- --------------------------------------------------
Legal Services $60,121
Planning & Engineering $7,044
Surveying $2,812
Other Services $800
Total Professional Services $70,777
--- --------------------------------------------------
Staff Overhead $180,545
--- --------------------------------------------------
Other Expenses $113,913
--- --------------------------------------------------
TOTAL EXPENSES $2,831,393
INCOME AND EXPENSES
+ TOTAL INCOME $3,875,000
- TOTAL EXPENSES $2,831,393
--- --------------------------------------------------
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) $1,043,607
--- --------------------------------------------------
RETURN ON TOTAL EXPENSES 36.9%
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the entire project.
As with the Barton Farm, MFCLT was able to contain
their interest costs by selling nine out of 15 development
lots within two months. Through an agreement with the
Peabody estate, several of the lots were actually sold two
weeks before MFCLT closed on the farm.2 9 By the ninth month
of the project only two combined lots remained, and the
project was safely in the black.
This quick turnaround on the development parcels
contained all holding costs--interest, real estate taxes,
and insurance. The three expenses totaled only 2.4 percent
of the purchase price. Although there were "hard" costs and
other expenses, they totaled only $114,000.
It should be noted that because there was no sale of
farmland, I have used the capitalized value of the annual
rents to show the value of the income stream from the
agricultural land to TTOR. Rent paid for the farmland
during the sell-out period of the development parcels is
included in this capitalized income stream in both the
income and expense and subsidy source and use analyses.
Subsidy Source and Use
The financial lesson of Powisset Farm is that limited
development can, under the right conditions, provide
significant subsidies to support agricultural preservation.
2 9 Ward interview, December 23, 1987.
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TABLE 4-3: POWISSET FARM SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES
SUMMARY (acreage-based)
Percent
Subsidy
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources
Bargain Sale Subsidy $392,730 12%
APR Subsidy $350,000 11%
Open Space Sale Subsidy $250,000 8%
--- ----------------------------------------------------
Total Non-Development Subsidies $992,730 31%
Enhancement Subsidy $275,000 9%
Net Appreciation Subsidy $423,352 13%
Net Subdivision Subsidy $1,510,893 47%
-----------------------------------------
Total Limited Development Subsidies $2,209,245 69%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $3,201,975 100%
Percent
Subsidy
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses
Agricultural Preservation $1,676,190 78%
Open Space Protection $482,179 22%
Affordable Housing Contribution $0 0%
-------------------------------------------
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $2,158,368 100%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $3,201,975
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $2,158,368
-------------------------------------
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) $1,043,607
-------------------------------------
PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES 48.4%
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Figure 4-4: Powisset Farm Subsidy Source and Use Summary
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SOURCE
Using an acreage-based analysis and assumptions discussed
below, development subsidies accounted for 69 percent of the
subsidy sources (Table 4-3, Figure 4-4). It is likely that
this analysis underestimates both appreciation and the
extent and relative importance of the bargain sale, however.
Apportionment of Total Development Value
and Development Costs
Unlike the two other case studies, Total Development
Value and Development Costs were apportioned by acreage, not
frontage, for the Powisset Farm subsidy source and use
analysis.
The acreage-based analysis better accounts for the
large amounts of buildable land that lacked frontage on an
existing road, particularly the land that became the
agricultural and open space parcels. Indeed, appraisals for
the APR showed the potential for at least 15 large house
lots on interior sections of the agricultural parcel. And
lot prices in Dover in 1985 and 1986 would easily support
the construction of subdivision roads to make use of these
potential interior lots. 3 0
Using acreage as the basis for apportioning the Total
Development Value of the farm at acquisition overestimates
the value of the agricultural portion of the parcel and
underestimates the value of the development parcels,
3 0 LandVest, "Highest and Best Use Plan," and "Soils
Suitability & Highest and Best Use Plan Combined,"
photocopied plans from DFA Powisset Farm APR file, both undated.
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however. The agricultural land includes several wetlands
and areas unsuitable for septic systems.3 1 An acreage-based
analysis also does not account for the cost of constructing
roads, attributing an equal value to an acre of interior
land and an acre of frontage land. Neither the acreage nor
frontage method takes account of the value of the four
existing houses. Because it attributes less initial
value to the development parcels, the acreage-based analysis
exaggerates the Net Subdivision Subsidy.
TABLE 4-4: POWISSET FARM FRONTAGE-BASED SUBSIDY SOURCE
SUMMARY
Percent of
Subsidy
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources
Bargain Sale Subsidy $392,730 22%
APR Subsidy $350,000 20%
Open Space Sale Subsidy $250,000 14%
--- -----------------------------------------------------
Total Non-Development Subsidies $992,730 57%
Enhancement Subsidy $275,000 16%
Net Appreciation Subsidy $423,352 24%
Net Subdivision Subsidy $60,665 3%
--- -----------------------------------------------------
Total Limited Development Subsidies $759,017 43%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $1,751,747 100%
Because the preponderance of the frontage was used for
development and most of the acreage was restricted to
agricultural use, the Powisset subsidy sources are quite
sensitive to the method of apportioning the Total
3 1 LandVest, "Septic System Suitability Plan,"
photocopied plan in DFA Powisset Farm APR file, undated.
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Development Value. Using a frontage-based analysis (Table
4-4, compare with Table 4-3), more of the subsidies are
provided by the non-development sources. The most
significant difference is in the Net Subdivision Subsidy:
using an acreage-based analysis it is the largest single
subsidy, accounting for almost half of the subsidy source
(Table 4-3); under a frontage-based analysis it is the
smallest subsidy at only three percent of all subsidy
sources (Table 4-4).
Such a wide variation casts doubt on the results of
either method. In the absence of a full appraisal, it is
simply impossible to be certain of the apportionment of the
Total Development Value and the subsidies from each source
at Powisset Farm.
Non-Development Subsidy Sources
Under an acreage-based analysis, non-development
subsidies accounted for only 31 percent of all the subsidies
provided. Because of uncertainty over the Total Development
Value, however, they could have been higher.
Bargain Sale Subsidy
Executor Harry Rice said the $2.4-million sale price
for Powisset Farm was about $200,000 less than it was worth.
In the belief that this is still a low estimate of the
farm's development value at acquisition, I have assumed its
Total Development Value was $2,800,000.
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Assuming a Total Development Value of $2,800,000 yields
a Bargain Sale Subsidy of just under $400,000, or 12 percent
of all subsidy sources.
It is possible that the Total Development Value was
much higher. The APR review appraisal set the development
value of the agricultural land alone at $2,475,000 in
December, 1985, only three months after the land was
purchased by MFCLT, and nine months after the signing of the
purchase and sale. Ward felt there was a sharp increase in
values between the signing of the purchase and sale
agreement by the estate and MFCLT in April and the closing
six months later.3 2
Assuming a higher Total Development Value results in a
much higher, and much more significant Bargain Sale Subsidy
(Table 4-5). Assuming a Total Development Value of $4
million--which is certainly possible--would mean a bargain
sale subsidy of $1.6-million--almost 40 percent of all
subsidy sources.
TABLE 4-5: POWISSET FARM BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY
SENSITIVITY TO TOTAL DEVELOPMENT VALUE
Total Bargain Percent of
Development Sale Subsidy
Value Subsidy Sources
--------------------------------------------
$2,800,000 $392,730 12.3%
$4,000,000 $1,592,730 39.2%
$5,000,000 $2,592,730 54.3%
3 2 O'Leary, Appraisal Review; Ward interview, October 5,
1987.
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Agricultural Preservation Restriction Subsidy
and Open Space Sales Subsidy
While both of the other case studies can be
characterized as APR projects that were assisted by
development subsidies, Powisset Farm can be seen as a
successful limited development project that received
assistance from the sale of an APR and open space.
Under an acreage-based analysis, the $350,000 APR
provided 11 percent of the total subsidy sources, while the
Open Space Sales accounted for another eight percent.
The project would easily have produced a surplus
without the sale of either the APR or the conservation land
to Dover, a fact Ward said was not apparent until the
project was well underway."
Cost Subsidy
It is unlikely that there was much of a cost subsidy
provided at Powisset Farm. Ward felt certain that the
$180,500 attributed to staff and overhead costs did reflect
MFCLT's actual costs.
The estate provided a sort of cost subsidy by agreeing
to a late closing date, holding the farm while MFCLT planned
and executed the project with minimal carrying costs.
Development Subsidies
Taken as a whole, the development subsidies were
"*Ward interview, October 5, 1987.
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responsible for 69 percent of the total subsidies provided
under an acreage-based analysis. Even under a frontage-
based analysis development subsidies amount to almost half
of the subsidies provided, and still cover all of the
subsidy use by the project (Table 4-4, Appendix C-2).**
Enhancement Subsidy
Enhancement of the development lots by the agricultural
restriction or town conservation land at Powisset Farm is
difficult to assess. The assumptions of enhancement in this
case are based on lot-by-lot estimates provided by realtor
Peg Crowley, who marketed the lots (Table 4-6). Rather than
the enhancement premium being a rate assumed across all of
the lots, then, the premium shown is the result of adding
all of the individual lot enhancement values.
Enhancement at Powisset is complicated by the fact that
eight of the original 15 development lots abut Noanet
Woodlands. Any enhancement value added to lots by Noanet
should not be considered a subsidy resulting from the
Powisset Farm limited development project. Noanet had
already been donated to TTOR by the Peabody will by the time
the farm was purchased. In theory, the enhancement value
added to Powisset development parcels by Noanet Woodlands
would have been reflected in the market value of the farm
"*Because a frontage-based analysis attributes less of
the total development value to non-market land uses, less
subsidies are required.
110
when MFCLT purchased it. The enhancement subsidy measures
the internal enhancement--value added to the development
parcels by the restriction of sections of the limited
development project itself.
TABLE 4-6: POWISSET FARM LOT-BY-LOT ENHANCEMENT ESTIMATES
Percent of
Lot Sale Enhancement Unenhanced Unenhanced
Designation Price Premium Value Value
-------------------------------------------------------
South 3 $170,000 $25,000 $145,000 17%
South 5 $175,000 $25,000 $150,000 17%
South 7 $240,000 $25,000 $215,000 12%
South 10 $185,000 $75,000 $110,000 68%
North 3 $240,000 $0 $240,000 0%
North 4 & 5 $345,000 $0 $345,000 0%
South 6 $175,000 $25,000 $150,000 17%
North 8 $425,000 $100,000 $325,000 31%
West 6, 7, & 8 $375,000 $0 $375,000 0%
North 6 $470,000 $0 $470,000 0%
West 4 & 5 $375,000 $0 $375,000 0%
South 8 $0 $0 $0 0%
--------------------------------------------
TOTAL $3,175,000 $275,000 $2,900,000 9%
=A5
In addition, enhancement is difficult to assess at
Powisset because many of the development parcels did not
actually abut the restricted farmland or open space. Only
"
5The "South 3, 5, 6, and 7" lots are all similar and
abut the Town of Dover's open space parcel. The "South 10"
lot has restricted farmland on two sides, and includes a
house which Crowley felt actually detracted from the value
of the land.
Crowley felt the setting and restrictions on adjacent
land were important to the buyer of the "North 8," but
declined to estimate a value added. The $100,000 estimate
is mine. It represents, I believe, the maximum that can be
attributed to enhancement by the agricultural parcel across
the street.
Crowley felt the restrictions were of no importance or
value whatsoever to the "North 6" buyer."
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six of the 15 development lots abut the farmland or open
space, and two more lots are across Powisset Street from the
farmland. Crowley felt that value was added only to those
lots which abutted or faced the restricted agricultural land
or town conservation land."*
Crowley also maintained that enhancement was a function
of specific buyers, with some placing a high premium on the
setting and adjacent land uses and restrictions, and others
none at all.3 7
The $275,000 in enhancement value added to the lots,
represents about nine percent of the unenhanced value of all
of the development land. In other words, restricting part
of the land increased the overall value of the remainder by
only nine percent.
Compared to the other subsidy sources, the $275,000
enhancement subsidy was small--only nine percent of all
subsidy sources under an acreage-based analysis.
Although higher assumptions of the value added through
enhancement produce higher enhancement subsidies, very high
assumptions are necessary for enhancement to figure
significantly in the limited development (Table 4-7). Even
if the value added had been as high as 40 percent of the
unenhanced value, the Enhancement subsidy would account for
less than 30 percent of the total subsidy sources.
36 Ibid.
3 7 Crowley interview.
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TABLE 4-7: POWISSET FARM ENHANCEMENT
SUBSIDY SENSITIVITY TO ENHANCEMENT PREMIUM
Percent of
Enhancement Enhancement Subsidy
Rate Subsidy Sources
0.0% $0 0.0%
10.0% $288,636 9.0%
40.0% $907,143 28.3%
Net Appreciation Subsidy
Because the Powisset development parcels were sold so
quickly, appreciation contributed little to the project.
Indeed, more than half of the appreciation that did accrue
was on the two final sales.
I have added four months to the actual holding time of
all the development parcels to account for appreciation
between the purchase and sale between MFCLT and the estate
and the closing. While six months elapsed between the
agreement on a price for the farm and the closing, most of
the lot sale prices were agreed to only two months before
their closings.
The "Monthly Appreciation Rate" assumed is 2.0 percent,
which translates into an annual rate of 27 percent. Data on
appreciation in Dover from County Comps (comparables), also
known as County Home Data, a subscription service to New
England realtors, is shown in Tables 4-8 and 4-9. The data
are flawed because the median residential sale figures are
not based on comparable sales. Nevertheless, the County
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Comps data provide at least a rough benchmark for measuring
appreciation.
TABLE 4-8: INCREASE IN DOVER MEDIAN RESIDENTIAL SALES,
1st QUARTER 1985 to 3rd QUARTER, 1987
Monthly
Median Increase
Residential Rate from
Quarter Sale 1st Q, 1985
1st, 1985 $260,000
2nd, 1985 $295,000 4.30%
3rd, 1985 $279,500 1.21%
4th, 1985 $326,250 2.55%
1st, 1986 $244,000 -0.53%
2nd, 1986 $326,500 1.53%
3rd, 1986 $325,500 1.26%
4th, 1986 $325,000 1.07%
1st, 1987 $360,000 1.37%
2nd, 1987 $426,000 1.85%
3rd, 1987 $452,500 1.86%
TOTAL PERCENTAGE INCREASE 74.0%
MONTHLY INCREASE RATE 1.86%
= 38
There are two important points at which to measure the
appreciation rates for Powisset Farm. The first is during
the six months from the signing of the purchase and sale to
the closing (first to third quarters, 1985), when
appreciation was added to all of the development lots. The
County Comps data show a monthly appreciation rate of 1.2
percent for this period. Overall rates as of the preceding
and subsequent quarters were higher, however.
3 8 County Home Data, "Median Report for Dover,"
Shelburne, Vt.: County Home Data, photocopied documents,
fourth quarter, 1986 and third quarter 1987.
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The second period of concern is from the first quarter
of 1985 to the present, because the greatest amount of
appreciation was on the last lots sold. Based on the
quarterly median residential sales (Table 4-8), the overall
monthly appreciation rate from the third quarter of 1985 to
the third quarter of 1987 was 1.9 percent. If the monthly
appreciation rate is based on annual medians (including the
first half of 1987, Table 4-9), the rate is again just under
two percent.
TABLE 4-9: INCREASE IN MEDIAN RESIDENTIAL SALES, 1985-1987
DOVER AND NORFOLK COUNTY
DOVER NORFOLK COUNTY
Median Median
Residential Residential
YEAR Number Sale Number Sale
-- ------------------------------------------------------
1985 105 $266,000 12,617 $136,510
1986 139 $325,000 15,269 $173,586
Ja-Jun, 1987 90 $377,500 10,567 $184,164
1985 to 1986
TOTAL PERCENTAGE INCR. 22.2% 27.2%
MONTHLY INCREASE RATE 1.68% 2.02%
-------------------------------------------
1984 to January-June, 1987
TOTAL PERCENTAGE INCR. 41.9% 34.9%
MONTHLY INCREASE RATE 1.96% 1.68%
3 9 County Home Data (County Comps), "Statistical Report
for the Year of 1985 for Norfolk County," "Statistical
Report for the Year of 1986 for Norfolk County," and
"Statistical Report for the Months of January thru June,
1987 for Norfolk County," Shelburne, Vt.: County Home Data,
photocopied documents, 1986 and 1987.
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In all likelihood, land was appreciating at rates much
higher than buildings during this period and these figures,
which include both finished houses and unbuilt lots,
underestimate the appreciation rate for in land alone.
Assuming two-percent monthly appreciation, gross
appreciation of the unenhanced development land was
$482,200. When holding costs of interest, real estate
taxes, and insurance are subtracted, the Net Appreciation
Subsidy is $423,400 (Table 4-10). This accounted for 13
percent of all subsidies provided in the Powisset Farm
project.
TABLE 4-10: POWISSET FARM NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY
Gross Appreciation $482,240
- Interest, Real Estate Taxes, & Insurance $58,888
+ Rental Income $0
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY $423,352
TABLE 4-11: POWISSET FARM NET
APPRECIATION SUBSIDY SENSITIVITY TO
MONTHLY APPRECIATION RATE
Monthly Net Percent of
Appreciation Appreciation Subsidies
Rate Subsidy Provided
0.00% ($58,888) -1.8%
1.00% $202,931 6.3%
2.00% $423,352 13.2%
3.00% $611,463 19.1%
4.00% $774,019 24.2%
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Sensitivity analysis (Table 4-11) shows that the Net
Appreciation Subsidy would have a significant impact on the
project only given extremely high assumptions of monthly
appreciation. For net appreciation to account for a quarter
of the subsidy sources, we would have to assume appreciation
of four percent per month, or 60 percent annually. While
appreciation that high may have occurred for several months,
it is unlikely it continued for an extended period of time.
Net Subdivision Subsidy
The acreage-based analysis suggests that the surplus
produced by the Powisset Farm limited development was
largely the result of the creation and marketing of
subdivided building lots. Given the division of the Total
Development Value by acreage and initial assumptions of
enhancement, appreciation, and Total Development Value, the
Net Subdivision Subsidy was $1,511,000 (Table 4-12), or 47
percent of all the subsidies provided.
This result is sensitive to a number of assumptions,
however. It is sensitive to both enhancement value added
and the appreciation rate, but in both cases only extreme
assumptions alter the basic conclusion that the Net
Subdivision Subsidy was the single most important subsidy
provided.
The result is extremely sensitive to the method of
dividing the Total Development Value. Part of the reason
for the large Net Subdivision Subsidy can be seen in Table
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4-12 in the relatively low development value at acquisition,
$802,200, attributed to the development land. A frontage-
based analysis attributes a much higher value--$1.9 million-
-to the development land at acquisition, but attributes a
very low value--$529,000--to the agricultural land.
TABLE 4-12: POWISSET FARM NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
Total Development Value $2,800,000
* Market Development Land Percentage 29%
-- ----------------------------------------------------
Value of Development Land at Acquisition $802,224
Gross Sales of Development Land $3,175,000
- Value of Development Land at Acquisition $802,224
------------------------------------------
Increase in Value of Development Land $2,372,776
- Total Enhancement $275,000
- Gross Appreciation $482,240
------------------------------------------
Gross Subdivision Subsidy $1,615,536
- Professional & Staff Costs $104,643
------------------------------------------
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY $1,510,893
TABLE 4-13: POWISSET FARM NET SUBDIVISION
SUBSIDY SENSITIVITY TO TOTAL DEVELOPMENT VALUE
Total Net Percent of
Development Subdivision Subsidy
Value Subsidy Sources
$2,800,000 $1,510,893 47.2%
$4,000,000 $1,167,083 28.8%
$5,000,000 $880,575 18.5%
This suggests that it is the assumption of Total
Development Value itself which is too low. If we assume a
higher Total Development Value (Table 4-13), the Net
Subdivision Subsidy remains significant in absolute terms,
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but its relative importance as a subsidy source declines a
great deal.
Summary
Powisset Farm provides an example of the financial
potential of limited development. It also demonstrates the
limitations of the financial model used in this thesis.
Assumptions about the Total Development Value of the
farm and how that value is divided have a significant effect
on the results of the Powisset Farm analysis. Under any
assumptions, however, the development component of the
project provided a significant source of subsidy.
Attributing that Development Subsidy to specific
sources is more problematic. Although the acreage-based
analysis suggests that the Net Subdivision Subsidy was by
far the most important, a frontage-based analysis shows Net
Subdivision contributing very little to the project.
The assumption used for Total Development Value has a
marked effect on the results of the analysis as well.
Assuming a higher Total Development Value results in a
conclusion that more of the subsidy available to the project
came from non-development sources--specifically the Bargain
Sale--and less of it from development sources--specifically
Net Subdivision.
Powisset Farm was either a limited development
supported largely by the benefits of subdividing and selling
building lots, or by a bargain sale of the land.
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CHAPTER V: LOOMIS FARM
Although successful in protecting 176 acres of farmland
in Ashfield, Massachusetts, the Loomis Farm limited
development project illustrates some of the conflicts
inherent in limited development.
Without a financial need to do so, the limited
developer did not exploit the full potential of the
development parcels, subdividing them at very low densities.
Rather than producing a subsidy, the development portion of
the project was actually supported to some extent by the
subsidy provided by an APR.
Institutionally, the Loomis Farm shows the awkward
position a local land trust can be put in by assuming the
role of a developer. In addition, it illustrates what can
be a balancing act between the need for access to capital
and legal and development expertise, and the need for local
contacts and local market and political knowledge.
CASE HISTORY
The 451-acre farm Loomis Farm is located in Ashfield, a
Western Massachusetts "hilltown" where homebuyers commuting
to jobs in the Connecticut River Valley and buyers of second
homes are beginning to compete with agriculture--still the
town's main industry--for land. Since the early 1950's, the
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number of dairy farms in Ashfield has dwindled from more
than 40 to six.'
In spring 1985, Russell V. Loomis decided to sell the
dairy farm he had assembled in the 1940's. The farm was
actually two farms about a half-mile apart. At the time he
sold the farm, Loomis had 60 acres in corn, 20 acres in
pasture; the remaining 350 acres were woodland and wetland.
He planned to use the equity realized to buy a farm for his
son-in-law in Washington County, New York, an area that had
less non-agricultural competition for land.2
The Loomis farm's impressive views over wooded hills
and pastures and its 12,500 feet of road frontage along two
roads' (Figures 5-1, 5-2) had attracted bids from two "cut-
and-run speculators."' The parcel could have accommodated
up to 43 subdivision-approval-not-required house lots with
the minimum two acres and 200 feet of frontage required by
Ashfield bylaws, according to a plan prepared by the
'Telephone interview with Mark Zenick, Director,
Franklin Land Trust, November 30, 1987.
2 Trust for Public Land, Application Form for Loomis
Farm, Agricultural Preservation Restriction Act,
Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture, dated
August 29, 1985, p. 2; telephone interview with Russell V.
Loomis, Sr., December 18, 1987.
'APR Application, Attachment #2, "Degree of threat to
continuance of farming"; telephone interview with Mark
Zenick, December 23, 1987.
4 Zenick interview, October 2, 1987.
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Franklin Land Trust.'
At the time Loomis was deciding to sell his farmland,
two local residents, landscape architect Harry Dodson and
Franklin County Building Inspector Steve Judge, had begun
discussing the formation of a land trust dedicated to
preserving productive farmland in Franklin County. The pair
began discussions with Loomis and sought assistance from
several groups in establishing the land trust and protecting
the Loomis Farm from development. Dodson contacted an
acquaintance, John Feingold of the Trust for Public Land
(TPL). TPL, which had recently established a regional
office in Boston, agreed to assist in the creation of what
was to become the Franklin Land Trust (FLT), and to
participate in the effort to preserve the Loomis farm.'
TPL is a San Francisco-based national organization
founded in 1974 to be an "interim land owner," facilitating
the transfer of land from private to public hands. As a
private tax-exempt organization, is often able to act more
quickly than public agencies to secure land, and is able to
create charitable contribution benefits for sellers. TPL
sees its role as securing short-term control of the land,
'Franklin Land Trust, "Loomis Farm, Full Development
Potential," photocopied map, April, 1987; "Protective By-
Laws, Town of Ashfield, Massachusetts," Ashfield, Mass.:
Town of Ashfield, photocopied document, (1979), p. 4.
6 Telephone interview with Harry Dodson, Dodson
Associates, November 30, 1987; telephone interview with
Steve Judge, December 21, 1987.
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then selling it to public agencies or another organization
capable of long-term ownership and management. TPL also
seeks to work with existing local land preservation
organizations or assist in the creation of new ones, often
pursuing joint ventures with local land trusts which become
the eventual owners of the property. TPL deals with a wide
variety of land, including forest, farmland, and urban open
space.
TPL was primarily interested not in saving the Loomis
Farm, which it felt was "unremarkable," but in using
preservation of the farm as a "rallying point" around which
to establish a local organization to pursue open space and
farmland preservation in Franklin County. TPL felt the
Loomis farm was important symbolically and that other
Franklin County farmland would face the same development
threat."
The Franklin Land trust was informally organized in
May, 1985, and was officially incorporated in April, 1986.
A prime focus of the organization, which has a local
membership, was the preservation of active farming,
particularly dairy farming, in the hill towns of western
Franklin County.'
7 Interview with John Feingold, Director, Boston office,
Trust for Public Land, October 16, 1987.
8 Telephone interview with John Feingold, September 29,
1987; Zenick interview, November 30, 1987.
"Zenick interview, November 30, 1987; Judge interview.
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Despite his retirement and goals of establishing his
son-in-law as a farmer in New York, Loomis wanted to see his
farm continue in agriculture use. Loomis, who cannot
remember what offers were made for the property and what
values were estimated by appraisers, reportedly received
offers of $300,000 to $350,000 from private developers, and
a non-qualified (i.e. not acceptable to the Internal Revenue
Service' ) appraisal of $387,750. He agreed in June, 1985
to a contract sale price of $310,000 with TPL. A subsequent
IRS-qualified appraisal--considered low by some involved in
the case--set the value of the farm at $319,000, allowing
Loomis to claim a $9,000 charitable contribution deduction
from his federal income tax. 1
Loomis was paid $50,000 in cash ($37,000 from TPL, and
$13,000 in zero-interest loans from three local residents),
and TPL assumed Loomis's $88,000, 11% fixed rate, 30-year
mortgage from the Farm Credit Service. The final $172,000
was in the form of secondary financing provided by Loomis,
with $15,000 quarterly principal payments and 11-percent
interest.12
"
0 For an appraisal to qualify, it must be done by an
appraiser certified by one of several national organizations
recognized by the IRS.
''Feingold interview, October 16, 1987; Loomis interview.
1
2 Feingold interview, October 16, 1987; Trust for
Public Land, "Certified Copy of a Resolution Adopted by the
Executive Committee of the Board of Directors of the Trust
for Public Land," (included with Agricultural Preservation
Restriction file, Massachusetts Department of Food and
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A group of farmers assisted FLT in identifying which
portions of the original farm parcel should be preserved to
provide for an economically viable farm. They identified
176 acres for protection, including all of the open pasture
and cropland, and 100 acres of wooded land. 3 TPL applied
for an agricultural preservation restriction (APR) from the
Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture on the 176
acres in September, 1985. The eight-acre farmstead parcel
with the original farmhouse (Loomis lived in a newer house
across the street which he has retained), was not included
in the APR. TPL intended to lease both the farmland and the
farmstead parcel to a farmer pending approval of the APR,
when it would be sold to the farmer.14
The remaining land was subdivided into 16 potential
development parcels, of which 12 were actually sold for
development. Deed restrictions on combined lots reduced the
number of houses which can be built to a maximum of nine.15
The original plan (Figure 5-3) provided for nine frontage
lots of four to 12 acres each along West Road in the
northern section of the farm. In addition, the plan called
Agriculture), dated September 5, 1986.
13 TPL, Loomis Farm APR application form, p. 2.
"
4 APR application; Zenick interview, October 2, 1987;
Feingold interview, October 16, 1987; Judge interview.
"Lots "F" and "G" in the northern section of the farm
were sold to a single buyer and restricted to only one
house, as were lots "J," "K," and "L," also in the northern
section of the farm.
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for three large lots of 42, 50, and 107 acres, each
restricted to a single house.'"
Had the APR been rejected or been smaller than hoped,
FLT had a contingency development plan calling for
additional development parcels. The contingency plan
included five additional lots on the 42-acre parcel (parcel
"C" of the north section of the farm), and three lots on
what has become restricted farmland with frontage on West
Road (parcel "A" on the south portion of the farm).17
TPL preferred higher density subdivision of the
development parcels, but the financial contribution of the
APR and the failure of some lots to pass percolation tests
led to implementation of the lower density plan, one
participant said. Although it would have used less land for
development, clustered detached housing on smaller lots or
attached housing was rejected for the site because it was
not allowed under Ashfield bylaws and subdivision controls
and it was felt there was little or no market for it in
Franklin County.1"
All of the development lots were wooded and carried
'Franklin Land Trust, "Loomis Farm, Farmland
Preservation Plan," photocopied map, April, 1987.
"
7 Zenick interview, October 2, 1987.
18 Zenick interview, October 2, 1987; "Protective By-
Laws, Town of Ashfield, Massachusetts," Ashfield,
photocopied document, p.5 (Section IV, B); "Rules and
Regulations Governing the Subdivision of Land in the Town of
Ashfield, Mass.," Ashfield, photocopied document, p. 9
(Section VI, C); Judge interview.
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deed restrictions requiring the maintenance of a 200-foot
wooded buffer along the road. Deed restrictions also
required that utilities to the lots be buried and limiting
driveways to 12 feet in pavement width and a 16-foot cleared
swath. Although not required to, buyers have been
encouraged to share driveways.19
TPL had considerable difficulty attracting a farmer.
Advertisements in New England Farm elicited responses from
"hobbyists and retirees, but not farmers." 2 o A dairy farmer
found by FLT moved into the farmhouse during the winter of
1985-86, but negotiations to purchase the farm broke down
and he moved out.2" Subsequently, Department of Food and
Agriculture staff put TPL in contact with Patricia Libby and
Kim Reardon, two part-time goat farmers looking for a farm.
They began leasing the farm in June 1986 for $600 per
month.22
After a "long, frustrating, protracted process"2 3 the
Department of Food and Agriculture purchased an APR on the
176 acres of farmland for $166,000 in December, 1986. The
state paid the entire sum, with the Town of Ashfield
"'Zenick interview, October 2, 1987.
2 oTelephone interview with John Feingold, October 29, 1987.
2 1 Feingold interview, October 16, 1987; Zenick
interview, November 30, 1987; Judge interview.
2 2 Feingold interview, October 29, 1987; telephone
interview with Patricia Libby, November 23, 1987.
2 3 Zenick interview, October 2, 1987.
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attributing its inability to contribute to the constraints
imposed by Proposition 2 1/2.24 The farm, including the
unrestricted farmstead parcel as well as the 176 restricted
acres, was sold to Libby and Reardon in April, 1987 for
$130,000.
Libby and Reardon reported considerable difficulty in
obtaining financing. Limits on the security value of the
restricted land and the price of the farm given its
"terrible" condition were reasons given for denying them
financing. They were forced to put $30,000 down to get a
conventional $100,000 bank mortgage secured by the
unrestricted farmstead and buildings. Financing was further
complicated by a contaminated spring providing water to the
house, obliging TPL to install a well.25
The farmers also said they felt TPL had little interest
in them purchasing the land and little concern with their
ultimate success as farmers. In contrast, they claim that
Mark Zenick, Director of the Franklin Land Trust, "came
through" and has provided "moral support." Zenick
attributed the difficulties between the farmers and TPL to a
"real clash of cultures" between the farmers and TPL's New
York legal staff.2"
2 
4 APR application.
2 'Libby interview.
2
'Libby interview; Zenick interview, October 2, 1987.
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TABLE 5-1: LOOMIS FARM DEVELOPMENT LOT SALES
Lot Sale TPL Sales Final Sale
Designation Date Acres to FLT Price
South B, C-1, 2/87 14.6 $7,000
C-2, & C-3
North C 2/87 42.1 $38,675 $45,500
North E 2/87 4.5 $17,850 $21,000
Farmstead 4/87 8.4 $56,000
North D 4/87 5.3 $16,575 $19,500
North F & G 5/87 9.4 $30,600 $36,000
North J, K, & L 10/87 23.9 $29,900
South D-3 12/87 106.6 $46,640
North H & I 12/87 10.0 $14,875 $17,500
North B UNSOLD 50.3 UNSOLD
TOTAL 275.1 $279,040
Lot sales got underway in late 1986, and are being
completed as of this writing (Table 5-1). FLT purchased an
option from TPL on seven of the development parcels at the
higher of a base wholesale price or 85 percent of their
final sale price. TPL's Feingold said this was an attempt
to repay FLT for its planning and marketing work on behalf
of the project. By putting FLT in the chain of title to the
land, it also gave the local organization legal standing to
enforce the development restrictions attached to the deeds
of the parcels.
Two lots, "H" and "I" in the northern section of the
farm, were purchased in December, 1987 by the Franklin
County Community Development Corporation for affordable
housing. The FCCDC paid a total of $17,500 for the two
lots, of which $14,875 went to TPL and the remainder to FLT.
FLT's Mark Zenick estimated the market value of the combined
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lots to be at least $35,000. FCCDC has contracted local
builders to produce two single family homes, which are
expected to retail for about $90,000 each.2 7
TPL has contracted to sell the 106-acre lot ("D-3" on
the southern section of the farm) for $46,640, with a
closing expected in January 1988. Although FLT will not get
15 percent of the final sale price, it will hold a mortgage
on the property worth close to 15 percent of the sale price.
The purchaser of the land is expected to donate 46 interior
acres, including a beaver pond and stream, to FLT. FLT
plans to donate the 46 acres, in turn, to The Trustees of
Reservations, which has purchased an adjacent parcel, which
is itself adjacent to an existing TTOR reservation. Because
there is no contractual requirement that the lot buyer
donate the land, however, he will be able to claim a
charitable contribution deduction if a donation occurs.2
The 50-acre lot ("B" on the northern section of the
farm) has failed all percolation tests within 300 feet of
the road, and any development of the lot is likely to be set
back at least 1,000 feet. The land was advertised in the
Boston Globe as "recreation land" for $45,000 in December,
1987, and Zenick reported interest from several parties.
Four parcels totaling about 15 acres ("B," "C-i,"
2 7 Feingold interview, October 29, 1987.
2 Feingold interview, October 29, 1987; Zenick
interviews, October 2, November 30, and December 22, 1987.
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"C-2," and "C-3" on the southern section) were sold to
abutters seeking a buffer area for $7,000 in November,
1986.29
TPL's expenses for the entire project were:
Financing Costs $56,000
Real Estate Taxes $5,500
Insurance $2,000
Legal Services $19,000
Planning & Engineering $4,000
Surveying $10,100
Staff Salary and Benefits $30,400
Administrative Overhead $15,200
Travel $750
The $30,400 in TPL Staff Salary and Benefits is based on
records of billable time, according to Feingold. The
$15,200 Administrative Overhead fee is based on 50 percent
of the billable hours and benefits.3
Land planning for the project was provided free by
Dodson, who estimated its value between $8,000 and $10,000,
and FLT provided most of the marketing of the development
land. Although no accounting of project expenses was kept
by FLT, the $20,800 it made by reselling the seven lots can
be attributed entirely to FLT's expenses and did not produce
a surplus for the local organization, according to Mark
2
'Feingold interview, October 29, 1987; Zenick
interviews, October 2, November 30, and December 22, 1987;
Boston Sunday Globe, real estate classified section,
December 20, 1987, p. A-58.
3 Feingold interview, October 16, 1987.
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Zenick. 3 1
John Feingold of TPL attributed the two-year
development process and added interest expenses at Loomis
Farm to several factors. Winter stalled both the survey and
percolation tests until the spring of 1986. "Time was
against us," said Feingold. In addition, the survey was
stalled by title complications and poor deeds. Finding a
farmer to lease and purchase the restricted farmland further
complicated the project, as did the delay in obtaining the
APR.3 2 Legal expenses were increased because of an
abandoned attempt to arrange a tax-free exchange, purchasing
the New York farm to swap with Loomis for his farm.
Feingold felt the lessons of Loomis Farm were to limit the
"moving parts" of future limited developments to expedite
the projects and contain costs, and to try to sell
restricted agricultural land to established local farmers
who are looking to expand.3 3
The relationship between TPL and FLT was cooperative,
with FLT supplying local knowledge and representation, as
well as planning and marketing, and TPL providing the
capital to undertake the project, and the legal and
development expertise to carry it out.
There was some conflict inherent in the relationship,
"Dodson interview; Zenick interview, December 22, 1987.
3 2 Feingold interview, October 29, 1987.
3 3 Feingold interviews, September 29 and October 29, 1987.
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however, and it was occasionally strained."* FLT had
conceived of and initiated the limited development project,
but TPL, as the purchaser and developer, held legal title to
the land and ultimate control of the project. FLT's
objectives for the Loomis Farm were to preserve active
agriculture with as little development as possible. TPL's
main interest was in establishing FLT. But TPL also
supports itself in part through its projects, and needs some
income from each project. While FLT answered to a local
membership, TPL is not a membership organization, and
answered to its national office."'
FLT and the Loomis Farm limited development project
have met with some antagonism from townspeople who felt the
entire farm should have been preserved. "We were viewed
with distrust and suspicion locally, as just another
developer," said Steve Judge. Many of those misgivings have
been dispelled with the successful completion of the project
and the realization that very little of the farmland has
been visibly developed, Mark Zenick said.3 *
"Judge interview.
asFeingold interview, October 16, 1987.
3
'Judge interview; Zenick interview, December 22, 1987.
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AGRICULTURAL IMPACT
Pat Libby and Kim Reardon have had difficulty
establishing a new farm on the former Loomis Farm. Problems
have included lack of capital, poor condition of the farm
and farmhouse, and being unable to farm full time.
Libby brought livestock--70 to 75 goats which had been
kept on leased land--with them, but no equipment. Without
equipment, they have been unable to seed down pasture land
that had been allowed to go to weeds in the year that the
farmland went unused. They have had to close in and rewire
the barn and do a great deal of work on the house. Their
first winter on the farm saw a barn roof collapse and
illness among their livestock."7
Libby and Reardon continue to work full-time jobs in
addition to farming, limiting the effort they can put into
improving and maintaining the farm. "You sort of get used
eating dinner at eleven o'clock and getting up at five,"
said Pat Libby. Attempts to produce hay proved difficult
because there was not enough daylight left after work to mow
the hay. They have hired part-time help on occasion and
often resort to bartering to pay for work around the farm."3
The two farmers plan to eventually put in 20 acres of
small fruit trees and vegetables, and keep 60 acres in
"Libby interview.
38 Ibid.
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pasture and hay to support the herd of goats. In addition
to the goats, they produce small quantities of beef,
poultry, and vegetables for their own consumption and for
barter."*
To date, only one house has been built on the
development lots. The farmers have reported no conflict
with this homeowner, but have had two complaints from other
neighbors, one complaining about wind-blown corn husks, the
other objecting to the cutting of trees on the restricted
farm parcel (the APR in no way restricts the cutting of
trees). The farmers anticipate little conflict with
neighbors over agricultural practices because of the large
wooded buffer zones (400 to 1,500 feet) between all but one
of the houses and the fields, and their intention to use few
if any chemical pesticides."
FINANCIAL ANALYSES
The main financial lesson of the Loomis Farm is that
environmentally motivated, low-density planning can undercut
potential "subdivision" subsidies. In this case, TPL and
FLT forwent potential income from the development parcels by
subdividing into large lots with extensive frontage after
paying for the land based on close to its maximum
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
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development potential.
In addition, the case suggests that inflationary land
markets can add considerably to the value of the land
selected for development, but that much of that potential
benefit can be eaten up by added interest costs of holding
the development land.
Financial analysis of the Loomis Farm project also
points out how unimportant enhancement of development lots
can be, particularly in rural areas where open space is
commonplace.
Income and Expense
Assumptions
The purchases of the restricted farmland and the
unrestricted farmstead parcel to Libby and Reardon have been
separated for this analysis. I have considered only the
restricted farmland to be agricultural land, and have
treated the farmstead as a development parcel. I have used
the APR review appraiser's estimate of the agricultural
value of the 176 restricted acres as the sale price of
agricultural land to the farmer. The $56,000 difference
between the $130,000 Libby and Reardon paid for both the
farmland and the farmstead and the $74,000 has been
considered the sale price of the farmstead parcel.*"
In order to analyze the project as a whole rather than
*
1 Feingold interview, October 16, 1987.
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TABLE 5-2: LOOMIS FARM INCOME AND EXPENSES
INCOME
Total Rental Income $5,400
Sale to Farmer $74,000
APR Sale $166,000
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales $240,000
Open Space Land Sales $0
Market Development Land Sales $261,540
Affordable Housing Land Sales $17,500
Total Development Land Sales $279,040
Other Income $0
TOTAL INCOME $524,440
EXPENSES
Purchase Price $310,000
Financing $56,000
Real Estate Taxes $5,500
Insurance $2,000
Legal Services $19,000
Planning & Engineering $4,000
Surveying $10,100
Other Services $0
Total Professional Services $33,100
Staff Overhead $46,350
Other Expenses $20,925
TOTAL EXPENSES $473,875
SURPLUS AND RETURN
+ TOTAL INCOME $524,440
- TOTAL EXPENSES $473,875
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) $50,565
RETURN ON TOTAL EXPENSES 10.7%
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simply from TPL's perspective, I have used the final sales
prices for the lots resold by FLT under the option agreement
with TPL. The 15 percent of the sale price that went to FLT
has been considered payment for development expenses, and
entered into the spreadsheet as "Other Expenses."
The "Staff Overhead" entry includes TPL's accounting of
staff salaries and benefits, the added overhead described in
the case history, and travel expenses.
Results
The project was quite successful in "making ends meet,"
producing a surplus of $50,600--an 11 percent return on the
Total Expenses (Table 5-2).
Two considerations suggest that the project was, or
could have been, even more successful than the analysis
indicates. First, this surplus is what remained after TPL
fully accounted for staff salaries and benefits, as well as
for its overhead fee. FLT's returns on the lot sales also
have been accounted for as an expense rather than part of
the surplus.
Second, the 11-percent return is based on total
expenses, which include high interest and legal costs. If
the surplus is viewed in light of the purchase price, it
appears much more substantial.
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Subsidy Source and Use
In terms of subsidy sources and uses, the Loomis Farm
was very successful (Table 5-3, Figure 5-4). Based on
assumptions about Total Development Value, appreciation, and
enhancement (discussed below), subsidy sources provided are
almost double the subsidies needed by non-market portions of
the project.
The project's success was due entirely to external,
non-development subsidies. Rather than providing a cross-
subsidy to the agricultural component of the project, the
development component of the Loomis Farm actually received a
subsidy from the non-development sources--the APR and the
bargain sale.
Non-Development Subsidies accounted for $175,000, or
163 percent of all subsidy sources, virtually all of it from
the $166,000 APR subsidy. Total Development Subsidies were
negative $67,300--a 63-percent drain on the total subsidies
provided.
Apportionment of Total Development Value
and Development Costs
Because 1985 house lot prices in Ashfield would not
have supported the construction of roads to service interior
lots, I have apportioned the Loomis Farm Total Development
Value and development costs by frontage, not acreage.
Switching to an acreage-based analysis would not change
the basic conclusion that non-development subsidy sources
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TABLE 5-3: LOOMIS FARM SUBSIDY SOURCE AND USE SUMMARY
Percent of
Subsidy
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources
Bargain Sale Subsidy $9,000 8%
APR Subsidy $166,000 154%
Open Space Sale Subsidy $0 0%
--- -----------------------------------------------------
Total Non-Development Subsidies $175,000 163%
Enhancement Subsidy $10,000 9%
Net Appreciation Subsidy $13,398 12%
Net Subdivision Subsidy ($90,738) -84%
------------------------------------------
Total Development Subsidies ($67,339) -63%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $107,661 100%
Percent of
Subsidy
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses
Agricultural Preservation $58,970 103%
Open Space Protection $0 0%
Affordable Housing Contribution ($1,874) -3%
------------------------------------------
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $57,096 100%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $107,661
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $57,096
-------------------------------------
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) $50,565
PE6--------------------------
PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES 88.6%
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Figure 5-4: Loomis Farm Subsidy Source and Use
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USE
SOURCE
Summary
were responsible for the success of the project. Under the
acreage-based analysis (Appendix D-1), 133 percent of all
subsidies would come from non-development sources, and
development sources would represent a 33 percent drain on
subsidies.
Non-Development Subsidy Sources
Bargain Sale Subsidy
The Total Development Value assumed was the $319,000
qualified appraisal of the entire farm sold by Loomis.
There were no reliable numbers available for the developers'
offers made to Loomis before TPL purchased the farm.
Although there was a much higher, unqualified appraisal, I
feel it may have overestimated the value of the farm by
failing to take into account the limited suitability of some
parts of the farm for septic systems.
This assumption of $319,000 Total Development Value
results in a minimal bargain sale subsidy of $9,000. Using
the unqualified appraisal amount of $387,750 as the Total
Development Value would yield a significant bargain sale
subsidy of $77,750.
Agricultural Preservation Restriction Subsidy
The subsidy supplied by the sale of the APR to the
state for $166,000 provided for all of the subsidy use by
preservation of the agricultural land, as well as helping to
cover the negative Net Subdivision Subsidy. In other words,
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the analysis suggests that a high APR not only subsidized
agricultural preservation, but also contributed to the
subsidy used by the low-density subdivision of the
development parcels and to the project surplus.
The APR was based on the difference between a fair
market value (of only the 176 acres covered by the APR)
appraisal of $260,000 and an agricultural value appraisal of
$74,000. In addition, the review appraiser deducted $10,000
in value he felt would be added to the other parcels owned
by TPL as a result of the restriction.4 2
If the initial development value of the 176 acres of
restricted farmland is based on frontage, it was worth
$101,000, considerably less than the $260,000 estimated by
the APR appraiser. Some of this difference in value can be
attributed to appreciation between the purchase of the land
by TPL and the APR appraisal. The remaining discrepancy is
due to either undervaluation by the qualified appraiser,
overvaluation by the APR appraiser, or incorrect
apportionment of the initial value of the entire farm in
this analysis.
Open Space Sale Subsidy
Because there was no direct sale of open space, no Open
Space Sale Subsidy has been analyzed here. There was,
however, a slight subsidy through the sale of the 46 acres
42 Ibid.
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from the 106-acre lot that is expected to be contributed to
FLT and eventually to TTOR. If the value of the 60 acres
alone was known, any additional amount paid by the lot
purchaser in expectation of a charitable contribution
deduction for the donation of the 46-acre section would
represent a subsidy to conservation of the open space.
Wetlands, steep slopes, and limited road access make it
unlikely that the rear 46 acres has much development value
alone.*"
Development Subsidy Sources
Enhancement Subsidy
Because Ashfield and surrounding towns are still rural,
value added to the development parcels due to restriction of
adjacent land was probably minimal.
The review appraisal done for the APR program estimated
the total value added to TPL's unrestricted land at the
Loomis Farm because of the agricultural restriction (which
it calls "estate value") to be $10,000.**
I have adopted this $10,000 assumption as the overall
value added to the development parcels through enhancement.
This translates into an enhancement premium of 5.1 percent
of the unenhanced value of the lots. The $10,000 Enhancement
4 3 FLT, "Loomis Farm ... Farmland Preservation Plan."
4 4 Zenick interview, October 2, 1987; Feingold
interview, October 16, 1987.
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Subsidy represented only nine percent of all the subsidy
sources.
Case participants, local brokers, and the APR appraiser
concurred that there was little or no enhancement value
added to the development parcels. Mark Zenick of FLT, who
has marketed most of the lots, felt there was no value added
to them due to enhancement, but speculated that the lots
sold quicker because of the restriction on the farmland,
providing an unknown benefit to FLT and TPL. In a second
interview, he estimated that restriction of adjacent farm or
open space land could have added at most 13 percent to the
value of the development parcels.*"
Three area realtors and appraisers interviewed all felt
that there was no enhancement value added to the development
lots. "It's just not going to happen," said Susan
Louisigneau, a realtor and appraiser. "It's still very,
very rural up here. People aren't worried about a
subdivision in their backyard." She echoed Zenick's feeling
that the restrictions on the adjacent farmland probably
facilitated lot sales, but maintained it would not have
added to the prices paid by consumers. Louisigneau stressed
the same point made by all realtors and brokers interviewed:
without being able to compare otherwise identical lots with
4 Zenick interviews, October 2 and November 30, 1987.
The 13 percent premium represents $4,000 in value added to
the $26,000 base value of a hypothetical two-acre building
lot with views comparable to those at the Loomis Farm.
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and without adjacent restricted land--almost an
impossibility to find--there is no way to be certain of the
value added by enhancement.**
Realtor Philip Pless of Masamont Realty insisted that
the agricultural restriction provided no enhancement
whatsoever of the value of the Loomis development lots.
Reasons he stated were the length of the lots, the abundance
of undeveloped land in Ashfield, and the lesser importance
to homebuyers of protecting land behind, rather than to
either side, of their lots.4"
Appraiser Kim Levitch of Levitch Realty asserted that
there would be no enhancement value added because of the
point in the "real estate cycle" at which the lots were
sold. He maintained that in periods of high demand, such as
that in Ashfield in 1986 and 1987, amenities add less to the
value of real estate. Only when there is a surplus of
supply over demand in building lots will buyers weigh and
pay for such amenities as adjacent restricted land, he
claimed.**
If enhancement is assumed to be more than $10,000, the
value of the Enhancement Subsidy would be higher (Table 5-
4), but not significantly. Even at 15 percent--more than
**Telephone interview with Susan Louisigneau, December
22, 1987.
4 7 Telephone interview with Philip Pless, Masamont
Realty, November 30, 1987.
48 Levitch interview.
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anyone involved with the case suggested it could have been,
it would account for only $26,800 in subsidy.
TABLE 5-4: LOOMIS FARM ENHANCEMENT SUBSIDY
SENSITIVITY TO ENHANCEMENT PREMIUM
Percent of
Enhancement Enhancement Subsidies
Premium Subsidy Provided
0.0% $0 0.0%
5.0% $9,788 9.1%
10.0% $18,685 17.4%
15.0% $26,810 24.9%
Net Appreciation Subsidy
TPL's purchase and subsequent sale of the Loomis farm
coincided with a extraordinary increase in land values seen
in Franklin County.
I have assumed a monthly appreciation rate of two
percent based on data from County Comps and interviews with
case participants and area realtors.
The County Comps data on quarterly median sales, which
are based on relatively small samples and include the Loomis
Farm lot sales themselves, suggest an overall monthly
appreciation rate of about 2.6 percent, with wide variations
(Table 5-5). The annual median sales suggest a monthly
appreciation rate of two to three percent for Ashfield
itself and 1.7 to 1.8 percent for Franklin County as a whole
(Table 5-6). It should be remembered that the median
residential sales are primarily sales of finished homes, not
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unbuilt lots. One of the realtors interviewed and Ashfield
Assessor Malcolm Clark stressed that appreciation in the
value of land alone exceeded overall appreciation of houses
and land.**
TABLE 5-5: INCREASE IN ASHFIELD MEDIAN RESIDENTIAL
SALES, 2nd QUARTER, 1985 to 3rd QUARTER, 1987
Monthly
Median Appreciation
Residential Rate from
Quarter Sale 2nd Q, 1985
2nd, 1985 $62,000
3rd, 1985 $68,500 3.38%
4th, 1985 $69,450 1.91%
1st, 1986 $51,000 -2.15%
2nd, 1986 $79,250 2.07%
3rd, 1986 $92,250 2.68%
4th, 1986 $80,000 1.43%
1st, 1987 $173,500 5.02%
2nd, 1987 $94,500 1.77%
3rd, 1987 $122,500 2.55%
TOTAL PERCENTAGE INCREASE 97.6%
MONTHLY INCREASE RATE 2.55%
50
Interviews with Zenick, three area realtors, and an
Ashfield assessor provided similar results. Zenick
estimated that values of buildable raw land rose 50 percent
from 1985 to 1987. Levitch set the annual increase for 1985
and 1986 at about 25 and 27 percent respectively--an overall
**Pless interview; telephone interview with Malcolm
Clark, Chairman, Ashfield Board of Assessors, December 3,
1987.
s*County Home Data, "Median Report for Ashfield,"
fourth quarter, 1986 and third quarter, 1987, Shelburne,
Vt.: County Home Data, photocopied documents.
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monthly appreciation rate of two percent. Louisigneau
estimated monthly appreciation during the period at two
percent, but said it was uneven, ranging from zero to three
or four percent. Pless estimated that raw land values had
doubled during the same period--a monthly appreciation rate
of 2.9 percent. This view was shared by Malcolm Clark,
Chairman of the Ashfield Board of Assessors, who based his
rough estimate on comparisons of recent residential sales
with the assessments on the same property, last revalued in
1985.51
TABLE 5-6: INCREASE IN MEDIAN RESIDENTIAL SALES, 1985-1987,
ASHFIELD AND FRANKLIN COUNTY
DOVER NORFOLK COUNTY
Median Median
Residential Residential
YEAR Number Sale Number Sale
-- -------------------------------------------------------
1985 56 $62,000 1,873 $61,840
1986 65 $79,000 2,470 $75,760
Ja-Jun, 1987 35 $106,250 791 $86,365
1985 to 1986
TOTAL PERCENTAGE INCREASE 27.4% 22.5%
MONTHLY INCREASE RATE 2.04% 1.71%
-- -------------------------------------------------------
1985 to January-June, 1987
TOTAL PERCENTAGE INCREASE 71.4% 39.7%
MONTHLY INCREASE RATE 3.04% 1.87%
5 1 Zenick interview, November 30, 1987; Levitch
interview; Louisigneau interview; Pless interview; Clark
interview.
5 2 County Home Data, "Statistical Report for the Year
1985 for Franklin County," "Statistical Report for the Year
1986 for Franklin County," and "Statistical Report for the
MOnths of January thru June, 1987 for Franklin County,"
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Assuming two percent monthly appreciation, gross
appreciation added a very high $71,500 to the value of the
development land. When holding costs are subtracted, and
rental income added, however, the Net Appreciation subsidy
is only $13,500 (Table 5-7). This represents only 12
percent of all subsidy sources. Despite sustained, very
high appreciation in Ashfield during the period of the
development, then, appreciation contributed little in
subsidies to the Loomis Farm project.
TABLE 5-7: LOOMIS FARM NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY
Gross Appreciation $71,498
- Interest, Real Estate Taxes, & Insurance $63,500
+ Rental Income $5,400
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY $13,398
TABLE 5-8: LOOMIS FARM NET APPRECIATION
SUBSIDY SENSITIVITY TO MONTHLY APPRECIATION RATE
Monthly Net Percent of
Appreciation Appreciation Subsidy
Rate Subsidy Sources
0.00% ($58,100) -54.0%
2.00% $13,398 12.4%
4.00% $57,566 53.5%
This result is sensitive to the monthly appreciation
rate assumed (Table 5-8). Although the monthly appreciation
rate certainly varied and may have been higher than two
percent, it is unlikely that it was higher than four percent
Shelburne, Vt.: County Home Data, photocopied documents.
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for any sustained period of time. Even assuming overall
monthly appreciation of four percent, the Net Appreciation
Subsidy would be $57,566--still much less significant that
the APR Subsidy of $166,000, or the negative Net Subdivision
Subsidy.
Net Subdivision Subsidy
The large negative Net Subdivision Subsidy is the most
surprising result of the financial analysis of the Loomis
Farm (Table 5-9). This doesn't seem to make sense: when
land is legally subdivided and passes percolation tests, its
value usually goes up, not down.
TABLE 5-9: LOOMIS FARM NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
Total Development Value $319,000
* Market Development Land Percentage 65%
-- ----------------------------------------------------
Value of Development Land at Acquisition $205,970
Gross Sales of Development Land $261,540
- Value of Development Land at Acquisition $205,970
-- ----------------------------------------------------
Increase in Value of Development Land $55,570
- Total Enhancement $10,000
- Gross Appreciation $71,498
-- ----------------------------------------------------
Gross Subdivision Subsidy ($25,928)
- Professional & Staff Costs $64,809
--- ----------------------------------------------------
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY ($90,738)
But the Net Subdivision Subsidy includes more than
that. It also includes the value added to or lost from the
development portion of the original farm as a result of the
design of the subdivision that takes place. At the Loomis
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Farm, the negative Net Subdivision Subsidy reflects TPL's
and FLT's decision not to use the full development potential
of the development parcels, as well as the negative impact
of the restrictions placed on the development lots.
By subdividing the development land into relatively
large parcels with long frontage, TPL and FLT gave up
potential subsidies from the development of the land.
According to plans prepared by Dodson, the entire farm might
have supported 43 lots as-of-right. Twenty-five of these
possible lots would have been in the portions of the
original farm that were designated for development--more
than twice the number of house lots called for in the
original limited development plan. On a smaller scale,
the four parcels sold for $7,000 to neighbors as a buffer
zone could have been sold (if they passed percolation tests)
as three house lots, and the 42-acre lot could have
supported six house lots.5"
As in the other cases, the Net Subdivision Subsidy is
sensitive to assumptions of monthly appreciation rate and
the Total Development Value. The enhancement premium
assumed has little effect on the conclusions.
This result is not particularly sensitive to the
monthly appreciation rate assumed. Even with no
appreciation the Net Subdivision Subsidy would still be
s"Franklin Land Trust, "Loomis Farm, Full Development
Plan" and "Loomis Farm, Farmland Preservation Plan," both
photocopied plans, April, 1987.
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negative, although much smaller (Table 5-10). And had the
appreciation rate been higher, there would be an even larger
negative Net Subdivision Subsidy.
TABLE 5-10: LOOMIS FARM NET SUBDIVISION
SUBSIDY SENSITIVITY TO MONTHLY APPRECIATION RATE
Monthly Net Net
Appreciation Subdivision Appreciation
Rate Subsidy Subsidy
0.00% ($19,240) -18%
2.00% ($90,738) -84%
4.00% ($134,905) -125%
The basic conclusion that there was a significant
subsidy loss due to the development plan is not sensitive to
the Total Development Value assumed (Table 5-11). Nobody
involved in the case has suggested that TPL paid more for
the farm than it was worth, and assuming a higher Total
Development Value produces an even lower Net Subdivision
Subsidy. In other words, if the farm was worth more than
assumed here, then it had even greater development potential
that was not exploited.
TABLE 5-11: LOOMIS FARM NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
SENSITIVITY TO TOTAL DEVELOPMENT VALUE
Total Net Percent of
Development Subdivision Subsidy
Value Subsidy Sources
$319,000 ($90,738) -84%
$387,750 ($135,128) -102%
$450,000 ($175,321) -114%
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Summary
The Loomis Farm demonstrates that development does not
always produce a profit which can be used as a subsidy. The
analysis makes it clear that the development parcels used a
subsidy rather than producing one.
This is not to say that TPL or FLT made the "wrong"
decision in subdividing the land so sparsely--the project
was financially quite successful without any added
development. As land conservation organizations, both TPL
and FLT were concerned with minimizing the impact of
development on the environment. FLT, as a locally-based
membership organization, could have lost a great deal of
support by pursuing denser development, threatening its
existence and hindering further projects.
It is important to observe, however, that decisions
concerning density of development can have a profound effect
on the subsidy generated by development. Because of its
institutional structure and political position, a non-profit
land trust may not be able to fully assume the role of a
developer. The nature, make-up, and motivation of a non-
profit may prevent it from seeking a significant return
through development.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSIONS
Although many see limited development as the answer to
financing land protection in the face of escalating land
prices, it is not a panacea. Limited development rarely can
provide all, or even most, of the financial support
necessary to support the purchase and protection of resource
land.
Limited development also casts a non-profit
conservation organization in the role of a for-profit
developer, creating conflicts in motivation and temperament.
It forces the non-profit to make basic development strategy
decisions and to accept considerable financial risk.
When limited development is used for agricultural
preservation, the reduction in size of the farmland does not
necessarily reduce its agricultural viability. Proximity to
residential use can be troublesome but is not unusual for
farms in metropolitan areas. Protection of farmland does
not ensure agricultural success, and can even limit farmers'
access to credit.
Given these limitations, it is unlikely that limited
development can be more than a marginal tool in the
protection of farmland--in rare cases providing significant
subsidies for land protection, but most often providing only
supplemental support.
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This chapter will discuss limited development from four
perspectives: financial effectiveness and strategy
considerations; institutional implications; agricultural
viability; and policy context.
FINANCIAL EFFECTIVENESS AND STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS
In examining non-profit limited development from a
financial perspective, there are two basic questions to
address:
1. Is limited development effective in
subsidizing the non-market use of land? Can it
provide significant cross-subsidies, or does it
merely supplement existing public and private
subsidies?
2. What is the source of the subsidies that
limited development does provide? Is it
enhancement by adjacent restricted land? Is it a
windfall from appreciation in land values? Or is
it turning raw land into legally buildable lots?
What strategies does this imply for a non-profit
limited developer?
Non-Development v. Development Subsidies:
Is Limited Development Financially Effective?
Limited development is often seen in land conservation
circles as a way to finance the protection of land by
harnessing market development forces. The three case
studies suggest, however, that except in very active real
estate markets limited development is only marginally
effective as a tool for financing land conservation.
The case studies offer only one suspect example--
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Powisset Farm--of limited development wholly paying for the
protection of valuable land. At both the Barton and Loomis
Farms, it was non-development subsidies--the APR and sale of
open space--that provided most or all of the subsidies used
to protect farmland and open space (Table 6-1, Figure 6-1).
At Barton, only 16 percent of the total subsidies
provided came from development sources. The development
subsidies covered only 15 percent of what the project's
non-market land uses required in subsidies. At the Loomis
Farm, the development aspects of the Loomis Farm actually
used subsidies, rather than contributing to the subsidies
available.
TABLE 6-1: NON-DEVELOPMENT AND DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES
COMPARED
Barton Powisset Loomis
-- -------------------------------------------------------
Non-Development Subsidies $300, 000 $792,730 $175,000
Percent of Total Sources 84% 26% 163%
Percent of Total Uses 82% 37% 307%
--------------------------------------------
Development Subsidies $56,807 $2,288,214 ($67,339)
Percent of Total Sources 16% 74% -63%
Percent of Total Uses 15% 106% -118%
--------------------------------------------
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $356,807 $3,080,944 $107,661
--------------------------------------------
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $366,716 $2,158,368 $57,096
In contrast, at Powisset Farm the development portion
of the project accounted for most of the subsidies
available. Furthermore, the analysis suggests that limited
development could have supported all of the non-market uses
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Figure 6-1: Barton, Powisset, and Loomis Farm Subsidy Source
and Use Comparison
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without any external subsidies from the APR, sale of open
space, or bargain sale.
The relative importance of the development and non-
development subsidies is sensitive to the assumptions in
each case study. For Powisset Farm, alternative assumptions
would diminish the importance of the development subsidies,
although they would continue to be significant. For both
Barton and Loomis, alternative assumptions would have little
impact on the basic conclusion that the development
subsidies were not significant. Even under alternative
assumptions, then, of the three case study projects, only
Powisset Farm was effective in subsidizing non-market land
uses through limited development.
Some of success of limited development at Powisset is
probably due to its location in Dover, one of the most
expensive real estate markets in the Boston area. Most
practitioners feel that limited development works best in a
"somewhat overheated"1 market such as Dover's. 2 Assessing
the constraints of limited development in research that led
to the creation of the Land Planning and Management
Foundation (LPMF), Davis Cherington noted that
'Interview with Peter Stein, Trust for Public Land,
October 27, 1987.
2 John Malamut, "Compromise Development: Bridging the
Gap between Development and Preservation," Urban Land,
March, 1987, p. 4.
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[glenerally, [limited development] works best in
upper income real estate markets where buyers are
willing to pay a substantial premium for proximity
to preserved land.'
Inability to find projects in "active real estate markets"
was cited by Cherington as one of several difficulties which
hampered LPMF's first year of operations.'
Such real estate markets are not necessarily in
metropolitan areas. In rural northwestern Connecticut and
New York's Duchess county, a private limited developer,
Country Lands, Inc., relies on a market fueled by wealthy,
often New York-based clientele purchasing second homes.'
The case studies suggest, then, that limited
development generally does not provide more than marginal
support to non-market land uses, and can require support
itself. Only in an active, expensive real estate market did
the development component of one of the case study projects
provide significant subsidies to non-market land uses.
Even without providing subsidies, limited development
can help make land conservation more affordable by limiting
the amount of land that needs to be subsidized. Reselling
'Davis Cherington, "Limited Development Research
Project, Final Report," Beverly, Mass.: The Trustees of
Reservations, The Society for the Protection of New
Hampshire Forests, and the Ottauqueechee Land Trust, (July,
1986).
4 Letter from Davis Cherington, President, Land Planning
and Management Foundation, December 23, 1987.
5 Interview with Ralph Goodno, partner, Country Lands,
Inc., November 6, 1987.
163
development parcels permits a limited developer to protect
and subsidize only critical portions of a site.
Where Do Development Subsidies Come From?
The case study financial analyses, because they are
based on assumptions and often suspect data, cannot
definitively tell us what created the development profits
that were available to subsidize non-market land uses. But
however inconclusive, the case studies do provide some
evidence of what creates development subsidies.
While most land conservationists put great store in
enhancement as the source of limited development profits,
the case studies do not bear this out. Rather, they suggest
that what I have collectively called "subdivision"--design,
testing, surveying, obtaining subdivision approvals,
marketing, and, importantly, bringing the pieces and players
of a complex project together--adds the greatest value to
limited development parcels. While specific data is scant,
the case studies provide some evidence that enhancement is
limited in value and is a function of the specific site,
lot, and buyer. Appreciation can add significantly to the
value of development land, but usually at the expense of
added holding costs and risk.
The significance of each development subsidy implies
certain strategies for non-profit limited development,
including decisions about the limited developer's role in
the project, the holding period, and design. Like any
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developer, a non-profit limited developer must consider its
purpose, its expertise, its access to capital, and its
willingness to accept risk in making these decisions. It
must also weigh the benefits and risks involved in the
specific project and inherent in the real estate market in
which it is operating.
Net Subdivision Subsidy
If we accept the assumptions and inputs discussed in
each case study, subdivision was the most important source
of gross value added to development parcels at Barton and
Powisset Farms (Table 6-2).
TABLE 6-2: GROSS VALUE ADDED TO DEVELOPMENT LAND
Barton Powisset Loomis
Total Development Sales $272,300 $3,175,000 $261,540
- Initial Value $186,957 $744,922 $205,970
--- ----------------------------------------------------
Total Value Added $85,343 $2,430,078 $55,570
to Development Land
Total Enhancement $24,755 $275,000 $10,000
Percent of Value Added 29% 11% 18%
--- ----------------------------------------------------
Gross Appreciation $0 $482,240 $71,498
Percent of Value Added 0% 20% 129%
-- -----------------------------------------------------
Gross Subdivision Subsidy $60,589 $1,672,838 ($25,928)
Percent of Value Added 71% 69% -47%
When holding and development costs are subtracted from
gross appreciation and the gross subdivision subsidy,
respectively, the conclusion remains that the Net
Subdivision Subsidy was the most important source of
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development subsidies at both farms (Table 6-3, Figure 6-2).
These conclusions must be tempered by the reliability
of the data and assumptions on which they rest, however. At
Barton, there was no appreciation and the value of
enhancement is purely an assumption. The Powisset result is
questionable due to uncertainty over the Total Development
Value and method used to apportion it.
For the Loomis Farm, the low-density subdivision
actually decreased the value of the development land (Table
6-2). When development costs are subtracted, a small drop
in value becomes a large negative Net Subdivision Subsidy
(Table 6-3).
TABLE 6-3: DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
(NET VALUE ADDED TO DEVELOPMENT LAND)
Barton Powisset Loomis
-- -------------------------------------------------------
Enhancement Subsidy $24,755 $275,000 $10,000
Percent of
Development Subsidies 44% 12% 15%
--------------------------------------------
Net Appreciation Subsidy ($8,053) $445,019 $13,398
Percent of
Development Subsidies -14% 19% 20%
--------------------------------------------
Net Subdivision Subsidy $40,105 $1,568,195 ($90,738)
Percent of
Development Subsidies 71% 69% -135%
--------------------------------------------
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES $56,807 $2,288,214 ($67,340)
That the creation of buildable lots adds more value to
land than appreciation or enhancement should not be
surprising. When the highest and best use of land is for
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development, the basic value of that land is in the legal
permission to build on it, or the potential to obtain that
permission. Appreciation is not based on the land itself,
but on the value of the legal right or potential to build on
that land. Similarly, enhancement should not be viewed as
value added to the land, but as value added to the
underlying value of being able to build on land. Attractive
views or adjacency to protected land adds little or nothing
to the value of a piece of land that cannot be built upon.
The importance of what I have generically called
"subdivision" in creating development subsidies has
implications for limited development strategy. A limited
developer must decide whether it will act only as the
assembler and deal-maker of a project who wholesales
undivided development parcels to a builder, or if it will
assume the added role of a land developer who tests,
designs, subdivides, and markets the subdivided building
lots.
Underlying this decision are questions of how much
internal development subsidies are needed to make the
project successful, and whether the limited developer has
the expertise need for land development and is willing to
assume the risk involved. Wholesaling development land
limits the potential benefits from development parcels, but
also limits the risk to the limited developer from added
financial commitment, the approvals process, and marketing
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the lots.
Decisions affecting the intensity of development have a
profound impact on subsidies produced by limited
development. In order to maximize subdivision subsidies,
the limited developer must be willing to act like a for-
profit developer and exploit the full development potential
of the non-restricted land. In order to obtain any
subdivision subsidy, the limited developer must be willing
to subdivide the land at densities high enough to cover at
least the land and development costs due to the development
parcels. When the limited developer is a non-profit
conservation organization, however, decisions over density
are often driven as much by concerns with the natural
environment, landscape quality, and public image as they are
by maximizing returns.
Appreciation
Although it is often thought that holding land in an
inflationary land market brings a huge windfall, the cost of
holding land usually eats away at any benefits to a limited
developer and presents serious risk.
Of the two projects that experienced appreciation,
Loomis is the most instructive. Despite two years of
phenomenal inflation in the Ashfield real estate market,
appreciation provided little in net benefits to the project.
The gross value added to the Loomis development parcels by
appreciation was $71,500 (Table 6-2)--35 percent of the
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value of the development land when acquired (Total
Development Value divided by frontage). But when holding
costs are subtracted, only $13,400 in Net Appreciation
Subsidy remains.
Although it provided little benefit to the Loomis
project, the extended holding period could have easily
jeopardized its success. Had monthly appreciation been one
percent--13 percent annually--the project would have barely
broken even, producing little in surplus (Table 6-4).
TABLE 6-4: LOOMIS FARM NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY,
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL), AND RETURN ON TOTAL EXPENSES
GIVEN MONTHLY APPRECIATION RATE
Monthly Net Surplus Return
Appreciation Appreciation or on Total
Rate Subsidy (Shortfall) Expenses
0.0% ($58,100) ($24,589) -5.2%
1.0% ($26,351) $8,783 1.9%
2.0% $13,398 $50,565 10.7%
6
With both the Barton and Powisset Farms, MFCLT strove
to avoid risk from holding land, selling development parcels
as soon as--or even before--the farms were purchased. This
quick turnaround limited any benefits from appreciation, but
allowed MFCLT to avoid the risk of holding either property.
When a limited developer must pay holding costs, even
very high appreciation can provide little benefit. The
*This uses the predictive analysis described in Chapter
II. As related there, it is based on the initial
assumptions of the frontage-based Loomis Farm analysis
discussed in the case study.
170
irregularity of appreciation also poses great risk to a non-
profit limited developer, who have little ability to ride
out even short-term market swings. All of this points to
the wisdom of MFCLT's strategy of selling development
parcels as quickly as possible.
Enhancement
Most descriptions of the benefits of limited
development stress the value added through enhancement. It
is attractive to conservationists that what they do--protect
natural resources--can provide some of the money with which
to do it. Although the case studies offer no definitive
proof, I believe enhancement does not provide substantial
benefits in most limited developments.
In four different studies of the value added to real
estate by adjacent park land, estimates range between 10 and
45 percent7 , while the National Association of Home Builders
has argued that enhancement by park land may only 15 to 20
percent."
Realizing this potential enhancement value through
limited development is difficult, however. The value of
'Daniel S. Greenbaum and Arleen O'Donnell, Losing
Ground: The Case for Land Conservation in Massachusetts,
Lincoln, Mass.: Massachusetts Audubon Society (October,
1987), pp. 30-31.
8 Open Space Pays, The Socioenvironomics of Open Space
Preservation, New Jersey Conservation Foundation,
Morristown, New Jersey, p. 9, cited in Greenbaum and
O'Donnell, p. 30.
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enhancement to a limited developer is not the long-term
value added to the development parcels, but only the extra
amount buyers of the development parcels are willing to pay
due to the adjacent restricted land. Because the potential
worth of an adjacent amenity may not be understood for many
years, enhancement may be worth little to a limited
developer who must sell lots immediately. For both the
Barton and Loomis Farms, participants and realtors suggested
that the limited developer realized little in enhancement
subsidies, but that enhancement would add more to the value
of the lots in the future.
Using the assumptions described in the case studies,
enhancement contributed relatively little to the increase in
value of development parcels or the subsidies to non-market
land uses in any of the case study projects (Tables 6-2 and
6-3). The Barton financial analysis suggests that
enhancement added no more than 30 percent to the unenhanced
value of the development parcels, and probably much less.
At Powisset, realtor Crowley's estimates of enhancement
suggest that enhancement by the restricted farmland and open
space added about 10 percent to the overall value of the
development land. Participants, realtors, and the APR
review appraisal all felt enhancement was negligible at
Loomis Farm.
The most important lessons about enhancement from the
case studies are qualitative, not quantitative. Enhancement
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is largely dependent on factors beyond the control of the
limited developer, including the local real estate market,
the physical qualities of the site itself, local regulations
which govern site design, and the individual buyer who
places a monetary value on enhancement.
From the Loomis Farm the clear lesson is that
restricted open land adds little value to surrounding
properties in rural areas. In other words, adjacent open
land is worth less where there is more of it, and
restrictions prohibiting development are worth less where
there is less perceived threat of development.
The physical arrangement of parcels in a limited
development has an impact on enhancement as well. Realtor
Crowley argued that value is added only when development
parcels actually abut restricted land. Realtor Philip Pless
maintained for Loomis Farm that restricted parcels on either
side of a development lot add more value than they do at the
rear where there is less likelihood of future development.
He also asserted that with larger lots there is less
enhancement value added because the restricted land is
farther away and of less concern. Virtually all of the
brokers interviewed also insisted that the value added by
enhancement is largely a function of the individual
purchaser.
Enhancement by restricted farmland is even more
problematic. The noise, smells, and perceived threat of
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chemical pesticides associated with farming limit potential
enhancement of surrounding property values. The degree to
which active agriculture provides enhancement is a function
of the type of agriculture, the siting and landscaping of
the house lots, the terrain, and the individual homeowners
and farmers involved.
Enhancement of the value of development parcels by
adjacent restricted land is not what drives limited
development. Rather, enhancement can provide only slight
increases in the value of development parcels and is
difficult to realize. The potential for enhancement value
is specific to each site and lot, and is largely beyond the
control of the limited developer.
Careful arrangement of development lots--maximizing
adjacency to restricted land and making full use of views
and natural features--may increase the value of enhancement.
Pursuit of enhancement should not take priority over the
creation of building lots in the first place, however.
Summary
Limited development typically provides only marginal
subsidies to non-market land uses which can be used to
supplement traditional methods of financing land
conservation. It is perhaps best thought of not as a
potential source of subsidies, but as disposition of land
which is not critical to the conservation goals for which
the site was purchased.
174
To the extent that subsidies are sought from limited
development, the effort should concentrate on adding value
by turning raw land into subdivided building lots. Non-
profit limited developers should minimize carrying costs and
financial risk by selling development lots as quickly as
possible.
INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
The very term "limited development" suggests the
underlying institutional contradiction: developers don't
try to limit their own profits, and those who limit
developers actions don't seek profit from development.
Non-profit, environmentally motivated land trusts face
inherent conflicts in purpose, motivation, and temperment
when they act as limited developers. They are constrained
in the pursuit of development profits by their membership,
need to maintain a public image, and access to development
skills and capital.
For-profit limited development are constrained by the
need to earn a return on their investment of effort and
risk, and by the competition from other developers willing
to exploit the development potential of land fully.
This section is primarily concerned with institutional
constraints on the non-profit limited developer, and only
secondarily with the potential role of private limited
developers.
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The Non-Profit as Limited Developer
The case studies provide some indication of the
institutional contradictions of a non-profit conservation
organization trying to profit from development.
When pursuing the primary goals of farmland and open
space protection, the case study limited developers were
clearly and comfortably acting as conservationists. When
they assumed the role of a for-profit developer to pursue
the secondary goal of making money from the exploitation of
land, however, the limited developers were less certain of
their purpose. Their actions as developers were restrained
by their instincts as conservationists. While a for-profit
developer would try to maximize profits within legal and
political limitations, the non-profit limited developers
tried to earn only a minimum profit with the least
development possible.
At both Powisset and Loomis Farms the limited
developers lowered the original density of the project by
combining lots and pursuing a less intense subdivision as it
became apparent that they did not need additional funds to
make ends meet. At Loomis, the final development did not
even support itself, requiring a subsidy from other sources.
In all three cases, development parcels were sold with a
range of environmentally motivated restrictions which may
have lowered the prices the limited developer received.
Although it appears that the protection of farmland and open
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space was not impaired by sparse subdivision and development
restrictions, they reveal an underlying conflict in roles.
Some of this conflict is due to the structure of the
non-profit organizations undertaking limited development.
The control of a non-profit limited developer by membership
and the need to maintain its public image can hinder it in
seeking a profit from land development.
The Loomis Farm provides examples of two extremes. The
Trust for Public Land, as a non-membership national
organization which derives operating income from "non-profit
profits," is freer and more motivated as an organization to
maximize subsidies from the development components of its
projects. But TPL lacked the local knowledge essential to
effective land development. The Franklin Land Trust,
because it is a local organization, has to answer to its
membership and to some extent to the larger community. Even
the minimal development at the Loomis Farm drew criticism.
This conflict is not unique to FLT. The criticism the
Housatonic Valley Association (HVA) received for a limited
development it carried out in Connecticut was among the
factors that led Ralph Goodno to leave HVA and form Country
Lands, Inc., a private for-profit limited developer.'
Public image is also cited as a problem for non-profit
limited developers by former MFCLT Executive Director and
9 nterview with Ralph Goodno, November, 1987; telephone
interview with Ralph Goodno, October 10, 1987.
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TTOR Deputy Director Davis Cherington in research on the
structure of a new limited development organization, the
Land Planning and Management Foundation (LPMF), which he now
heads. "Without careful attention to public relations, a
land trust's development activities are often misconstrued
and criticized," his report states. 10
These role conflicts have financial implications for
limited developers. Goodno cited lack of access to capital
as the most difficult hurdle land trusts must overcome as
limited developers. Land trusts, he said, are either unable
to get cash, or afraid--with good reason--of debt.1 1
Cherington links this difficulty to the nature of the
projects and the organizations undertaking them:
Charitable trusts have found it difficult to raise
private investment capital in part because
entrepreneurs are understandably wary of projects
with a combination of charitable and for-profit
objectives. Land trusts, in turn, are wary of
entering into partnerships which may be difficult
to control, particularly when the entrepreneurs
may be board members of the organization, or
abutters of the parcel undergoing limited
development.12
LPMF was an "experiment" in creating a new limited
development entity which is a non-profit foundation with a
1
*Cherington, "Limited Development Research Project,
Final Report," p. 1.
1 1 Goodno interview, October 10, 1987.
12Cherington, "Limited Development Research Project,
Final Report," p. 2.
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for-profit subsidiary. LPMF and the subsidiary were
intended to form limited partnerships with for-profit
builders and developers around specific projects. 3
After 14 months of operation, however, LPMF was unable
to support itself through returns on limited development
projects as planned. Cherington attributes this to seven
factors, including "...lack of sufficient investment capital
to undertake projects which involve more than a few months
holding time." In addition, he cited problems of high land
prices, diminished income tax incentives for bargain sales,
covering too large a geographic area (Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Vermont) and reliance on three parent
organizations for referrals of potential projects.'"
If limited development is to be more than a marginal
tool for land protection, it must generate significant
subsidies to non-market land uses. The reluctance of non-
profit environmental groups to fully exploit land for profit
decreases the subsidies generated by limited development, as
well as hampering the limited developer's access to capital.
Alternative Limited Development Entities
Non-profit environmental groups are not the only
limited developers. Municipalities and for-profit entities
also have undertaken limited development.
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*Ibid, pp. 7-8, 11-12.
'*Cherington letter, December 23, 1987, p. 1.
Municipalities are in some ways better suited to be
limited developers than land trusts. Towns have much easier
access to capital, and can bear much greater financial risk-
-in the end they do not have to make ends meet. It is
common for municipalities to subsidize land protection from
non-project revenue. But getting an appropriation or
bonding approval from town meeting or a city council can be
difficult and subjects a project to open public debate.
Municipalities as limited developers face the basic
constraint, too, that each one can act only within its
borders.
For-Profit Limited Development
For-profit limited development is a paradox. It
requires a developer who is normally driven to maximize
profit to sacrifice profit. In for-profit limited
development, limits must somehow be imposed on the profit
motive of the developer."
At Country Lands, Inc., the limits are imposed by the
partners' willingness not to develop land fully. This
commitment permits Country Lands to buy properties from
buyers unwilling to sell to conventional developers.
Country Lands also is able to get "bargain sales" from land
"Throughout this discussion, a "for-profit limited
developer" is one who subsidizes non-market land use through
development profits. It does not mean a developer who is
paid by the state (as with an APR) or town (by sale of open
space) for the protection of land.
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owners who don't want their property fully developed, even
without offering charitable contribution deductions. And
unlike a non-profit, a for-profit limited developer can take
advantage of tax deductions for contributions of land or
development rights."'
Other ways Country Lands is able to compete with
conventional developers include savings in infrastructure
costs and cost subsidies, chiefly in the form of cost
sharing of agricultural planning services offered by the
Soil Conservation Service.17
Country Lands structures its projects as limited
partnerships, maintaining control as the general partner.
Although its objective is to develop as little of the land
as possible and there is no guaranteed return to the limited
partners, Country Lands must maintain a strong enough return
to continue attracting investors for future projects.18
Another Connecticut-based for-profit investment
company, Farmvest, also uses limited development, but views
it primarily as a source of cash to purchase farms and
finance capital investment in the farming operation.1"
Limited development calls for a marriage between a
"'Goodno interviews, October 10 and November 6, 1987.
17 Ibid.
1"Ibid.
1'Dougald MacDonald, "Clients Don't Know Red Top From
Ragweed on Folly Farm," New England Business; interview with
Austin Dunham Barney and Brad Beeler, November 6, 1987.
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conservation ethic and the profit motive. Any marriage of
the two is bound to involve conflicts, and it is perhaps the
greatest challenge of limited development to structure the
marriage to resolve, or at least sidestep those conflicts.
AGRICULTURAL VIABILITY
The use of limited development for farmland protection
poses the question of whether the protected farmland remains
viable. Concerns which underlie this question are the
reduced size of farms protected by limited development,
potential conflicts with residential neighbors, the form of
tenure, and finding farmers willing and able to operate the
farm.
The case studies suggest that limited development--at
least in New England, and particularly in metropolitan
areas--does not necessarily diminish the viability of the
farmland it protects. Although limited development pose
potential handicaps for agriculture, these are best
understood as part of a larger pattern of urbanization which
has compelled farmers to adapt their operations.
In terms of size, little or no land was taken out of
agricultural production by the three case study limited
development projects. Even the relatively small parcels at
Barton Farm remained viable when used by established farmers
accustomed to farming small, dispersed parcels.
Furthermore, smaller farm sizes and more intensive use of
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agricultural land are typical of farming in metropolitan
areas. 20
Although annoying to farmers, conflicts with
residential neighbors usually do not threaten agricultural
viability.2 1 In each of the three case studies limited
development added residential abutters for the farms. This
adjacency is a fact of life for metropolitan farmers,
however. In the long-run, any farm in Sudbury or Dover will
abut residential uses. Limited development at least offers
the opportunity to design the physical interface between the
two land uses in a way that diminishes conflicts.
Moreover, none of the farmers in the three case studies
reported significant conflicts with neighbors. Through
careful management and by providing information to
neighbors, Verrill and Arena minimize conflicts. Libby's
intention to farm organically will also eliminate some
potential conflicts.
The form of tenure created difficulties at Powisset
Farm. Although TTOR leased the land to ensure that it
2 oChristopher R. Bryant and Thomas R. R. Johnston, "The
City's Countryside: Landscapes of Opportunities or Conflict
for Farming," Waterloo, Ontario: Department of Geography,
University of Waterloo, unpublished paper presented at the
annual meeting of the Association of American Geographers,
Portland, Oregon, April, 1987, p. 2.
2 1 Tom Johnston and Barry Smit, "An Evaluation of the
Rationale for Farmland Preservation Policy in Ontario," Land
Use Policy, July, 1985, pp. 232-33.
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continued to be used for "meaningful" agriculture,2 2
conflicts arose between the farmer and the owner over
changes to the land and buildings. Davis Cherington also
asserted that leased farmland is typically abused by tenants
who have no long-term interest in the land.
Both the Powisset and Loomis Farms show the potential
difficulty in finding a viable farmer to purchase or rent
protected farmland. Comparison with the Barton Farm
suggests that established local farmers looking to expand
are better able to assume and use the restricted farmland.
Locating such a farmer can be difficult or impossible,
however.
One of the hopes of restricting farmland through the
APR program or limited development is to remove land cost as
an obstacle to new farmers. Pat Libby's and Kim Reardon's
experience at what is now Cross Farm suggests that
undercapitalization is also a major obstacle to starting new
farms. Because the deed restriction on the farmland reduced
its market value, it also reduced Libby's and Reardon's
access to credit in purchasing and starting the farm.
The two for-profit Connecticut limited developers,
Farmvest and Country Lands, provide examples of how limited
development can help overcome this obstacle. In both cases
profit from the sale of development parcels is invested in
the farming operation as well as being used to subsidize the
2 2 Cherington interview, December 29, 1987.
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purchase of the farmland. Country Lands retains and
operates the farmland itself, trying to reestablish
profitability, while Farmvest offers investors partnerships
in operating farms.23
There is a basic question of whether environmental
groups preserve agricultural land for its continued use or
for aesthetic reasons, and what impact their motives have on
the viability of farmland. Cherington felt the two
motivations are not mutually exclusive, and pointed to
MFCLT's successful work with farmers on a number of
projects.24
Dunham Barney of Farmvest argued that environmentalists
in land trusts are not connected to the agricultural
community or agriculture. "Environmentalists aren't
fundamentally supportive of agriculture," he said. "If
you're going to preserve farmland, you must preserve
farmers. You need to design not just the development, but
the agricultural use of the land."25
Limited development does not necessarily affect the
viability of farmland. To the extent that it is effective
in financing the protection of farmland, limited development
increases the viability of farmland by lowering its price.
The constraints limited development places on farming are no
2 aGoodno interviews, Barney and Beeler interview.
2
*Cherington interview, December 29, 1987.
25Barney interview.
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different than those faced by farmers throughout
metropolitan areas.
POLICY CONTEXT
Protecting farmland through limited development poses
several broad policy questions, including:
1. Does the protection of agricultural land and
open space justify the exclusive housing typical
of limited development? Does limited development
work only with exclusive housing?
2. Where, and under what circumstances is limited
development most appropriate as a tool for
agricultural preservation?
3. What is the role of limited development? Can
it replace direct subsidy programs? Can it
compete with full development for land?
Affordable Housing v. Conservation: Limited Development for
Whom?
Because limited development typically produces
exclusive housing, there have been charges that it is
"gentrifying" the countryside. Moreover, protection of
farmland and open space diminishes the supply of land
available for housing, driving up housing prices.2"
Ralph Goodno defended Country Lands' exclusive product
by arguing that its first priority is to preserve land and
its second priority is to produce a profit so it can
2
'Malamut, p. 6; Goodno interviews.
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continue to attract investors.2 7 In his research report,
Cherington notes the conflict over housing affordability as
well:
Because lots must sell for premium prices, limited
development tends to have a "gentrifying" effect
on an area. Arguably, however, upper income
buyers should be the ones to pay for open space
preservation from which the public-at-large may
then derive some benefit.2"
In the face of finite resources, the fundamental goal
of farmland or open space protection takes precedence in
limited development. At the Barton Farm, for instance,
added subsidy use by affordable housing would have increased
the project's shortfall.
The question of affordable housing becomes important
when a limited development project generates a surplus.
After meeting their initial conservation goals, a limited
developers has a number of options. It can decrease the
density of the development, creating even more exclusive
house lots but lowering the profit from the development
parcels; it can protect additional land rather than selling
it for development; it can put the surplus to a related use
(such as providing a maintenance endowment Noanet Woodlands
from the Powisset surplus); it can use the surplus to
provide non-land support to agriculture; or it can include
27Goodno interviews.
2 aCherington, "Final Report," p. 6.
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affordable housing.
There is potential for combining affordable housing and
agricultural preservation in limited development projects.
At Loomis Farm, for example, two out of nine potential
houses will be affordable. The negative $1,900 subsidy use
by affordable housing at Loomis Farm (Table 5-3, page 143)
means that TPL and FLT made a slight profit on the sale of
the affordable lots--despite selling them at half their
expected market price. Although the Loomis market
development parcels did not produce a subsidy, the higher
density and more efficient use of land allowed the
affordable lots to generate a small subsidy despite discount
prices.
It is not a forgone conclusion that exclusive housing
is necessary to make limited development work. Because
upper income lot buyers are able to pay the highest premium
for the amenity of adjacent restricted land, creating
exclusive lots supposedly provides a greater subsidy--
through enhancement--to the project.
The case study financial analyses suggest, however,
that even with exclusive buyers enhancement creates far less
in subsidies than the basic act of creating approved
building lots. If this is true, limited developers may be
able to provide greater subsidies to non-market land uses by
creating greater numbers of smaller, more affordable lots.
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A Tool for the Suburbs and the Metropolitan Fringe
To the extent that it is effective as a tool for
financing land conservation, limited development is most
effective in areas with high demand for housing--typically
the suburbs and metropolitan fringe.
Limited development produces subsidies through the sale
of house lots, and is predicated on a demand for those lots.
The same development pressure that creates the need for land
conservation in the first place provides the market for
limited development lots. One of the reasons Cherington
cited for LPMF's difficulties was that "[mlany of the
partial development opportunities ... were located outside
of active real estate markets, making partial development
infeasible."2 9  This feature of limited development is not
unique to New England.3 *
Although enhancement appears not to be important to the
success of limited development, it is likely to contribute
more to limited development where open land is scarcer or
there is a perception that open land is disappearing.
In suburban and metropolitan fringe areas, as well,
limited development can to some extent mitigate the impact
of urbanization on agriculture.
Because it is market-driven, limited development works
best where direct subsidy programs can least afford to
2
'Cherington letter, p. 1.
3 Malamut, p. 4.
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operate. Limited development allows the APR program to keep
operating at least at the fringe of the metropolitan Boston
region." At Powisset Farm, for example, limited
development produced subsidies which the APR program could
not afford to provide. Realistically, the APR at Powisset
Farm was a token contribution to ensure a permanent
agricultural restriction on the land. Limited development
offers a complement to the APR program, not a way to replace
it.
Can Limited Development Make a Difference?
Perhaps the most important question about limited
development is whether it can make a significant difference
in protecting farmland, or whether it provides a series of
interesting but anomalous experiments.
If, as the financial analyses suggest, substantial
bargain sales, government subsidies, and government
purchases of conservation land are needed for limited
development to work, then it is only a marginal tool for
financing land protection. Limited development usually
provides only supplemental subsidies, bridging the gap
between traditional subsidy sources and the subsidies needed
for non-market land uses. In very active real estate
markets limited development can complement public subsidy
3 1 Interview with James Alicata, Chief, Bureau of Land
Use, Massachusetts Department of Food and Agriculture,
December 7, 1987.
190
programs.
Limited development does not offer the hope that
conservation can compete with market development for land on
a wide scale. Without additional subsidies from non-
development sources, limited development usually cannot make
ends meet, and for-profit developers willing to exploit the
full development potential of a property will almost always
be able to outbid a limited developer.
Limited development is not a panacea, but is another in
the array of tools that can be combined to help pay for the
protection of farmland and open space. Private charity
through bargain sales and donations of conservation
easements, and public policy instruments such as the APR,
federal income tax deductions, and regulation of development
will continue to be the primary tools for protecting open
land.
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APPENDIX A: THE ANALYSIS SPREADSHEET
This appendix provides an explanation of the basic
spreadsheet used in the financial analyses of the case
studies. Each section below explains a single table of the
spreadsheet line by line. Differences between the basic
spreadsheet and the predictive spreadsheet are described at
the end.
LAND VARIABLES
This table shows inputs for the division of the entire
project into its various components, including
agriculturally restricted land, non-agricultural open space
land, market development land, and affordable housing land.
Land which includes conservation restrictions but is
sold to the buyer of a developable parcel has been treated
as development land, not open space. Open space refers to
land which is owned for conservation purposes by a town,
state, or federal agency or private land conservation
organization such as The Trustees of Reservations or a local
land trust.
The land is divided by both acreage and legal road
frontage, with absolute and percentage divisions shown. The
"Percent Analyzed" column indicates which percentage is
being used throughout the spreadsheet in allocating costs
and value. If this column shows the percentage by acreage,
then the entire analysis is acreage-based, if by frontage,
then it is frontage based.
INCOME VARIABLES
Information on rental and sales income from the entire
project are entered in this table.
The "Months Rented" and "Monthly Rent" entries include
rent from both agricultural land and existing houses.
The "Sale to Farmer" entry is the total sales of
restricted farmlands. In the case of Powisset Farm, the
"Sale of Farmer" has been replaced by annual rents
capitalized at 10 percent. The "APR Sale" entry is the
total of state and local contributions to the purchase of an
Agricultural Preservation Restriction on the farmland.
"Total Agricultural Sales" is the sum of the "Sale to
Farmer" and "APR Sale."
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"Open Space Sales" includes the purchase of all open
space land by public bodies and private conservation
organizations.
"Market Development Land Sales" is the total sales of
market development land, including restricted parcels. It
is drawn from the total of the fifth column, "Sale Price,"
in the MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE table (see
below).
"Affordable Development Sales" is the total sale price
of all land sold at less than market value in order to
subsidize the production of affordable housing.
EXPENSE VARIABLES
All data on project expenses are entered in this table.
"Purchase Price" is the actual price at which the
limited developer purchased the land.
"Financing Costs" shows the aggregate interest costs to
the limited developer. "Real Estate Taxes" shows aggregate
taxes paid by the limited developer for the period during
which the land was held. "Insurance" is the insurance
carried by the limited developer on buildings purchased with
the farm.
"Legal," "Planning & Engineering," "Surveying," and
"Other Services" include all non-staff professional services
paid for by the limited developer to complete the project,
and are summed under "Total Professional Services."
"Staff Overhead" is the estimate supplied by the
limited developer of staff overhead costs. "Other Expenses"
includes all other expenses, including any "hard"
development costs.
SUBSIDY ASSUMPTIONS
This table includes information and assumptions used in
calculating the different subsidy sources and uses of the
limited development project.
"Total Development Value" is the best estimate
available of the fair market value (for development) of the
entire project at the time it was acquired by the limited
developer.
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"Monthly Appreciation Factor" is the assumption used
for the uniform monthly rate at which land appreciated from
the purchase of the farm to the sale of the final
development lot.
"Enhancement Premium" is the estimated overall
percentage by which the market development lots were
enhanced by the restriction of the farm and conservation
components of the project. Where enhancement was analyzed
lot by lot (Powisset Farm), this item is the percentage of
the unenhanced value represented by enhancement, drawn from
the MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE (see below).
INCOME
This table calculates the gross income for the project.
The "Per Acre" column shows the values divided by the
appropriate acreage, drawn from the LAND VARIABLES table.
The "Sale to Farmer," "Total APR Purchase," and the "Total
Restricted Agricultural Land Sales" are each divided by the
"Agriculturally Restricted" acreage from the "Land
Variables" table. The "Open Space Land Sales," "Market
Development Land Sales," "Affordable Development Land
Sales," and "Total Development Land Sales" are each divided
by the corresponding acreage from the "Land Variables"
table. The "TOTAL INCOME" is divided by the total acreage
of the project.
"Total Rental Income" is simply the product of the
"Months Rented" and "Monthly Rent" entries. All other items
are drawn directly from the INCOME VARIABLES table.
"TOTAL INCOME" is the sum of the "Total Rental Income,"
"Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales," "Open Space Land
Sales," "Total Development Land Sales," and "Other Income."
EXPENSES
This table shows project expenses, drawn directly from
the EXPENSE VARIABLES table. Each item is again divided by
the corresponding acreage from the LAND VARIABLES table.
"TOTAL EXPENSES" is the sum of "Purchase Price,"
"Financing," "Real Estate Taxes,"1 "Insurance," "Total
Professional Services," "Staff Overhead," and "Other
Expenses."
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INCOME AND EXPENSES
This table subtracts the "TOTAL EXPENSE" from "TOTAL
INCOME" to show the "SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL)" resulting from
the entire project, both as a total and per acre. "RETURN
ON TOTAL EXPENSES" divides the "SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL)" by
"TOTAL EXPENSES."
MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE
This table includes information on the sale of market
development lots, and accounts for enhancement and
appreciation in value.
The "Lot Designation" column indicates the designation
given to the lot or lots on the subdivision plan. The "Sale
Date" indicates the month in which it was sold, while the
"Project Month" column is the number of months from the
purchase of the farm (or agreement on price in the case of
Powisset Farm) by the limited developer to the sale of the
particular lot. "Sale Price" is the price paid by the lot
purchaser to the limited developer.
The "Enhancement Premium" column indicates for the
Loomis and Barton Farm projects the amount the individual
lot would have been enhanced at the overall enhancement rate
from the SUBSIDY ASSUMPTIONS table. For the Powisset Farm,
it indicates the estimates of enhancement value given by the
realtor who sold the lots. "Unenhanced Value" is the sale
price less the "Enhancement Premium."
"Gross Appreciation" is the amount of the "Unenhanced
Value" due to appreciation given the "Project Month," and
the "Monthly Appreciation Factor" from the SUBSIDY
ASSUMPTIONS table. "Percent Appreciation" is the percent of
the "Unappreciated, Unenhanced Value" represented by the
gross appreciation--in other words it is the appreciation
rate on that particular lot.
"Unappreciated, Unenhanced Value" is the sale price of
the lot less the "Enhancement Premium" and less the "Gross
Appreciation."
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY
This table calculates the "BARGAIN SALE BENEFIT" to the
limited developer by subtracting the "Purchase Price"
(EXPENSE VARIABLES table) from the "Total Development Value"
(SUBSIDY ASSUMPTIONS table).
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AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION RESTRICTION SUBSIDY
This is the amount paid by the state (and town in some
cases) for the Agricultural Preservation Restriction, taken
from the INCOME VARIABLES table.
OPEN SPACE SALE SUBSIDY
This is the amount paid by town, state, federal or
private land conservation organizations for open space
portions of the project, taken from the INCOME VARIABLES
table.
ENHANCEMENT SUBSIDY
This table simply shows the total enhancement subsidy,
which is drawn from the "TOTAL" of the "Enhancement Premium"
column of the MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE table.
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY
This table calculates the "Net Appreciation Subsidy"
provided. The "Gross Appreciation" entry is drawn from the
MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE table. From this is
subtracted the total time-dependent expenses for the entire
project: "Financing Costs," "Real Estate Taxes," and
"Insurance" from the EXPENSE VARIABLES table. To this is
added "Total Rental Income" collected during this period,
drawn from the EXPENSES table.
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
This table estimates the net subsidy resulting from
subdivision of the property.
First, "Initial Value [of the] Development Land" is
calculated by multiplying the "Total Development Value"
(SUBSIDY ASSUMPTIONS table) by the "Percent Analyzed" for
"Market Development Land" (LAND VARIABLES table).
This "Initial Value Development Land" is subtracted
from the "Total Unappreciated, Unenhanced Value" of the
development land, drawn from the "TOTAL" of the
"Unappreciated Value" of the MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE
SCHEDULE. The remainder is the "Gross Subdivision Subsidy,"
or the gross income generated by subdivision of the
property.
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From this is subtracted "Professional & Staff Costs"
attributable to the development portion of the project.
These costs are the sum of "Total Professional," "Staff
Overhead," and "Other Expenses" from the EXPENSE VARIABLES
table, multiplied by the "Percent Analyzed" for "Market
Development Land" from the LAND VARIABLES table. The
remainder is the "NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY."
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION
All three of these tables estimate the subsidies use by
the three non-market land uses involved in the case studies.
For each, the initial "Development Value" of the land
is calculated by multiplying the "Total Development Value"
from the SUBSIDY ASSUMPTIONS table by the appropriate
"Percent Analyzed" from the LAND VARIABLES table. This
product represents what it would have cost to acquire the
portion of land dedicated to the specific non-market use at
the beginning of the project.
To this is added the "Professional & Staff Costs"
attributable to that portion of the project. These costs
are estimated by multiplying the sum of "Total Professional
Services," "Staff Overhead," and "Other Expenses" from the
EXPENSE VARIABLES table, by the appropriate "Percent
Analyzed" from the LAND VARIABLES table.
For AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION, the "Sale Price to
Farmer," from the INCOME VARIABLES table, is then
subtracted. For AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION, the
"Affordable Housing Land Sales," also from the INCOME
VARIABLES table, is subtracted. The sale income of
conservation land is not subtracted for Open Space
Protection because that sale is considered a subsidy source,
not use.
SUBSIDY SOURCES
This table summarizes the subsidies estimated earlier.
The subsidies are grouped and summed. The entries are drawn
from the corresponding SUBSIDY SOURCES tables. "Non-
Development Subsidies" are those which are not the result of
the limited development project, while "Limited Development
Subsidies" are those which resulted from the development of
a portion of the original property.
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The "Percent of Subsidies Sources" column shows each
subsidy source divided by the "TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES," i.e.
the percent of the total subsidy sources represented each
individual subsidy source. The "Percent of Total
Development Value" column shows each subsidy represented as
a percent of the "Total Development Value," from the SUBSIDY
ASSUMPTIONS table. This latter column is to allow
comparability between the three case studies.
SUBSIDY USES
This table summarizes the use of subsidy by
"Agricultural Preservation," "Open Space Preservation," and
"Affordable Housing Land Contribution," drawn from the
corresponding SUBSIDY USES tables. The "Percent of Subsidy
Use" column shows each subsidy use divided by the "TOTAL
SUBSIDY USES," i.e. the percent of the total subsidy use
represented each individual subsidy use. The "Percent of
Total Development Value" column shows each subsidy use
represented as a percent of the "Total Development Value,"
from the SUBSIDY ASSUMPTIONS table. This latter column is
to allow comparability between the three case studies.is the
column here is percent of the subsidies used.
SUBSIDY SURPLUS OR SHORTFALL
This table simply determines the "SUBSIDY SURPLUS or
(SHORTFALL)" by subtracting the "TOTAL SUBSIDIES USED" from
the "TOTAL SUBSIDIES PROVIDED." The "SURPLUS or
(SHORTFALL)" is also divided by the "TOTAL SUBSIDY USES" and
shown as a "PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES."
PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
The predictive analysis spreadsheet differs in that it
calculates the sales price of the lots based on assumptions
of enhancement and appreciation, rather than accounting for
enhancement and appreciation given the sales prices.
The MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE starts with
the "Unappreciated, Unenhanced Value" of each lot, drawn
from the same table in the basic spreadsheet. To this is
added "Gross Appreciation," based on the "Monthly
Appreciation Factor" (SUBSIDY ASSUMPTIONS table) and the
"Project Month." To this is then added the "Enhancement
Premium," based on the "Enhancement Premium" (SUBSIDY
ASSUMPTIONS table). The final sum is the predicted "Sales
Price" of each lot.
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The total of the "Sales Prices" is the source of the
"Market Development Land Sales" in the INCOME VARIABLES
table, from which it is used in the INCOME table and the NET
SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY table.
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APPENDIX B-1: BARTON FARM ACREAGE-BASED SPREADSHEET
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CASE: Barton Farm, Sudbury
ANALYSIS: Acreage based
page oneFILE: bartonla.wkl
DATE: 1/6/88
Percent of Percent of Percentage
LAND VARIABLES Acres Acreage Frontage Frontage Analyzed
Agriculturally Restricted Land 43 54% 2,115 46% 54%
Open Space Land 15 19% 885 19% 19%
Market Development Land 22 27% 1,600 35% 27%
Affordable Housing Land 0 0% 0 0% 0%
Total Development Land 22 27% 1,600 35% 27%
-------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL 81 100% 4.600 100% 100%
INCOME VARIABLES
Months Rented 6
Total Monthly Rents $259
--------------------------------------------------------
Sale to Farmer S22,235
APR Sale S200,350
Total Agricultural Land Sales $222,585
--------------------------------------------------------
Open Space Land Sales S99,650
--------------------------------------------------------
Market Development Land Sales S272.300
Affordable Housing Land Sales SO
Total Development Land Sales S272,300
Other Income SO
EXPENSE VARIABLES
Purchase Price $537,500
---------------------- ------- - ---------------
Financing Costs S4,232
Real Estate Taxes $5.375
Insurance SO
------------------------------- ----- --------------
Legal Services S21.066
Planning & Engineering $9,900
Surveying SO
Other Services $1,050
Total Professional Services $32,016
Staff Overhead $26,875
Other Expenses SO
SUBSIDY ASSUMPTIONS
Total Development Value $537,500
Monthly Appreciation Factor 0.0%
Enhancement Premium 10.0%
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page two
INCOME AND EXPENSE
INCOME Total Per Acre
Total Rental Income S1,554
Sale to Farmer S22,235 S512
APR Sale S200.350 $4,609
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales S222,585 S5,120
Open Space Land Sales $99.650 $6.586
Market Development Land Sales S272.300 S12,422
Affordable Housing Land Sales SO SO
Total Development Land Sales S272.300 $12,422
Other Income SO
TOTAL INCOME S596.089 $7.403
EXPENSES Total Per Acre
Purchase Price $537,500 S6,675
Financing S4,232 $53
Real Estate Taxes S5.375 $67
Insurance SO SO
Legal Services $21,066
Planning & Engineering S9,900
Surveying so
Other Services SI.050
Total Professional Services $32,016 S398
Staff Overhead S26.875 S334
Other Expenses SO
TOTAL EXPENSES S605.998 S7,526
INCOME AND EXPENSES
+ TOTAL INCOME $596,089 $7,403
- TOTAL EXPENSES S605.998 $7.526
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) (S9,909) (S123)
RETURN ON TOTAL EXPENSES -1.6%
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page three
MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE
Unappreciated
Lot Sale Project Sale Enhancement Unenhanced Gross Percent Unenhanced
Designation Date Month Acres Price Premium Value Appreciation Appreciation Value
TOTAL 2/82 21.9 $272,300 $24,755 S247,545 SO 0% $247.545
0
SUBSIDY SOURCES
NON-DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY
Total Development Value S537,500
- Purchase Price S537,500
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY (to buyer) SO
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION RESTRICTION SUBSIDY
Total APR Sales S200,350
OPEN SPACE SALE SUBSIDY
Total Open Space Sales S99,650
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
ENHANCEMENT SUBSIDY
Total Enhancement Premium $24,755
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY
Gross Appreciation SO
- Interest, Real Estate Taxes, & Insurance S9.607
+ Rental Income S1,554
----- ----------------- ------------ ----------
NET'APPRECIATION SUBSIDY (S8,053)
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
Total Development Value $537,500
* Market Development Land Percentage 277.
Initial Value Development Land $146.324
Total Unappreciated, Unenhanced Value $247,545
- Initial Value Development Land S146,324
Gross Subdivision Subsidy S101.222
- Professional & Staff Costs S16,032
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY S85,190
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SUBSIDY USES
AGRICULTURAL P ESERVATION
Total Development Value S537,500
* Agriculturally Restricted Percentage 54%
Development Value of Agricultural Land $290,178
+ Professional & Staff Costs $31,793
- Sale Price to Farmer $22,235
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION SUBSIDY USE S299.736
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION
Total Development Value S537,500
* Open Space Land Percentage 19%
Development Value of Open Space Land SIOO.998
+ Professional & Staff Costs S11,066
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION SUBSIDY USE S112,064
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION
Total Development Value $537,500
* Affordable Housing Land Percentage 0%
Development Value, Affordable Housing Land SO
+ Professional & Staff Costs so
- Affordable Housing Sales SO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION USE SO
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SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES UMMARY
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources Value
Bargain Sale Subsidy SO 0% 0%
APR Subsidy S200.350 50% 37%
Open Space Sale Subsidy S99,650 25% 19%
Total Non-Development Subsidies $300,000 75% 56%
Enhancement Subsidy S24.755 6% 5%
Net Appreciation Subsidy (S8,053) -2% -1%
Net Subdivision Subsidy S85,190 21% 16%
Total Limited Development Subsidies $101.891 25% 19%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S401,891 100% 75%
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses Value
Agricultural Preservation S299,736 73% 56%
Open Space Protection S112,064 27% 21%
Affordable Housing Contribution SO 0% 0%
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $411,800 100% 77%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S401,891
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES S411,800
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) (9,909)
PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES -2.4%
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APPENDIX B-2: BARTON FARM FRONTAGE-BASED SPREADSHEET
212
CASE: Barton Farm, Sudbury
ANALYSIS: Frontage based
FILE: bartonlb.wkl
DATE: 1/7/88
Percent of Approximate Percent of Percentage
LAND VARIABLES Acres Acreage Frontage Frontage Analyzed
Agriculturally Restricted Land 43 54% 2,115 46% 46%
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Open Space Land 15 19% 885 19% 19%
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Market Development Land 22 27% 1,600 35% 35%
Affordable Housing Land 0 0% 0 0% 0%
Total Development Land 22 27% 1,600 35% 35%
------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTALJ 81 100% 4.600 100% 100%
INCOME VARIABLES
Months Rented 6
Total Monthly Rents $259
- -- - - - - -- - - - ---------------------- - - -- - -
Sale to Farmer S22.235
APR Sale S200,350
Total Agricultural Land Sales $222.585
---- ----------------------  --------
Open Space Land Sales $99,650
- --- -------- ------------ - ----- ---
Market Development Land Sales $272,300
Affordable Housing Land Sales SO
Total Development Land Sales $272,300
Other Income SO
EXPENSE VARIABLES
Purchase Price $537,500
--------------------------- ------------- -------
Financing Costs $4,232
Real Estate Taxes S5,375
Insurance SO
--------------------- -- ----- ---- --------
Legal Services S21,066
Planning & Engineering S9.900
Surveying so
Other Services $1.050
Total Professional Services S32.016
Staff Overhead S26,875
Other Expenses SO
SUBSIDY ASSUMPTIONS
Total Development Value S537,500
Monthly Appreciation Factor 0.0%
Enhancement Premium 10.0%
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INCOME AND EXPENSE
INCOME Total Per Acre
Total Rental Income Sl,554
Sale to Farmer $22,235 $512
APR Sale $200,350 S4,609
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales S222,585 S5,120
Open Space Land Sales $99,650 S6,586
Market Development Land Sales S272,300 $12,422
Affordable Housing Land Sales SO so
Total Development Land Sales S272.300 S12.422
Other Income SO
TOTAL INCOME S596,089 S7,403
EXPENSES Total Per Acre
Purchase Price S537,500 S6.675
Financing S4,232 S53
Real Estate Taxes $5,375 $67
Insurance so SO
Legal Services $21,066
Planning & Engineering $9,900
Surveying SO
Other Services S1,050
Total Professional Services S32,016 S398
Staff Overhead S26,875 S334
Other Expenses SO
TOTAL EXPENSES S605,998 S7,526
INCOME AND EXPENSES
+ TOTAL INCOME S596,089 $7,403
- TOTAL EXPENSES S605,998 $7,526
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) ($9,909) (S123)
RETURN O  TOTAL EXPENSES -1.6%
214
page three
MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE
Unappreciated
Lot Sale Project Sale Enhancement Unenhanced Gross Percent Unenhanced
Designation Date Month Acres Price Premium Value Appreciation Appreciation Value
TOTAL 2/82 21.9 $272,300 S24,755 S247.545 SO 0% $247,545
0
SUBSIDY SOURCES
NON-DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY
Total Development Value $537,500
- Purchase Price $537,500
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY (to buyer) SO
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION RESTRICTION SUBSIDY
Total APR Sales S200,350
OPEN SPACE SALE SUBSIDY
Total Open Space Sales $99,650
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
ENHANCEMENT SUBSIDY
Total Enhancement Premium $24.755
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY
Gross Appreciation SO
- Interest, Real Estate Taxes, & Insurance S9.607
+ Rental Income S1,554
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY (S8,053)
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
Total Development Value $537,500
* Market Development Land Percentage 35%
Initial Value Development Land S186,957
Total Unappreciated, Unenhanced Value $247,545
- Initial Value Development Land S186,957
Gross Subdivision Subsidy S60,589
- Professional & Staff Costs S20,484
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY S40.105
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SUBSIDY USES
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION
Total Development Value S537,500
* Agriculturally Restricted Percentage 46%
Development Value of Agricultural Land S247,133
+ Professional & Staff Costs S27.077
- Sale Price to Farmer S22,235
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION SUBSIDY USE S251,975
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION
Total Development Value S537,500
* Open Space Land Percentage 19%
Development Value of Open Space Land S103.410
+ Professional & Staff Costs S11,330
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION SUBSIDY USE S114,740
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION
Total Development Value S537,500
* Affordable Housing Land Percentage 0%
Development Value, Affordable Housing Land SO
+ Professional & Staff Costs so
- Affordable Housing Sales SO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION USE SO
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SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES SUXMARY
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources Value
Bargain Sale Subsidy SO 0% 0%
APR Subsidy S200.350 56% 37%
Open Space Sale Subsidy S99,650 28% 19%
Total Non-Development Subsidies $300,000 84% 56%
Enhancement Subsidy S24,755 7% 5%
Net Appreciation Subsidy (8,053) -2% -1%
Net Subdivision Subsidy S40,105 11% 7%
Total Limited Development Subsidies S56,807 16% 11%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S356,807 100% 66%
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses Value
Agricultural Preservation S251,975 69% 47%
Open Space Protection $114,740 31% 21%
Affordable Housing Contribution SO 0. 0%
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $366,716 100% 68%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S356,807
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $366.716
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) (S9,909)
PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES -2.7%
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APPENDIX B-3: BARTON FARM PREDICTIVE SPREADSHEET
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CASE: Barton Farm, Sudbury
ANALYSIS: Frontage based, with variable
appreciation and enhancement
page oneFILE: barton2a.wkl
DATE: 1/7/88
Percent of Approximate Percent of Percentage
LAND VARIABLES Acres Acreage Frontage Frontage Analyzed
Agriculturally Restricted Land 43 54% 2,115 46% 46%
Open Space Land 15 19% 885 19% 19%
Market Development Land 22 27% 1,600 35% 35%
Affordable Housing Land 0 0% 0 0% 0%
Total Development Land 22 27% 1,600 35% 35%
TOTAL 81 100% 4,600 100% 100%
INCOME VARIABLES
Months Rented
Total Monthly Rents
6
$259
Sale to Farmer $22,235
APR Sale S200.350
Total Agricultural Land Sales S222,585
------------------------------ --------------------------
Open Space Land Sales S99,650
--------------------------------------------------------
Market Development Land Sales S272,300
Affordable Housing Land Sales SO
Total Development Land Sales S272,300
Other Income SO
EXPENSE VARIABLES
Purchase Price S537,500
----------------------- - --- -------- ----- -------
Financing Costs S4.232
Real Estate Taxes S5.375
Insurance SO
-------------------------- ---------------------------
Legal Services $21.066
Planning & Engineering S9,900
Surveying SO
Other Services SI,050
Total Professional Services S32,016
Staff Overhead S26,875
Other Expenses SO
SUBSIDY AND BENEFIT ASSUMPTIONS
Total Development Value S537,500
Monthly Appreciation Factor 0.0%
Enhancement Premium 10.0%
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INCOME AND EXPENSE
INCOME Total Per Acre
Total Rental Income $1,554
Sale to Farmer S22.235 S512
APR Sale $200,350 S4,616
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales $222.585 $5,129
Open Space Land Sales S99.650 16,471
Market Development Land Sales S272,300 S12,377
Affordable Housing Land Sales SO SO
Total Development Land Sales S272,300 S12,377
Other Income SO
TOTAL INCOME S596.089 S7,377
EXPENSES Total Per Acre
Purchase Price S537,500 16.652
Financing S4,232 152
Real Estate Taxes 15,375 S67
Insurance SO SO
Legal Services S21,066
Planning, Engineering, & Surveying S9.900
Other Services S1.050
Total Professional Services $32.016 S396
Staff Overhead 126,875 S333
Other Expenses SO
TOTAL EXPENSES 1605,998 S7,500
INCOME AND EXPENSES
+ TOTAL INCOME S596,089 $7,377
- TOTAL EXPENSES S605,998 17,500
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) (S9,910) (S123)
RETURN ON TOTAL EXPENSES -1.6%
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MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE
Unappreciated Appreciated
Lot Sale Project Unenhanced Gross Unenhanced Enhancement Final Value
Designation Date Month Acres Value Appreciation Value Premium (Sales Price)
TOTAL 2/82 13.0 S247,545 SO S247,545 S24.755 S272,300
0
SUBSIDY SOURCES
NON-DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY
Total Development Value $537,500
- Purchase Price $537,500
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY (to buyer) so
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION RESTRICTION SUBSIDY
Total APR Sales S200,350
-=.=--- - -- ... .- .-------- ------- ----
OPEN SPACE SALE SUBSIDY
Total Open Space Sales 199,650
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
ENHANCEMENT SUBSIDY
Total Enhancement Premium S24,755
--- --- = = =-= -== =-- ------------- - - - - - - - - =
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY
Gross Appreciation SO
- Interest, Real Estate Taxes, & Insurance $9,607
+ Rental Income S1,554
---------------------------------------- ---------------
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY ($8,053)
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
- =- -=---.=--==--------------------.. -- ---------------.
Total Development Value S537,500
* Market Development Land Percentage 35%
Initial Value Development Land $186,957
Total Unappreciated, Unenhanced Value S247.545
- Initial Value Development Land S186,957
Gross Subdivision Subsidy 160,588
- Professional & Staff Costs $20,484
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY S40,105
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SUBSIDY USES
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION
Total Development Value S537,500
* Agriculturally Restricted Percentage 46%
Development Value of Agricultural Land S247.133
+ Professional & Staff Costs S27,077
- Sale Price to Farmer S22,235
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION SUBSIDY USE S251,975
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION
Total Development Value S537,500
* Open Space Land Percentage 19%
Development Value of Open Space Land 1103,410
+ Professional & Staff Costs S11,330
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION SUBSIDY USE S114,740
AFFORDABLE ROUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION
Total Development Value S537,500
* Affordable Housing Land Percentage 0%
Development Value. Affordable Housing Land so
+ Professional & Staff Costs SO
- Affordable Housing Sales so
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION USE SO
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SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES UMMARY
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources Value
Bargain Sale Subsidy SO 0% 0%
APR Subsidy $200.350 56% 37%
Open Space Sale Subsidy $99.650 28% 19%
Total Non-Development Subsidies S300.000 84% 56%
Enhancement Subsidy S24,755 7% 5%
Net Appreciation Subsidy (S8,053) -2% -1%
Net Subdivision Subsidy S40,105 11% 7%
Total Limited Development Subsidies $56,806 16% 11%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $356,806 100% 66%
Percent of
Subsidy
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses
Agricultural Preservation S251.975 69% 47%
Open Space Protection $114,740 31% 21%
Affordable Housing Contribution so 0% 0%
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $366,716 100% 68%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S356,806
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $366,716
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) (S9,910)
PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES -2.7%
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APPENDIX C-1: POWISSET FARM ACREAGE-BASED SPREADSHEET
224
CASE: Powisset Farm. Dover
ANALYSIS: Acreage based
page oneFILE: powsstla.wkl
DATE: 1/7/88
Percent of Percent of Percentage
LAND VARIABLES Acres Acreage Frontage Frontage Analyzed
Agriculturally Restricted Land 106 56% 1,153 19% 56%
Open Space Land 29 15% 404 7% 15%
Market Development Land 54 29% 4.541 74% 29%
Affordable Housing Land 0 0% 0 0% 0%
Total Development Land 54 29% 4,541 74% 29%
TOTAL 190 100% 6,098 100% 100%
INCOME VARIABLES
Months Rented 0
Total Monthly Rents S833
---------------------------------------- ---------------
Annual Rents Capitalized @ 10% $100.000
APR Sale $350,000
Total Agricultural Land Sales and Value S450.000
--------------------------------------------------------
Open Space Land Sales $250,000
--------------------------------------------------------
Market Development Land Sales S3,175,000
Affordable Housing Land Sales SO
Total Development Land Sales $3,175,000
Other Income SO
EXPENSE VARIABLES
Purchase Price S2.407.270
------------------- - ------ - - ----- ------
Financing Costs S30,163
Real Estate Taxes $25,605
Insurance S3,120
------------------------ --- -- --- -- -- ----
Legal Services S60.121
Planning & Engineering $7,044
Surveying S2,812
Other Services $800
Total Professional Services $70.777
Staff Overhead S180,545
Other Expenses $113,913
SUBSIDY AND BENEFIT ASSUMPTIONS
Total Development Value S2,800,000
Monthly Appreciation Factor 2.0%
Enhancement Premium 9.5%
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INCOME AND EXPENSE
INCOME Total Per Acre
Total Rental Income so
Annual Rents Capitalized @ 107 S100,000 $939
APR Sale S350,000 $3.287
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales S450.000 S4,226
Open Space Land Sales S250,000 S8,648
Market Development Land Sales S3,175.000 $58,393
Affordable Housing Land Sales SO SO
Total Development Land Sales S3,175,000 S58,393
Other Income SO
TOTAL INCOME S3.875.000 S20.419
EXPENSES Total Per Acre
Purchase Price S2,407.270 S12.685
Financing $30,163 S159
Real Estate Taxes $25,605 S135
Insurance S3,120 S16
Legal Services $60,121
Planning & Engineering S7,044
Surveying S2,812
Other Services S800
Total Professional Services $70,777 $373
Staff Overhead S180,545 1951
Other Expenses $113.913
TOTAL EXPENSES S2.831.393 S14,920
INCOME AND EXPENSES
+ TOTAL INCOME S3,875,000 S20,419
- TOTAL EXPENSES S2,831.393 114,920
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) S1,043,607 $5.499
RETURN ON TOTAL EXPENSES 36.9%
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MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE
Unappreciated
Lot Sale Project Sale Enhancement Unenhanced Gross Percent Unenhanced
Designation Date Month Acres Price Premium Value Appreciation Appreciation Value
South 3 10/85
South 5
South 7
South 10
North 3
North 4 & 5
South 6
North 7-8
West 6, 7, &
North 6-7
West 4 & 5
South 8
2.1 S170,000 $25,000 S145,000 S11.042
10/85
10/85
10/85
10/85
10/85
11/85
12/85
8 3/86
7/86
1/88
UNSOLD
2.0
2.2
2.0
3.7
8.5
2.1
8.3
10.3
6.5
4.5
2.121
$175,000
S240,000
S185,000
S240,000
S345.000
S175,000
S425.000
S375,000
S470,000
S375,000
$25,000
S25,000
S75,000
so
so
S25.000
S100,000
So
so
so
So
$150,000
S215,000
S110,000
S240,000
S345,000
S150.000
$325,000
S375,000
S470,000
S375.000
so So
$11,423
$16,373
$8,377
518,277
S26,273
S14,140
$36,409
S61,217
$106.675
S172.033
So
8% S133.958
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
10%
13%
20%
29%
85%
S138,577
$198.627
$101,623
S221,723
S318.727
S135,860
S288.591
S313,783
S363.325
S202.967
0% s0
TOTAL 54.4 S3,175.000 S275,000 S2,900,000 S482.240 20% S2,417,760
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SUBSIDY SOURCES
NON-DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY
Total Development Value S2,800,000
- Purchase Price $2,407,270
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY (to buyer) S392,730
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION RESTRICTION SUBSIDY
Total APR Sales S350,000
- ==-_= - .. ------ - - ------------
OPEN SPACE SALE SUBSIDY
Total Open Space Sales S250,000
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
ENHANCEMENT SUBSIDY
Total Enhancement Premium S275,000
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY
Gross Appreciation S482,240
- Interest, Real Estate Taxes, & Insurance S58.888
+ Rental Income SO
------------------------------ --------------- ----
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY $423,352
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
Total Development Value S2,800,000
* Market Development Land Percentage 29%
Initial Value Development Land $802,224
Total Unappreciated, Unenhanced Value $2,417,760
- Initial Value Development Land S802,224
Gross Subdivision Subsidy Sl,615.536
- Professional & Staff Costs $104,643
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY S1,510.893
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SUBSIDY USES
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION
Total Development Value S2,800,000
* Agriculturally Restricted Percentage 56%
Development Value of Agricultural Land S1,571,236
+ Professional & Staff Costs S204,954
- Annual Rent Capitalized @ 10% S10.000
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION SUBSIDY USE S1,676.190
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION
Total Development Value S2.800.000
* Open Space Land Percentage 15%
Development Value of Open Space Land $426,540
+ Professional & Staff Costs $55,638
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION SUBSIDY USE $482,179
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION
Total Development Value S2,800,000
* Affordable Housing Land Percentage 0%
Development Value, Affordable Housing Land SO
+ Professional & Staff Costs SO
- Affordable Housing Sales SO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION USE SO
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SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES SUMMARY
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources Value
Bargain Sale Subsidy $392,730 12% 14%
APR Subsidy $350,000 11% 13%
Open Space Sale Subsidy S250.000 8% 9%
Total Non-Development Subsidies $992,730 31% 35%
Enhancement Subsidy S275,000 9% 10%
Net Appreciation Subsidy S423,352 13% 15%
Net Subdivision Subsidy $1,510,893 47% 54%
Total Limited Development Subsidies $2,209.245 69% 79%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S3,201.975 100% 114%
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses Value
Agricultural Preservation S1,676,190 78X 60%
Open Space Protection S482,179 22% 17%
Affordable Housing Contribution SO 0% 0%
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES S2,158,368 100% 77%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S3.201.975
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES S2,158,368
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) S1.043,607
PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES 48.4%
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APPENDIX C-2: POWISSET FARM FRONTAGE-BASED SPREADSHEET
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CASE: Powisset Farm, Dover
ANALYSIS: Frontage based
page oneFILE: powsstlb.wkl
DATE: 1/7/88
Percent of Percent of Percentage
LAND VARIABLES Acres Acreage Frontage Frontage Analyzed
Agriculturally Restricted Land 106 56% 1,153 19% 19%
Open Space Land 29 15% 404 7% 7%
Market Development Land 54 29% 4,541 74% 74%
Affordable Housing Land 0 0% 0 0% 0%
Total Development Land 54 29% 4,541 74% 74%
TOTAL 190 100% 6,098 100% 100%
INCOME VARIABLES
Months Rented 0
Total Monthly Rents S833
-------------------------------------------------------
Annual Rents Capitalized @ 10% $100,000
APR Sale S350,000
Total Agricultural Land Sales and Value $450,000
--------------------------------------------------------
Open Space Land Sales $250.000
------------------------------- -------------------------
Market Development Land Sales $3,175.000
Affordable Housing Land Sales SO
Total Development Land Sales S3,175,000
Other Income SO
EXPENSE VARIABLES
Purchase Price S2,407,270
------------------------- -------------------------------
Financing Costs S30,163
Real Estate Taxes S25,605
Insurance S3,120
-------------------------------------------------------
Legal Services S60.121
Planning & Engineering $7.044
Surveying S2,812
Other Services S800
Total Professional Services $70.777
Staff Overhead $180,545
Other Expenses $113,913
SUBSIDY AND BENEFIT ASSUMPTIONS
Total Development Value S2.800,000
Monthly Appreciation Factor 2.0%
Enhancement Premium 9.5%
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INCOME AND EXPENSE
INCOME Total Per Acre
Total Rental Income SO
Annual Rents Capitalized @ 10% S100,000 S939
APR Sale S350,000 S3,287
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales $450.000 S4,226
Open Space Land Sales $250,000 $8,648
Market Development Land Sales S3.175,000 S58,393
Affordable Housing Land Sales SO SO
Total Development Land Sales S3,175.000 S58,393
Other Income SO
TOTAL INCOME S3,875.000 S20,419
EXPENSES Total Per Acre
Purchase Price $2,407,270 S12,685
Financing S30,163 $159
Real Estate Taxes $25,605 S135
Insurance $3.120 $16
Legal Serviges S60,121
Planning & Engineering S7,044
Surveying S2,812
Other Services S800
Total Professional Services $70.777 $373
Staff Overhead S180,545 $951
Other Expenses $113,913
TOTAL EXPENSES $2,831,393 S14.920
INCOME AND EXPENSES
+ TOTAL INCOME S3,875,000 S20.419
- TOTAL EXPENSES S2,831,393 S14.920
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) Sl,043,607 S5,499
RETURN O TOTAL EXPENSES 36.9%
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MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE
Unappreciated
Lot Sale Project Sale Enhancement Unenhanced Gross Percent Unenhanced
Designation Date Month Acres Price Premiur Value Appreciation Appreciation Value
South 3 10/85
South 5
South 7
South 10
North 3
North 4 & 5
South 6
North 7-8
West 6, 7, &
North 6-7
West 4 & 5
South 8
10/85
10/85
10/85
10/85
10/85
11/85
12/85
8 3/86
7/86
1/88
UNSOLD
2.1 $170,000 S25,000 S145,000 $11,042
4
4
4
4
4
2.0
2.2
2.0
3.7
8.5
2.1
8.3
10.3
6.5
4.5
2.121
5
6
9
13
31
S175,000
S240,000
$185,000
$240,000
$345,000
S175,000
$425,000
S375,000
S470,000
S375,000
so
S25,000
S25,000
S75,000
so
so
$25,000
$100,000
so
so
so
so
$150,000
$215,000
S110,000
$240,000
S345,000
$150,000
S325,000
$375,000
$470,000
S375,000
so
$11,423
S16,373
$8,377
S18,277
$26,273
S14,140
$36,409
$61,217
$106,675
$172,033
so
8% $133,958
8%
8%
8%
8%
8%
10%
13%
20%
29%
85X.
$138,577
S198,627
S101.623
$221,723
$318,727
S135,860
$288,591
$313,783
S363,325
$202,967
0% SO
TOTAL 54.4 $3,175,000 $275,000 $2.900,000 $482,240 20% $2,417,760
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SUBSIDY SOURCES
NON-DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY
Total Development Value $2,800.000
- Purchase Price S2,407,270
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY (to buyer) S392,730
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION RESTRICTION SUBSIDY
Total APR Sales $350,000
OPEN SPACE SALE SUBSIDY
Total Open Space Sales $250,000
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
ENHANCEMENT SUBSIDY
Total Enhancement Premium $275.000
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY
Gross Appreciation $482,240
- Interest. Real Estate Taxes, & Insurance S58,888
+ Rental Income SO
--------------------------------------------------------
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY S423.352
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
-=-- .... ==---------- =- ----------.....----------- "-
Total Development Value S2,800,000
* Market Development Land Percentage 74%
Initial Value Development Land $2,085,111
Total Unappreciated, Unenhanced Value $2,417.760
- Initial Value Development Land $2,085,111
Gross Subdivision Subsidy $332,649
- Professional & Staff Costs $271,984
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY S60.665
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SUBSIDY USES
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION
Total Development Value $2,800,000
* Agriculturally Restricted Percentage 19%
Development Value of Agricultural Land S529,394
+ Professional & Staff Costs $69,055
- Annual Rent Capitalized @ 10% S100,000
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION SUBSIDY USE S498,449
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION
Total Development Value S2,800.000
* Open Space Land Percentage 7%
Developuent Value of Open Space Land S185,495
+ Professional & Staff Costs $24,196
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION SUBSIDY USE S209,691
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION
Total Development Value S2.800,000
* Affordable Housing Land Percentage 0%
Development Value. Affordable Housing Land SO
+ Professional & Staff Costs SO
- Affordable Housing Sales SO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION USE SO
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SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES SUMMARY
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources Value
Bargain Sale Subsidy S392,730 22% 14%
APR Subsidy $350,000 20% 13%
Open Space Sale Subsidy $250,000 14% 9%
Total Non-Development Subsidies $992,730 57% 35%
Enhancement Subsidy $275,000 16% 10%
Net Appreciation Subsidy $423,352 24% 15%
Net Subdivision Subsidy S60,665 3% 2%
Total Limited Development Subsidies S759.017 43% 27%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $1,751,747 100% 63%
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses Value
Agricultural Preservation S498,449 70% 18%
Open Space Protection S209,691 30% 7%
Affordable Housing Contribution SO 0% 0%
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES S708,140 100% 25%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S1,751,747
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES 5708,140
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) 11.043,607
PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES 147.4%
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CASE: Powisset Farm, Dover
ANALYSIS: Acreage based, with variable
appreciation and enhancement
FILE: powsst2a.wkl
DATE: 1/7/88
Percent of Percent of Percentage
LAND VARIABLES Acres Acreage Frontage Frontage Analyzed
Agriculturally Restricted Land 106 56% 1,153 19% 56%
Open Space Land 29 15% 404 7% 15%
Market Development Land 54 29% 4,541 74% 29%
Affordable Housing Land 0 0% 0 0% 0%
Total Development Land 54 29% 4,541 74% 29%
TOTAL 189 100% 6,098 100% 100%
INCOME VARIABLES
Months Rented 0
Total Monthly Rents $833
------------------------ --------- -- ---- - -------
Annual Rents Capitalized @ 10% $100,000
APR Sale S350,000
Total Agricultural Land Sales $450,000
-------------------------------------------------------
Open Space Land Sales $250,000
--------------------------------------------------------
Market Development Land Sales $2,131,393
Affordable Housing Land Sales SO
Total Development Land Sales S2.131,393
Other Income SO
EXPENSE VARIABLES
Purchase Price $2,407.270
------------------- ---------------- -------------------
Financing Costs S30,163
Real Estate Taxes S25,605
Insurance $3,120
---------------------- -- -- -- ---- ---------------
Legal Services S60.121
Planning & Engineering $7,044
Surveying S2,812
Other Services $800
Total Professional Services S70,777
Staff Overhead $180,545
Other Expenses $113,913
SUBSIDY AND BENEFIT ASSUMPTIONS
Total Development Value S2,800,000
Monthly Appreciation Factor -2.7%
Enhancement Premium 9.5%
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INCOME AND EXPENSE
INCOME Total Per Acre
Total Rental Income so
Annual Rents Capitalized @10% $100,000 $943
APR Sale $350,000 $3,302
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales $450,000 S4,245
Open Space Land Sales $250,000 $8,621
Market Development Land Sales $2,131,393 S39,470
Affordable Housing Land Sales so so
Total Development Land Sales $2,131,393 S39,470
Other Income SO
TOTAL INCOME $2,831,393 614,981
EXPENSES Total Per Acre
Purchase Price $2,407,270 S12,737
Financing $30,163 $160
Real Estate Taxes $25,605 S135
Insurance S3,120 $17
Legal Services S60,121
Planning & Engineering $7,044
Surveying $2,812
Other Services $800
Total Professional Services $70,777 $374
Staff Overhead S180,545 $955
Other Expenses S113,913
TOTAL EXPENSES $2,831,393 614,981
INCOME AND EXPENSES
+ TOTAL INCOME S2,831,393 $14,981
- TOTAL EXPENSES S2,831,393 $14,981
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) SO SO
RETURN ON TOTAL EXPENSES 0.0%
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MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE
Unappreciated Appreciated
Lot Sale Project Unenhanced Gross Unenhanced Enhancement Final Value
Designation Date Month Acres Value Appreciation Value Premiun (Sales Price)
South 3 10/85 2.1 $133,958 ($13,928) $120,030 $11,382 S131,412
4
South 5 10/85 2.0 $138,577 ($14.408) $124,169 $11,775 $135,944
4
South 7 10/85 2.2 $198,627 (S20,652) S177,975 $16,877 $194,852
4
South 10 10/85 2.0 S101,623 ($10,566) $91.057 $8,635 $99,692
4
North 3 10/85 3.7 S221.723 ($23,053) $198,670 $18,839 $217.509
4
North 4 & 5 10/85 8.5 S318,727 ($33,139) S285,588 $27,082 $312,670
4
South 6 11/85 2.1 $135,860 (S17,421) $118,439 $11,231 S129,670
5
North 7-8 12/85 8.3 $288,591 ($43,817) $244,774 $23,211 $267,985
6
West 6.7. & 8 3/86 10.3 $313,783 ($68,678) $245.105 S23,243 S268,348
9
North 6-7 7/86 6.5 S363,325 ($109,028) S254,297 S24,114 S278.411
13
West 4 & 5 1/88 4.5 $202,967 ($116,287) $86,680 $8,220 $94,899
31
South 8 UNSOLD 2.1
TOTAL 54.3 $2,417,761 ($470,977) $1,946,784 S184,609 S2,131,393
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SUBSIDY SOURCES
NON-DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY
Total Development Value $2,800,000
- Purchase Price S2.407,270
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY (to buyer) S392,730
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION RESTRICTION SUBSIDY
Total APR Sales S350,000
OPEN SPACE SALE SUBSIDY
Total Open Space Sales S250,000
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
ENHANCEMENT SUBSIDY
Total Enhancement Premium S184,609
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY
Gross Appreciation ($470,977)
- Interest, Real Estate Taxes, & Insurance S58,888
+ Rental Income SO
--------------------------------------------------------
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY (S529,865)
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
--- --- === == =-- --- -==---=-------------------------
Total Development Value S2,800,000
* Market Development Land Percentage 29%
Initial Value Development Land S800,000
Total Unappreciated, Unenhanced Value $2.417,761
- Initial Value Development Land $800,000
Gross Subdivision Subsidy S1,617,761
- Professional & Staff Costs $104,353
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY $1,513.408
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SUBSIDY USES
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION
Total Development Value $2,800,000
* Agriculturally Restricted Percentage 56%
Development Value of Agricultural Land $1,570,370
+ Professional & Staff Costs $204,841
- Sale Price to Farmer SIO0,000
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION SUBSIDY USE $1,675,211
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION
Total Development Value $2,800,000
* Open Space Land Percentage 15%
Development Value of Open Space Land S429,630
+ Professional & Staff Costs $56,041
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION SUBSIDY USE S485,671
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION
Total Development Value S2,800,000
* Affordable Housing Land Percentage 0%
Development Value, Affordable Housing Land SO
+ Professional & Staff Costs so
- Affordable Housing Sales SO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION USE SO
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SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES UMMARY
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources Value
Bargain Sale Subsidy S392,730 18% 14%
APR Subsidy S350,000 16% 13%
Open Space Sale Subsidy $250,000 12% 9%
Total Non-Development Subsidies $992,730 46% 35%
Enhancement Subsidy S184,609 9% 7%
Net Appreciation Subsidy ($529,865) -25% -19%
Net Development Subsidy $1,513,408 70% 54%
Total Limited Development Subsidies $1,168,152 54% 42%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $2,160,882 100% 77%
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses Value
Agricultural Preservation S1,675,211 78% 60%
Open Space Protection S485,671 22% 17%
Affordable Housing Contribution SO 0% 0%
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES 12,160,882 100% 77%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES 12,160,882
- TOTAL SUBSIDIES USES S2,160,882
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) SO
PERCENT OFSUBSIDY USES 0.0%
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CASE: Loomis Farm, Ashfield
ANALYSIS: Acreage based
FILE: loomisla.wkl
DATE: 1/7/88
Percent of Percent of Percentage
LAND VARIABLES Acres Acreage Frontage Frontage Analyzed
Agriculturally Restricted Land 176 39% 3.957 32% 39%
Open Space Land 0 0% 0 0% 0%
Market Development Land 265 59% 8.058 65% 59%
Affordable Housing Land 10 2% 465 4% 2%
Total Development Land 275 61% 8,523 68% 61%
TOTAL 451 100% 12,480 100% 100%
INCOME VARIABLES
Months Rented 9
Total Monthly Rents 1600
------------------------ ------------------------------
Sale to Farmer $74,000
APR Sale S166,000
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales S240.000
--------------------------------------------------------
Open Space Land Sales SO
--------------------------------------------------------
Market Development Land Sales S261,540
Affordable Housing Land Sales $17,500
Total Development Land Sales S279,040
Other Income SO
EXPENSE VARIABLES
Purchase Price S310,000
--------------------------------------------------------
Financing Costs $56,000
Real Estate Taxes S5,500
Insurance $2,000
--------------------------- -----------------------------
Legal Services $19,000
Planning & Engineering S4.000
Surveying $10,100
Other Services so
Total Professional Services S33,100
Staff Overhead 146,350
Other Expenses $20,925
SUBSIDY AND BENEFIT ASSUMPTIONS
Total Development Value 1319.000
Monthly Appreciation Factor 2.0%
Enhancement Premium 5.1%
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INCOME AND EXPENSE
INCOME Total Per Acre
Total Rental Income S5.400
Sale to Farmer S74,000 S421
APR Sale S166,000 S944
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales S240,000 $1,365
Open Space Land Sales so SO
Market Development Land Sales $261,540 $987
Affordable Housing Land Sales S17,500 Sl,753
Total Development Land Sales S279,040 S1,014
Other Income SO
TOTAL INCOME S524,440 S1,163
EXPENSES Total Per Acre
Purchase Price S310,000 S687
Financing S56,000 S124
Real Estate Taxes S5,500 S12
Insurance S2,000 S4
Legal Services 519,000
Planning & Engineering S4,000
Surveying S10,100
Other Services SO
Total Professional Services $33,100 S73
Staff Overhead $46,350 S103
Other Expenses S20,925
TOTAL EXPENSES S473,875 Sl.051
INCOME AND EXPENSES
+ TOTAL INCOME S524.440 S1,163
- TOTAL EXPENSES S473,875 S1,051
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) S50,565 S112
RETURN ON TOTAL EXPENSES 10.7%
247
page three
MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE
Unappreciated
Lot Sale Project Sale Enhancement Unenhanced Gross Percent Unenhanced
Designation Date Month Acres Price Premium Value Appreciation Appreciation Value
South B, C-1 2/87 14.6 S7,000 $341 S6,659 S2,088 46% S4,571
C-2, & C-3 19
North C 2/87 42.1 S45,500 S2,214 S43.286 S13,573 46% S29,713
19
North E 2/87 4.5 S21,000 S1,022 S19,978 S6,265 46% S13,714
19
Farmstead 4/87 8.4 S56,000 SO $56,000 SO 0% $56,000
21
North D 4/87 5.3 S19,500 $949 S18.551 $6.312 52% S12.240
21
North F & G 5/87 9.4 S36,000 $1,752 S34,248 $12,095 55% $22,153
22
North J, K, 10/87 23.9 S29,900 $1,455 S28,445 S11,780 71% S16,665
& L 27
South D-3 12/87 106.6 S46,640 $2,269 $44,371 S19,385 78% $24,986
29
North B NOT YET SOLD 50.32
TOTAL 265.1 S261,540 510,000 $251,540 $71,498 40% S180,041
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SUBSIDY SOURCES
NON-DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY
Total Development Value $319,000
- Purchase Price S310,000
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY (to buyer) $9,000
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION RESTRICTION SUBSIDY
Total APR Sales S166,000
OPEN SPACE SALE SUBSIDY
Total Open Space Sales so
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
ENHANCEMENT SUBSIDY
Total Enhancement Premium $10,000
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY
Gross Appreciation 671,498
- Interest, Real Estate Taxes, & Insurance $63,500
+ Rental Income $5,400
--------------------------------------------------------
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY $13,398
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
--- =-------------==-=--=--.------------ - ----
Total Development Value $319,000
* Market Development Land Percentage 59%
Initial Value Development Land $187,531
Total Unappreciated, Unenhanced Value $180,041
- Initial Value Development Land 6187,531
Gross Subdivision Subsidy ($7,489)
- Professional & Staff Costs $59,008
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY ($66,497)
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SUBSIDY USES
AGRICULTURAL P ESERVATION
Total Development Value $319,000
* Agriculturally Restricted Percentage 39%
Development Value of Agricultural Land S124,406
+ Professional & Staff Costs $39,145
- Sale Price to Farmer S74,000
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION SUBSIDY USE S89.551
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION
Total Development Value $319,000
* Open Space Land Percentage 0%
Development Value of Open Space Land so
+ Professional & Staff Costs SO
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION SUBSIDY USE SO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION
Total Development Value $319,000
* Affordable Housing Land Percentage 2%
Development Value, Affordable Housing Land $7,063
+ Professional & Staff Costs S2,222
- Affordable Housing Sales $17,500
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION USE ($8,214)
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SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES SUMMARY
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources Value
Bargain Sale Subsidy S9.000 7% 3%
APR Subsidy $166,000 126% 52%
Open Space Sale Subsidy So 0% 0%
Total Non-Development Subsidies $175.000 133% 55%
Enhancement Subsidy $10.000 8% 3%
Net Appreciation Subsidy S13,398 10% 4%
Net Subdivision Subsidy (S66,497) -50% -21%
Total Limited Development Subsidies (843,098) -33% -14%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $131,902 100% 41%
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses Value
Agricultural Preservation $89,551 110% 28%
Open Space Protection SO 0% 0%
Affordable Housing Contribution (8.214) -10% -3%
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $81,337 100% 25%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S131,902
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES S81,337
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) $50,565
PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES 62.2%
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CASE: Loomis Farm, Ashfield
ANALYSIS: Frontage based
page oneFILE: loomislb.wkl
DATE: 1/7/88
Percent of Percent of Percentage
LAND VARIABLES Acres Acreage Frontage Frontage Analyzed
Agriculturally Restricted Land 176 39% 3.957 32% 32%
Open Space Land 0 0% 0 0% 0%
Market Development Land 265 59% 8,058 65% 65%
Affordable Housing Land 10 2% 465 4% 4%
Total Development Land 275 61% 8,523 68% 68%
TOTAL 451 100% 12,480 100% 100%
INCOME VARIABLES
Months Rented 9
Total Monthly Rents S600
-------------------- ------------------------------------
Sale to Farmer S74,000
APR Sale S166.000
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales S240,000
--------------------------------------------------------
Open Space Land Sales SO
--------------------------------------------------------
Market Development Land Sales S261.540
Affordable Housing Land Sales 817.500
Total Development Land Sales S279,040
Other Income SO
EXPENSE VARIABLES
Purchase Price $310.000
------------------------------- - -----------
Financing Costs $56,000
Real Estate Taxes S5,500
Insurance $2,000
-----------------------------------------------------
Legal Services S19,000
Planning & Engineering S4,000
Surveying $10.100
Other Services so
Total Professional Services $33,100
Staff Overhead S46,350
Other Expenses $20.925
SUBSIDY AND BENEFIT ASSUMPTIONS
Total Development Value S319,000
Monthly Appreciation Factor 2.0%
Enhancement Premium 5.1%
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INCOME AND EXPENSE
INCOME Total Per Acre
Total Rental Income S5,400
Sale to Farmer $74,000 S421
APR Sale S166,000 S944
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales $240,000 $1,365
Open Space Land Sales SO SO
Market Development Land Sales $261,540 S987
Affordable Housing Land Sales S17,500 $1,753
Total Development Land Sales S279,040 S1,014
Other Income SO
TOTAL INCOME $524.440 $1,163
EXPENSES Total Per Acre
Purchase Price S310,000 S687
Financing S56,000 $124
Real Estate Taxes S5.500 S12
Insurance $2,000 S4
Legal Services S19.000
Planning & Engineering S4,000
Surveying $10,100
Other Services SO
Total Professional Services S33,100 $73
Staff Overhead $46,350 S103
Other Expenses $20,925
TOTAL EXPENSES S473,875 S1051
INCOME AND EXPENSES
+ TOTAL INCOME $524,440 S1,163
- TOTAL EXPENSES S473,875 $1,051
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) $50,565 S112
RETURN ON TOTAL EXPENSES 10.7%.
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MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE
Unappreciated
Lot Sale Project Sale Enhancement Unenhanced Gross Percent Unenhanced
Designation Date Month Acres Price Premium Value Appreciation Appreciation Value
South B, C-1 2/87 14.6 87,000 $341 $6,659 $2.088 46% S4,571
C-2. & C-3 19
North C 2/87 42.1 S45,500 S2,214 S43,286 $13.573 46% S29,713
19
North E 2/87 4.5 S21,000 S1,022 $19,978 S6,265 46% S13,714
19
Farmstead 4/87 8.4 S56,000 SO $56,000 SO 0% $56,000
21
North D 4/87 5.3 $19,500 $949 S18,551 S6,312 52% S12.240
21
North F & G 5/87 9.4 S36,000 $1,752 S34,248 $12,095 55% $22,153
22
North J, K, 10/87 23.9 S29,900 $1,455 $28,445 S11,780 71% S16,665
& L 27
South D-3 12/87 106.6 546,640 $2,269 S44,371 S19,385 78% $24,986
29
North B NOT YET SOLD 50.32
TOTAL 265.1 $261,540 $10,000 $251,540 S71,498 40% S180,041
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SUBSIDY SOURCES
NON-DEVELOPKENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY
Total Development Value $319,000
- Purchase Price S310,000
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY (to buyer) 9,OO
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION RESTRICTION SUBSIDY
Total APR Sales $166,000
OPEN SPACE SALE SUBSIDY
Total Open Space Sales SO
--~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ - ----- = -...... ... ..
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
ENHANCEMENT SUBSIDY
Total Enhancement Premium S10,000
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY
Gross Appreciation $71,498
- Interest, Real Estate Taxes, & Insurance $63,500
+ Rental Income S5,400
--------------------------------------------------------
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY S13,398
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
-=------..==-=-----= ------------.- ===---- ---------
Total Development Value $319.000
* Market Development Land Percentage 65%
Initial Value Development Land S205,970
Total Unappreciated, Unenhanced Value $180,041
- Initial Value Development Land S205,970
Gross Subdivision Subsidy ($25,928)
- Professional & Staff Costs $64,809
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY ($90,738)
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SUBSIDY USES
AGRICULTURAL P ESERVATION
Total Development Value S319,000
* Agriculturally Restricted Percentage 32%
Development Value of Agricultural Land S101.144
+ Professional & Staff Costs $31,826
- Sale Price to Farmer S74,000
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION SUBSIDY USE $58.970
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION
Total Development Value S319,000
* Open Space Land Percentage 0%
Development Value of Open Space Land so
+ Professional & Staff Costs so
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION SUBSIDY USE SO
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION
Total Development Value S319,000
* Affordable Housing Land Percentage 4%
Development Value, Affordable Housing Land $11,886
+ Professional & Staff Costs S3.740
- Affordable Housing Sales $17,500
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAD CONTRIBUTION USE (SI,874)
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SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES UMARY
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources Value
Bargain Sale Subsidy $9,000 8% 3%
APR Subsidy $166,000 154% 52%
Open Space Sale Subsidy SO 0% 0%
Total Non-Development Subsidies $175.000 163% 55%
Enhancement Subsidy $10.000 9% 3%
Net Appreciation Subsidy $13,398 12% 4%
Net Subdivision Subsidy ($90,738) -84% -28%
Total Limited Development Subsidies (S67,339) -63% -21%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $107,661 100% 34%
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses Value
Agricultural Preservation 58,970 103% 18%
Open Space Protection SO 0% 0%
Affordable Housing Contribution ($1,874) -3% -1%
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $57,096 100% 18%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S107,661
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES $57,096
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) $50,565
PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES 88.6%
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CASE: Loomis Farm, Ashfield
ANALYSIS: Frontage based, with variable
appreciation and enhancement
FILE: loonis2a.wkl
DATE: 1/7/88
Percent of Percent of Percentage
LAND VARIABLES Acres Acreage Frontage Frontage Analyzed
Agriculturally Restricted Land 176 39% 3,957 32% 32%
Open Space Land 0 0% 0 0% 0%
Market Development Land 265 59% 8.058 65% 65%
Affordable Housing Land 10 2% 465 4% 4%
Total Development Land 275 61% 8,523 68% 68%
TOTAL 451 100% 12,480 100% 100%
INCOME VARIABLES
Months Rented 9
Total Monthly Rents S600
------------------------------------------------------
Sale to Farmer S74,000
APR Sale S166,000
Total Agricultural Land Sales S240,000
--------------------------------------------------------
Open Space Land Sales SO
------------------------------------------- -----------
Market Development Land Sales S210,975
Affordable Housing Land Sales S17.500
Total Development Land Sales S228,475
Other Income s0
EXPENSE VARIABLES
Purchase Price $310,000
--------------------------- -----------------------------
Financing Costs $56,000
Real Estate Taxes $5.500
Insurance S2,000
---------------------------- ----------------------------
Legal Services $19,000
Planning & Engineering $4,000
Surveying S10,100
Other Services SO
Total Professional Services $33,100
Staff Overhead 146,350
Other Expenses 120,925
SUBSIDY AND BENEFIT ASSUMPTIONS
Total Development Value 1319,000
Monthly Appreciation Factor 0.8%
Enhancement Premium 5.1%
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INCOME AND EXPENSE
INCOME Total Per Acre
Total Rental Income $5.400
Sale to Farmer 174.000 S420
APR Sale S166,000 S943
Total Restricted Agricultural Land Sales $240,000 SI,364
Open Space Land Sales SO so
Market Development Land Sales 8210,975 S796
Affordable Housing Land Sales 117,500 11,750
Total Development Land Sales S228,475 1831
Other Income so
TOTAL INCOME S473,875 S .051
EXPENSES Total Per Acre
Purchase Price S310.000 1687
Financing $56,000 $124
Real Estate Taxes $5.500 $12
Insurance $2,000 $4
Legal Services 119,000
Planning & Engineering 14,000
Surveying 110,100
Other Services so
Total Professional Services $33,100 $73
Staff Overhead 146.350 1103
Other Expenses 120,925
TOTAL EXPENSES $473,875 S11051
INCOME AND EXPENSES
+ TOTAL INCOME S473,875 S1.051
- TOTAL EXPENSES S473,875 11,051
SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) so SO
RETURN ON TOTAL EXPENSES 0.0%
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MARKET DEVELOPMENT LOT SALE SCHEDULE
Unappreciated Appreciated
Lot Sale Project Unenhanced Gross Unenhanced Enhancement Final Value
Designation Date Month Acres Value Appreciation Value Premium (Sales Price)
South B. C-1 2/87 14.6 S4.571 $705 $5,276 S270 $5,546
C-2, & C-3 19
North C 2/87 42.1 S29.713 S4,583 134,296 11,754 S36,050
19
North E 2/87 4.5 S13,714 S2,115 S15,829 $810 $16,639
19
Farmstead 4/87 8.4 S56.000 so $56,000 SO 156,000
21
North D 4/87 5.3 $12,240 S2,103 S14,343 1733 S15,076
21
North F & G 5/87 9.4 $22.153 S4.003 S26.156 S1.338 S27,493
22
North J, K. 10/87 23.9 S16.665 13,768 $20,433 $1,045 121,478
& L 27
South D-3 12/87 106,6 824.986 16,116 S31,102 11,591 S32,692
29
North B NOT YET SOLD 50.3
TOTAL 265.1 $180,042 $23,393 S203,435 17.540 S210.975
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SUBSIDY SOURCES
NON-DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY
Total Development Value $319,000
- Purchase Price S310,000
BARGAIN SALE SUBSIDY (to buyer) S9,000
AGRICULTURAL P ESERVATION RESTRICTION SUBSIDY
Total APR Sales S166,000
........-- =.. .= -. .= --- --  ---
OPEN SPACE SALE SUBSIDY
Ta ... ...-- ----- Sa S s S
Total Open Space Sales so
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDY SOURCES
ENHANCEMENT SUBSIDY
Total Enhancement Premium $7,540
----- =-----------. ------------------------------------
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY
Gross Appreciation $23,393
- Interest, Real Estate Taxes. & Insurance S63,500
+ Rental Income $5,400
--------------------------------------------------------
NET APPRECIATION SUBSIDY ($34,707)
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY
-=----------= . .. . .. . . . . .=------------- - - - - - - - - - --
Total Development Value $319.000
* Market Development Land Percentage 65%
Initial Value Development Land $205,970
Total Unappreciated. Unenhanced Value S180.042
- Initial Value Development Land S205,970
Gross Subdivision Subsidy ($25,928)
- Professional & Staff Costs $64.809
NET SUBDIVISION SUBSIDY (S90,737)
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SUBSIDY USES
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION
Total Development Value $319,000
* Agriculturally Restricted Percentage 32%
Development Value of Agricultural Land $101,144
+ Professional & Staff Costs $31,826
- Sale Price to Farmer $74,000
AGRICULTURAL PRESERVATION SUBSIDY USE $58.970
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION
Total Development Value S319.000
* Open Space Land Percentage 0%
Development Value of Open Space Land SO
+ Professional & Staff Costs so
OPEN SPACE PROTECTION SUBSIDY USE SO
AFFORDABLE ROUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION
Total Development Value $319,000
* Affordable Housing Land Percentage 4%
Development Value, Affordable Housing Land $11,886
+ Professional & Staff Costs $3,740
- Affordable Housing Sales 117,500
AFFORDABLE HOUSING LAND CONTRIBUTION USE ($1,874)
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SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES UMMARY
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Sources Value
Bargain Sale Subsidy S9,000 16% 3%
APR Subsidy S166.000 291% 52%
Open Space Sale Subsidy SO 0% 0%
Total Non-Development Subsidies S175,000 307% 55%
Enhancement Subsidy S7,540 13% 2%
Net Appreciation Subsidy (S34,707) -61% -11%
Net Subdivision Subsidy (S90,737) -159% -28%
Total Limited Development Subsidies ($117,904) -207% -37%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES $57,096 100% 18%
Percent of Percent of
Subsidy Total Development
SUBSIDY USES Actual Uses Value
Agricultural Preservation S58,970 103% 18%
Open Space Protection so 0% 0%
Affordable Housing Contribution (S1,874) -3% -1%
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES S57.096 100% 18%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S57,096
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES S57,096
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) SO
PERCENT OF SUBSIDY USES 0.0%
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APPENDIX E: SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES COMPARED
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SUBSIDY SOURCES AND USES COMPARED
BARTON FARM POWISSET FARM L00MIS FARM
TOTAL DEVELOPMENT VALUE $537,500 S2,800,000 S319,000
% of Total % of Total % of Total
Development Development Development
SUBSIDY SOURCES Actual Value Actual Value Actual Value
Bargain Sale Subsidy so 0% $392,730 14% S9,000 3%
APR Subsidy $200,350 37% $350,000 13% S166,000 52%
Open Space Sale Subsidy S99,650 19% $250,000 9% SO 0%
Total Non-Development Subsidies $300,000 56% S992,730 35% S175,000 55%
Enhancement Subsidy S24,755 5% S275,000 10% $10,000 3%
Net Appreciation Subsidy ($8,053) -1% $423,352 15% S13,398 4%
Net Subdivision Subsidy S40,105 7% S1,510,893 54% ($90,738) -28%
Total Limited Development Subsidies S56,807 11% $2,209,245 79% ($67,340) -21%
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S356,807 66% S3,201,975 114% S107,660 34%
% of Total % of Total % of Total
Development Development Development
SUBSIDY USES Actual Value Actual Value Actual Value
Agricultural Preservation $251,975 47% $1.676,190 60% $58,970 18%
Open Space Protection S114,740 21% S482,179 17% SO 0%
Affordable Housing Contribution SO Ox SO 0% (Sl,874) -1%
TOTAL SUBSIDY USES S366,715 68% $2,158,369 77% S57,096 18%
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or SHORTFALL
TOTAL SUBSIDY SOURCES S356.807 S3,201,975 S107,660
- TOTAL SUBSIDY USES S366,715 S2,158,369 $57,096
SUBSIDY SURPLUS or (SHORTFALL) ($9,908) S1,043,606 $50,564
PERCENT OF TOTAL DEVELOPMENT VALUE -1.8% 37.3% 15.9%
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